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ABSTRACT
It has long been accepted that changes in monetary policy have real economic effects;
however, the mechanism by which these policy changes are transmitted to the real economy
has been the subject of much debate. Traditionally the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy has consisted of various channels which include the money channel, the asset price
channel and the exchange rate channel. Recent developments in economic theory have led to
a relatively new channel of policy transmission, termed the credit channel. The credit channel
consists of the bank lending channel as well as the balance sheet channel, and focuses on the
demand for credit as the variable of interest. The credit channel is based on the notion that
demanders and suppliers of credit face asymmetric information problems which create a gap
between the cost of external funds and the cost of internally generated funds, referred to as
the wedge. The aim here is to determine the size and lag length effects of changes in credit
demand, by both firms as well as households, as a result of changes in interest rates. A
secondary, but subordinate, aim is to test for a balance sheet channel of monetary policy
transmission. A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is used in conjunction with causality
tests, impulse response functions and variance decompositions to achieve the stated
objectives. Results indicate that the interest rate elasticity of credit demand, for both firms
and households, is interest inelastic and therefore the monetary policy authorities have a
limited ability to influence credit demand in the short as well as medium term. In light of the
second aim, only weak evidence of a balance sheet channel of policy transmission is found.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Empirical literature on the monetary policy transmission mechanism has generally found that
there is a relationship between the actions of the central bank and the state of aggregate
demand within an economy. The mechanism through which the repurchase rate affects
aggregate demand has, however, largely been neglected, which has led to what has been
termed the “black box” of monetary policy transmission (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:27).
The primary purpose of the present study is to determine the size and lag length effects of a
change in interest rates and the resultant changes in the demand for credit by firms as well as
households. A second, but subordinate, aim of the study is to determine if a balance sheet
channel of monetary policy is operative in South Africa and possibly shed some light on the
“black box” of policy transmission. It is noted at the outset that the balance sheet channel is
one sub-channel of the broader credit channel of policy transmission; however, the focus here
is only on the identification of a balance sheet channel and not to determine which of the two
sub-channels is operative.
When considering the demand for credit by firms only short term credit demand will be
considered, but both short as well as medium term credit demand will be considered in
relation to households. Following Post-Keynesian theory an endogenous money supply is
assumed to operate within the economy and the demand for short term credit by firms is
influenced by factors which influence the working capital needs of firms. One implication of
assuming an endogenous money supply is that credit demand becomes the variable of interest
when analysing the transmission of monetary policy, rather than the demand for money as
has traditionally been used (Hannsgen in Arestis and Sawyer, 2006:205). The demand for
credit by households is influenced by factors such as consumption, income and expected
future income. Post-Keynesians focus on how a change in interest rates affects the demand
for credit because it is the demand for credit that is thought to be influenced by real variables,
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such as output. Real variables are the focus of attention rather than inflation, which is seen as
indirect and not of primary importance (Hannsgen, 2006:205).
Traditionally three main channels have been identified through which a change in interest
rates is thought to impact aggregate demand and output; these channels include the money
channel, the asset price channel and the exchange rate channel. More recently a credit
channel has been thought to transmit the effects of interest rate changes to the real economy.
The credit channel is made up of two sub-channels, namely the balance sheet channel and the
bank lending channel. Bernanke (1993:56) asserts “… that in addition to affecting short term
interest rates, monetary policy affects aggregate demand by affecting the availability or terms
of new bank loans”. According to theory surrounding the credit channel, specifically the
balance sheet channel, the effects that changes in monetary policy have on the economy are
magnified by endogenous changes in the external finance premium. The external finance
premium is the difference between the cost of raising capital externally (via debt or equity
markets) and the cost of a firms retained or internally generated earnings. Changes in the size
of the external finance premium will reflect the degree of asymmetric information present
within credit markets (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:28). When a central bank changes the
repurchase rate the value of a firm’s net worth will change and this change in net worth will
influence the interest rate at which a firm or household can access external funds, due to a
change in the external finance premium. A change in interest rates will therefore affect a
firm’s (and household’s) ability to access credit and, in turn, have an effect on aggregate
output.
Thus far the theoretical underpinnings of the credit channel are well known but empirical
results have been mixed (Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2009:677). There is a vast empirical
literature on the demand for money; however there are “surprisingly few studies on the
demand for bank credit” (Fase, 1995:99). Similarly Chrystal and Mizen (2005:119) note with
respect to the household demand for credit, “extensive literatures have developed over the
past 50 years or so on consumption and the demand for money. Credit on the other hand has
been largely neglected”.
There are several reasons why examining the size and lag length effects of changes in credit
demand as a result of changes in interest rates is important. Firstly, in today’s environment of
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rapid financial innovation it is important to know the size and lag length effects of a monetary
policy action and how this policy action is transmitted to real sectors of the economy.
Secondly, credit aggregates may be used to measure the stance of monetary policy and
finally, the balance sheet channel is closely related to the idea that banks occupy a unique
position in the economy because they can create deposits and should therefore be specially
regulated (Bernanke, 1993:57). The behaviour of bank lending may also provide some insight
into the behaviour of broad monetary aggregates that cannot be explained by the traditional
theory based on money demand, which may also have implications for monetary policy
(Cuthbertson, 1985:91).
The paper is set out as follows: chapter two discusses the traditional IS/LM model and the
transmission of monetary policy before discussing some more general as well as specific
problems with the traditional theory. Chapter three then introduces a more Post-Keynesian
view of the economy and discusses the theoretical underpinnings of an endogenous money
supply. Chapter four deals with the traditional IS/LM model and the assumption of perfect
information before dealing with the implications for monetary policy, chapter five then
presents an outline of the Post-Keynesian theory of consumption behaviour. Chapter six will
review the empirical work on an endogenously determined money supply, the balance sheet
channel of monetary policy transmission and household credit demand. Chapter seven
discusses the methodology and data used and chapter eight covers the results of the estimated
firm as well as household VAR models. A discussion follows in chapter nine and chapter ten
concludes.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE TRADITONAL IS/LM MODEL
AND AN ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the standard textbook IS/LM model has used the money view to describe the
mechanism by which a change in the repurchase rate by the central bank is transmitted to
aggregate output (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:44). Channelling of savings to investment is
done through the purchase of bonds, where the purchase of bonds is a function of the
speculative motive of liquidity preference. It will be argued that the traditional model is based
on two limiting assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that perfect information is present within
credit markets and secondly, that the money supply is exogenously determined and under the
control of the central bank. The assumption of perfect information in the IS/LM model leads
to the theoretical conclusion that savings are efficiently channelled into productive
investments, via the purchase of bonds, and thus a Pareto-optimal economic outcome is
achieved (Bernanke, 1993:52), while the assumption of an exogenous money supply
incorrectly leads a central bank to focus on targeting monetary aggregates as a means to
influence aggregate output through the use of open market operations. These two
assumptions are challenged here in that markets do not have perfect information and the
money supply is endogenously determined. Before dealing with the implications of an
endogenous money supply and asymmetric information a brief review of the traditional
model is presented with a specific focus on the LM side, i.e. the money and credit markets,
followed by a review of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
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2.2 THE TRADITIONAL IS/LM MODEL AND MONETARY POLICY
2.2.1 Introduction
Before challenging the mainstream assumptions underlying the IS/LM model a brief review
of these assumptions is necessary. This section is split into two subsections, the first dealing
with the theory underlying the traditional IS/LM model and the second briefly covers the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy which is thought to operate within the traditional
model.
2.2.2 A Review of the traditional IS/LM model
The textbook model of the Keynesian economy is usually explained in relation to three
equilibrium levels which include: the equilibrium between the level of aggregate demand and
aggregate output (C+I+G=Y), the equilibrium between the level of savings and investment
(S+T=I+G) and the equilibrium between desired and realised investment (Ir=I). It is through
the difference between desired and realised inventories that equilibrium is maintained. If
aggregate demand exceeds output there will be a shortfall in the level of inventories and a rise
in the level of output as firms employ additional resources to increase the level of production,
and vice versa. These equilibrium conditions can all be shown in aggregate demand and
income space.
The equilibrium level of output/ income is determined endogenously and it is assumed that
the level of investment, government spending and taxes are given (autonomous). A change in
any of the autonomous variables in the model will lead to a change in income which will, via
the multiplier effect, increase the level of savings within the economy to a higher level which
is just sufficient to finance the increase in autonomous spending and an induced increase in
consumption expenditure. The multiplier gives rise to a greater increase in the level of
income (output) for any given level of exogenous expenditure due to the “ripple effect”
(Froyen, 1996:96). This basic model does not, however, take into account the effects of
interest rates and money but can be extended to include the effects of interest rates and
money demand by using the now familiar IS/LM model developed by Hicks (1937).
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The IS curve is derived from independent savings and investment functions for given rates of
interest. The level of investment is a negative function of the interest rate and the level of
savings is positively related to income. The negatively sloped IS schedule shows equilibrium
levels of output such that savings is equal to investment at a given rate of interest. The
schedule has a negative slope because an increase in interest rates will lead to a reduction in
the present value of expected cash flows from a given investment and thus fewer investments
will be profitable (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1990:110-111). The LM curve gives points of
equilibrium between the demand for real money balances and the exogenously determined
money supply within the money market. More focus is given to the LM schedule than the IS
schedule because of the underlying assumption that the money supply is exogenously
determined. The discussion on the LM schedule will begin with the demand for money in line
with liquidity preference theory and next focus on the supply of money.
The demand for money is seen as a function of Keynes’s liquidity preference theory and
includes the transactions, precautionary and speculative demand for money. The speculative
motive is important for understanding the relationship between money demand, interest rates
and the channelling of savings to productive investments and as such will be the focus here.
The channelling of savings to profitable investments is done by the issuing of bonds by
deficit spending economic units and investors will purchase these bonds at some market rate
of interest. Keynes defined the speculative motive as “the object of securing profit from
knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth” (Keynes, 1936:170). In other
words an investor will make speculative funds available (decrease in money demand) when
he/she expects to make a profit from the purchase of a financial asset, given expectations
about future interest rate movements relative to some “normal” level, which is subjective to
every investor. According to this view the interest rate will change endogenously in response
to a change in liquidity preference and it is the demand for money that is the relevant
economic variable. It will be argued below that the focus on the demand for money in
traditional theory is misplaced as it is the demand for credit that is the more relevant
economic variable when analysing macroeconomic policy. This is due to the endogenous
nature of the money supply within a credit money economy.
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Mainstream Neo-classical theory assumes the money supply is fixed exogenously by the
central bank and controlled through the use of open market operations, which changes the
amount of money available for lending to consumers by the banking sector (Bernanke,
1993:55). This view of an exogenous money supply gives rise to the familiar vertical money
supply schedule and at any point on the LM curve money demand will equal the fixed money
supply. The conclusion reached is that the targeting of a monetary aggregate is the most
appropriate way to conduct monetary policy; however, the assumption of an exogenous
money supply does not hold in a credit money economy as the money supply is endogenously
determined and the central bank then seeks to control the price of credit by setting interest
rates rather than targeting an aggregate quantity of money. Equilibrium in the money market
will indirectly bring about equilibrium in the bond market, which is essentially a market for
surplus funds (Wells, 1983:523). This channelling of funds from investors to borrowers
happens efficiently because of perfect information.
The economy as a whole is in general equilibrium at the point where the IS curve (product
market) intersects with the LM curve (money market) in interest-income space. The
traditional model does not recognise any finance motive for credit demand and no banking
system is necessary to satisfy credit demand.  The role of convenience lending is also
obscured and, as a result, the supply process of credit money is ignored (Moore, 1988:321).
Monetary policy is assumed to work via the central bank’s use of open market operations
which will lead to an increase or decrease in the monetary base. The change in the monetary
base together with the money multiplier will influence the money supply and ultimately
aggregate output. It will be argued that the central bank targets the repo rate, and due to the
practice of liability management by banks the money supply is endogenously determined and
therefore the variable of interest should be the demand for credit rather than the demand for
money.
2.2.3 The IS/LM model and the transmission of monetary policy
The transmission of monetary policy within the traditional IS/LM model is best described as
the “money view” of policy transmission (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:44). The money view
theorises that, in order to change the level of aggregate demand within an economy, the
central bank will indirectly influence interest rates by “changing the supply of the medium of
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exchange relative to the demand” (Bernanke, 1993:55). Assume, for example, that the
monetary authorities pursued an expansionary policy action, increasing the money supply by
buying bonds from the banking sector and causing an excess supply of money. The excess
supply of money will then lower the rate of interest because people will attempt to reduce
their money holdings by buying bonds, thereby increasing bond prices and reducing rates of
interest. The drop in rates will stimulate investment demand, leading to an increase in income
and induced consumption expenditure. A new equilibrium is achieved when the fall in the
rate of interest and rise in income both increase money demand by an amount equal to the
larger money supply, via the speculative motive of liquidity preference. The process would
work in reverse if the central bank undertook a contractionary policy stance.
The money view is a combination of Keynesian and Monetarist theories; with Friedman
being one of the leading proponents of Monetarism, believing that monetary policy operates
in an economy which can be described by the quantity equation. The quantity equation states
that in the long run an increase in the money supply by the monetary authorities will
ultimately only have an influence on the general price level (inflation), assuming both
velocity and output are stable over the short run. This may also be expressed mathematically
as MV = PY where M is the exogenously determined money supply, V is the velocity of
money over some given period, P is the price level and Y is real output (Brewster, 1982:357).
Controlling the growth rate of the money supply is seen by the central bank as the primary
means by which to influence the growth rates of prices, wages and money income. The
textbook model sees monetary policy transmission as operating via the liability side of a
banks’ balance sheet through the central banks open market operations, and the effects this
has on the amount of base money the banking system holds (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox
1993:78).
The theoretical basis for an exogenously determined money supply is flawed because the
exogeneity of the money supply is based on the operation of a commodity money economy.
An exogenous money supply cannot be assumed to apply to a credit money economy,
discussed further in section 3.2.4 (Moore, 1988:3).
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2.3 GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITONAL MODEL
2.3.1 Introduction
The traditional IS/LM model was developed by Hicks (1937) and has become the framework
through which Keynesian economics is explained. The model is two dimensional and depicts
a Walrasian equilibrium between three markets incorporating Say’s law (Moore, 1988:319).
Hicks has since, however, noted that the monetary part of his model is not adequate because
the real and monetary sectors of the economy are independent of each other and the financial
structure which supplies credit money is ignored (Moore, 1988:321). This section discusses
three of the broader problems with the traditional theory, leaving more specific aspects to the
next section. The section begins with a discussion of the differences between commodity and
credit money economies and the implications this has for an exogenous money supply. Next
the common misconception that full employment would be achieved if wages and prices are
perfectly flexible (Pigou or real balance effect) is dispelled and finally a critique on the nature
of general equilibrium analysis is given.
2.3.2 Commodity versus credit money
The dominant view in economics is that money developed as a way in which to economise on
barter transactions and thus money served as a store of value as well as a medium of
exchange. Credits and debits followed the development of precious metal coins because these
precious metal coins were deposited with a custodian (early banker) and either a debit or
credit was issued, depending on whether an economic agent was borrowing money from the
custodian or lending money to the custodian. This view of the history of money sees money
as a commodity. Within commodity money economies the stock of money at any point in
time can be regarded as fixed exogenously and an independent supply and demand for money
relationship exists. Any increase in the money supply can come from a new gold discovery or
a balance of payments surplus (Moore, 1988:10). It will be seen that the dominant view
ignores the possible existence of an early central authority which had the power to enforce
tax laws and has been challenged on a number of grounds based on evidence suggesting that
credits and debits are at least two thousand years older than precious metal coins as well as
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evidence that early coin denominations were too high to have been used for early transactions
purposes (Tymoigne and Wray in Arestis and Sawyer, 2006:7).
Tymoigne and Wray (2006) have proposed an alternative history of money which recognises
the unit of account function of money and emphasises that money originated as a result of
debits and credits rather than as a way to economise on commodity holdings. Within this
framework the medium of exchange function becomes secondary as debits and credits can
exist without a medium of exchange (Tymoigne and Wray, 2006:1). It is argued that the
origins of debt can be traced back to past societies and took the form of tributes or fines to
other specific individuals. As debts were originally negotiated and settled between two
individual parties a key development in the history of money was the payment of individual
debts to a central authority using a standardised unit of account which eventually led to the
development of government taxation. According to this view it was the creation of a central
authority able to impose taxes and thereby place individuals in debt that led to the need for a
monetary unit, and not the utility maximising behaviour of individuals (Tymoigne and Wray,
2006:2). Fullwiler (2006:495) also notes that as long as tax liabilities must be settled in state
money there will be a demand for the state’s money to exist. Coins are then seen to have
developed as tokens used to measure debt (Tymoigne and Wray, 2006:8).
In this alternative interpretation of the history of money the monetary system did not start
with precious metals replacing pure barter economies; it is also incorrect to place too much
emphasis on the operation of a gold standard, which was only a brief deviation from the
normal historical monetary system of debits and credits, regulated by a central authority
(Tymoigne and Wray, 2006:12).
For current purposes the key point to note between a commodity money economy and a
credit money economy is that commodity money is an asset to its holder and there is no
accompanying liability, whereas credit money represents a financial claim with both an asset
and liability coming into existence when the financial claim is created (Moore, 1988:13). In
modern financial economies credit money is created when a financial institution (bank)
creates a liability against itself, and the supply of credit money is a function of the demand
for credit as borrowers attempt to increase money holdings by increasing their demand for
credit. The ability of a bank to create a liability against itself leads to an endogenously
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determined money supply, rather than the exogenous money supply assumed under a
commodity money economy (Moore, 1988:14).
2.3.3 Real balance effect
A common misconception about the Keynesian theory of aggregate demand is that full
employment will be achieved if wages and prices were perfectly flexible, assuming that the
marginal propensity to consume is greater than zero and the money stock is fixed. If prices
and wages were perfectly flexible then a decrease in the price level would, according to
traditional theory, raise the real incomes of economic units. The increase in real money
balances will lead to an excess supply in the money market as economic agents rebalance
their ratio of money holdings to income due to a stable transactions demand for money. The
excess supply of money that is generated by the price level reduction is spent on newly
produced goods and services as consumption expenditure increases and in this way full
employment equilibrium is maintained. This view again sees the economy as operating under
a commodity money paradigm and the argument does not apply when considering a credit
money economy (Brown, 1992:101). Moore (1988:14) notes that, when considering a credit
money economy, an excess supply of money is in fact not possible as any excess supply of
bank money is reduced simply by repaying bank credit.
Within a credit money economy both an asset and liability are created when a bank creates
money and thus any increase in the value of creditor’s assets will be accompanied by a
decrease in the wealth of debtors. The decrease in the net wealth of debtors increases the
likelihood of default because the real cost of debt increases and this increased probability of
default is not taken into account within the real balance effect framework. Thus a price
deflation may actually lead to a decrease in the net financial wealth of the aggregate economy
(Brown, 1992:103).
2.3.4 General equilibrium analysis
The traditional Neo-classical model above is built on both Say’s and Walras’ laws which
together lead to a full employment general equilibrium outcome, around which the economy
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will move over the long term. In order to arrive at a general equilibrium solution it is assumed
that a commodity economy is operative and thus economic agents can only exchange current
output for other current output, as in a barter exchange economy. Within a credit money
economy however entrepreneurs can borrow money to finance the production process and as
a result both Say’s law and Walras’ law do not hold as a credit money economy allows
aggregate expenditure to be greater than that allowed only by income (Moore, 1988:316).
The traditional IS/LM model (and all modifications) are all a set of simultaneous equations
models and leave no room for time in the decision making process of entrepreneurs, in
addition to leaving no place for uncertainty (Moore, 1988:324). Due to the problems of
measuring an individual’s expectations, uncertainty and given that economic events take time
to unfold there can be no unique future general equilibrium solution (Moore, 1988:324).
2.4 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE LM SCHEDULE
2.4.1 Introduction
In this section a discussion of the more specific problems with the IS/LM approach is
undertaken with a focus on the LM schedule, specifically the money supply and money
demand schedules which are used to construct the LM schedule. The money supply schedule
is discussed in terms of the money multiplier and the money demand schedule is analysed in
terms of the Keynesian liquidity preference. This IS schedule is left for a later section.
2.4.2 The LM schedule and monetary policy
In the traditional model the LM schedule is upward sloping because the money supply
schedule is vertical and is derived by varying the level of income (transactions demand for
money) relative to an exogenously fixed money supply. As discussed above in section 2.2.3,
Friedman’s quantity theory (MV=PY) states that an increase in the money supply by the
central bank will only lead to inflation given that velocity and output are fixed in the short
run. Monetary policy is conducted by influencing the money supply, via the high powered
monetary base and the accompanying money multiplier. Mathematically the relationship
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between the high powered money base, the money multiplier and the money supply can be
expressed as M = m x MB, where M is the money supply (as in the quantity equation), m is
the money multiplier and MB is the high powered monetary base (Brewster, 1982:169). In
this view it is the deposits of surplus economic units which are lent out to deficit units and the
money supply is increased by a multiple of deposits, therefore deposits create loans.
Traditional theory is built on the assumption of a commodity money economy; however, both
the concept of the money multiplier and the manipulation of the monetary base are flawed
when applied to a credit money economy and it will be shown below that loans actually
create deposits. Given that loans create deposits the traditional view of a vertical money
supply schedule loses its significance. The money demand schedule also loses its significance
when analysed within a credit money setting and each will be discussed in turn, beginning
with the money multiplier and monetary base and then turning to the demand for money.
2.4.3 The money multiplier and high powered money base
In the Neo-classical view of monetary policy a central bank will act to manipulate some
monetary aggregate and can achieve this by manipulating the high powered monetary base or
some component of the money multiplier. The money multiplier is made up of the ratio of
currency holdings to deposits and the ratio of bank reserves to total bank deposits (Brewster,
1982:202). It can be shown that when monetary policy is conducted in this way it may
actually act to cause large movements in interest rates, which is in opposition to the intended
outcome.
If monetary policy authorities undertake a tightening of monetary policy, for example by
increasing reserve requirements, an individual bank may either cut back on new lending or
sell marketable securities to cover any increases in legislated reserve requirements (Moore,
1988:79). A bank’s primary defence against insolvency due to a bank run is the sale of
marketable securities and banks therefore always maintain some minimum reserve level of
currency to ensure that it can meet all deposit obligations as they fall due (Moore, 1988:52).
The policy action will force banks to decrease their assets and liabilities by some multiple of
any shortage of high powered money, which will lead to a rise in interest rates. Any attempt
to control the monetary base would lead to volatile swings in interest rates as financial
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markets provide the liquidity for banks to adjust their portfolios, as the central bank will not
provide the base money (Moore, 1988:79). The multiplier approach is in direct contradiction
with reality and can be regarded as a mathematical identity which has no causal implications
for economic theory (Moore, 1988:85).
2.4.4 Money demand and liquidity preference
Keynes views the demand for money as a function of income as well as liquidity preference,
and the interest rate is seen to adjust endogenously to bring about equilibrium in the money
market. In Keynes’ original theory an investor will either be invested in all bonds or all
money. Two extensions to this theory came from Tobin (1956) and Baumol (1952) in an
attempt to modify the theory to explain why investors would hold money as well as bonds.
These models, however, still view economic agents as demanding money relative to a fixed
money supply and are thus holding onto commodity money principles. These are not the only
studies which make such an assumption as much research has sought to explain the effects of
financial innovation on the demand for money in light of Hicks’ (1937) IS/LM model.
The mainstream argument is that if alternative forms of payment develop then the central
bank will have a limited ability to influence interest rates by controlling banks’ reserve
balances (Fullwiler, 2006:495). One example is given by Wells (1983:526), who argues that
in modern financial economies there are a number of highly liquid short term assets which
pay interest and therefore dominate money as a store of value; accordingly, due to financial
innovation, there is no reason to hold any wealth in the form of non-interest bearing money
and the role of money becomes that of a medium of exchange, with all the implications of the
quantity theory (Wells, 1983:527). Another example of trying to apply commodity money
principles to a credit money economy is given by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993:45) who
suggest that control over shorter term rates of interest by the central bank, via the use of open
market operations, should diminish as close money substitutes become available due to
financial innovation becoming more prevalent. It will be argued that within a credit money
economy (endogenous money economy) liquidity preference as viewed by Keynes has no
relevance (Lavoie, 1992:193).
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Within an endogenous money economy the theory of liquidity preference no longer plays any
role in the determination of the market rate of interest (Lavoie, 1992:193). However Lavoie
(1992:193) still sees liquidity preference as playing a role, provided the definition of liquidity
preference is broadened to include all agents within the economy and all financial securities.
Three interest rates must be considered, which include a short term rate, a long term rate and
the central bank discount rate. The central bank sets the discount rate which reflects societal
factors which cannot be measured (Lavoie, 1992:193).  The spread between short and long
term rates is determined by investors and reflects preferences between liquid and illiquid
positions and represents preferences that cannot be explained. Interest rates are exogenous
and the liquidity preference of investors sets all market rates in relation to the discount rate
set by the central bank. Liquidity preference is seen to set the term structure of interest rates
and, if rates are not expected to change, there should only be a slight difference between short
and long term rates. In conclusion liquidity preference only plays a causal role in the short
run and no role in the long run (Lavoie, 1992:196).
2.5 SUMMARY
The traditional model developed by Hicks (1937) has been the standard framework by which
Keynesian economics has been taught. In this framework any increase in autonomous
spending will increase income by some multiple of the autonomous spending, and monetary
policy operates by influencing the high powered money base through the use of open market
operations and ultimately the money supply. The money supply is seen as exogenously
determined and under the control of the central bank in line with a commodity money
economy and the variable of interest in economic policy analysis is the demand for money
following Keynes’ liquidity preference theory. The traditional model suffers from a number
of shortcomings in that it assumes the operation of a commodity money economy, asserting
that the economy can achieve a state of general equilibrium and maintaining that the solution
to unemployment is price and wage flexibility.
Modern financial economies operate under a credit money paradigm and as such full
employment equilibrium may not be reached owing to the real world observations that
economic agents operate under conditions of uncertainty as well as the fact that economic
processes take time. Within a credit money economy the money supply is endogenously
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determined and the money multiplier no longer has any significance, while the concept of
money demand as theorised by Keynes’ liquidity preference still holds significance in that it
sets relative interest rates between short and long term financial securities. Given these
shortcomings a theory of the economy must be adopted which recognises the importance of a
credit orientated money economy, as found in the Post-Keynesian macroeconomic approach.
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CHAPTER THREE
A POST-KEYNESIAN VIEW OF THE IS/LM MODEL AND
ENDOGENOUS MONEY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A central tenet in Post-Keynesian macroeconomic theory is the endogeneity of the money
supply based on the implicit assumption of a credit money economy. The money supply
originates endogenously due to the demand for credit and the practice of liability
management by banks. Monetary policy is made effective by the targeting of interest rates by
central banks which in turn will influence the borrowing behaviour of firms and consumers.
Briefly, liability management allows banks to extend loans to firms or consumers in the retail
market and borrow any needed reserves in the wholesale money market. The resultant non-
independence of the savings and investment functions has implications for the income
multiplier process in the traditional IS/LM model.
This section begins by discussing the unique role played by banks in a credit money
economy. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of interest rates with the dominant
schools of economic thought. Finally the role of credit and increases in aggregate output is
discussed.
3.2 BANK INTERMEDIATION WITHIN A CREDIT MONEY ECONOMY
AND AN ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY
3.2.1 Introduction
It is argued here that the money supply is not exogenous because banks occupy a unique role
in the financial system due to their ability to create credit money. Banks serve a special role
within the financial system because bank deposits serve as a generally accepted means of
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payment for goods in most transactions, thus banks have the unique ability to monetize non-
negotiable primary market securities created when banks extend loans to borrowers (Moore,
1988:46). As a result the money supply schedule is horizontal rather than vertical and loans
are seen to create deposits.
3.2.2 Bank intermediation in a credit money economy (circuitist approach)
A prominent feature of Post-Keynesian macroeconomics is the theory underlying the practice
of bank liability management. The theory states that banks can borrow any funds needed to
meet minimum reserve requirements from the wholesale money market; this approach can be
closely related to the “circuit” or circuitist approach first proposed in eighteenth century
France. The circuit sees production as starting with bank advances and ending with the sale of
produced goods. This theory has influenced many writers, including Marx and Keynes, and
was more generally accepted in the second half of the twentieth century, as evidenced in the
French and Italian circuit theories as well as the Post-Keynesian approach (Gnos in Arestis
and Sawyer, 2006:87). The commonality between all three approaches is the belief that credit
money is necessary to accommodate production and is seen as both a financial as well as
monetary variable (Lavoie, 1992:151). This discussion will err on the side of the Post-
Keynesian school, where the granting of credit by banks to firms in order to start the
production process is what Keynes described as the finance motive and applies to both
consumption and investment goods (Lavoie, 1992:153). The need to borrow in the form of
credit in order to undertake production creates a discrepancy between a bank’s retail assets
and liabilities and wholesale assets needed to maintain a certain level of liquidity.
For simplicity it is assumed that banks use two inputs, retail and wholesale deposits, and two
outputs, retail and wholesale loans. In the retail market (both loans and deposits) banks are
seen as price setters and quantity takers because they set their deposit and loan rates and then
accept all cash forthcoming in the form of deposits as well as meet all loan demands up to a
set maximum credit limit, provided all minimum credit requirements have been satisfied
(Moore, 1988:57). Banks make a profit from the difference in the spread between deposit and
lending rates in line with their function as an intermediary (Moore, 1988:49). Retail bank
loans and bank overdrafts are priced on a floating rate of interest and a customer-specific
mark-up (or mark-down). Bank customers usually have prearranged lines of credit
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(overdrafts), with credit limits being a function of the interest rate, the borrower’s net worth
and any expected future income flows (Moore, 1988:295). Within the wholesale money
market, however, banks are seen as price takers and quantity setters. The wholesale assets of
banks are made up of marketable securities which act as a defence against any unexpected
withdrawal of deposits and serve to maintain the banks’ liquidity, thus marketable assets must
exceed required reserves (Moore, 1988:58).
Liability management allows banks to increase the level of their loans without having to sell
marketable securities in order to maintain minimum reserve requirements (Moore, 1988:27).
Banks can then extend credit to customers and borrow the additional money required to meet
any shortage in required reserves in the wholesale market, allowing banks to supply credit to
their customers almost indefinitely (Moore, 1988:52). The use of liability management has
led to an increase in the level of risk in commercial banking because banks increasingly
finance risky illiquid assets (bank loans) with an unstable, liquid liability structure (Moore,
1988:38). Any change in the cost of borrowing funds in the wholesale market will be passed
on to borrowers in the retail market and it is for this reason that the central bank implements
its’ monetary policy stance through the wholesale money market.
3.2.3 Wholesale money market and the operation of monetary policy
In the course of granting loans and taking deposits there is no reason for loans to equal
deposits in the retail banking market since borrowers and lenders are different economic units
and banks face a leakage of deposits (Moore, 1988:58).. Over the long run a bank will
attempt to maintain approximate equilibrium between the quantity of loans and deposits
through the adjustment of the respective interest rates. However, owing to the interest
inelasticy of short term credit demand and the stickiness of interest rates, the short term
adjustment of interest rates is not enough to keep approximate equilibrium between retail
loans and deposits. Over the short run deposit leakage will force a bank into the wholesale
money market to borrow funds in order to make up any shortage between outstanding loans
and the level of legislated required reserves (Moore, 1988:60). Any individual bank may be
either a net debtor or creditor in the wholesale market due to any net surplus or deficit in the
retail market as a result of new deposits and the granting of new loans. Banks with a net
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deficit must borrow any required funds in the wholesale market and the marginal cost of
funds to banks is then equal to the wholesale market rate (Moore, 1988:61).
It is in the wholesale money market that the central bank implements monetary policy by
ensuring that banks are always indebted to the central bank (Moore and Smit, 1986:83). As
already noted, legislation imposes certain required reserve ratios on banks to ensure the
liquidity of the banking system, and the central bank acts to set the wholesale rate at which
banks can borrow reserves to support any level of deficit incurred through their business of
granting credit, thereby allowing banks to maintain legislated reserve requirements (Lavoie,
1992:178). Banks can obtain the needed funds from two primary sources; the interbank
market or the central bank. The interbank market is a wholesale market in which banks can
lend surplus funds to deficit banks at the interbank-overnight rate in order to meet their
increased liabilities (retail loans) and is often cheaper than borrowing at the repurchase rate
from the central bank (Lavoie, 1992:161). The implication of the above analysis is that the
central bank will manipulate the repurchase rate in order to influence the borrowing
behaviour of retail borrowers, and the money supply is endogenously determined by the
demand for retail credit (this is left to the next section). As a result of liability management
and the existence of overdraft facilities, banks have a limited ability to control their rate of
loan expansion and thus view the volume of loans and deposits as non-discretionary variables
(Moore, 1988:51).
Within the Post-Keynesian framework of liability management, the mainstream view that the
central bank can influence the money supply via open market operations is only partially
correct because this view maintains that the marketable and non-marketable securities of
banks are homogenous. The central bank can increase the money stock via open market
operations but it cannot decrease the money stock in the same way due to the asymmetry
between marketable and non-marketable bank securities (Moore, 1988:28).  The traditional
conclusion that banks will adjust their ratio of loans and deposits to any changes in the high
powered money base assumes that banks behave like portfolio managers. Banks may only
adjust their asset and liability holdings at their own discretion if bank assets consist mainly of
marketable securities. If the Central bank wishes to increase the money stock it will buy
securities from the banking system and thereby increase the excess reserves held at the
central bank; however, excess reserves do not earn interest and banks will therefore purchase
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interest earning marketable securities. The central bank cannot, however, decrease the money
supply in the same way because banks cannot adjust their portfolios at their own discretion;
they hold a large amount on non-marketable assets such as consumer loans for which there
exists no secondary market (Moore, 1988:23). Attention will now turn to the creation of these
non-marketable assets and their role in an endogenous money economy.
3.2.4 Bank deposits and an endogenous money supply
It is the unique ability of a bank to create deposits, by creating a claim against itself, which
leads to the money supply being endogenously determined because banks are not limited to
creating deposits based on a limited amount of some physically available commodity, such as
gold. Keynes (1930:24) noted, however, that there is a limit to the level of deposits a bank
can create and that limit depends on the level of passively created deposits. If, however, a
closed banking system with no physical currency is assumed, such that all transactions are
done via cheque and banks do not hold any excess reserves, then theoretically there is no
limit to the amount of deposits a bank can create, provided they all work in tandem with each
other (Keynes,1930:26).
One of the major sources of the demand for bank credit comes from the short term working
capital requirements of firms. It is the productive activities of entrepreneurs and their
expectations of future effective demand that introduces money into the economic system, via
the creation of bank deposits, which in turn leads to income generation when these loans are
used to pay factors of production. This is why Post-Keynesians are more concerned with the
asset side of a banks’ balance sheet than the liability side because it is credit rather than
money by which deficient economic units bridge the gap between current income and current
expenditure (Lavoie, 1984:774). Moore (1983:538-539) notes, “The evidence suggests that
the quantity of bank intermediation is determined primarily by the demand for bank credit”.
The recognition that it is the demand for credit that leads to changes in the money supply
implies that it is the borrowing requirements of firms that will be the primary reason for any
changes in the money supply; however, it has been proposed that there may be other
important components of credit demand.
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Howells and Hussein (1999:441) recognise that the source of the endogeneity of money has
traditionally been the costs and volume of production determined by the current state of the
economy, and argue that the generally accepted meaning of the state of trade (costs and
volume of production) is too narrow. The meaning should be broadened because money is
required to finance all types of transactions and not just transactions on newly produced
goods. A second argument for a broader definition is because there has been a shift in the
components of credit demand as households have contributed to a greater portion of credit
demand in recent years (Howells and Hussein, 1999:442).
If it can be shown that the demand for credit is influenced more by total transactions than by
GDP then an endogenous money supply does not necessarily need to follow GDP, but rather
provides the additional liquidity required to finance extra production, and may have more of
an active role than traditionally thought (Howells and Hussein, 1999:442). Evidence
suggested that the demand for credit is better explained using a measure of total transactions
than a measure of spending on final output alone and thus credit may provide the additional
liquidity needed in the production process (Howells and Hussein, 1999:453).
Referring to the money supply as being endogenously determined implies that there is a
“reverse” line of causation to that asserted by the quantity theory as a banks cash reserve
holding will be some fraction of monetary liabilities, rather than some multiple of cash
reserves as in the traditional Friedman type analysis (Moore and Smit, 1986:83). Nell
(2001:314) analyses the money supply process in South Africa over the period 1966-1997,
breaking the period under review into two sub-periods ranging from 1966-1979 and 1980-
1997. The 1966-1979 period represents a more direct approach by policy authorities to
control credit growth and the money supply. Instruments used by the SARB included credit
ceilings, cash reserve requirements and interest rate controls (Nell, 2001:317). The 1980-
1997 period represented a shift by the SARB towards a more market orientated approach to
monetary policy (Nell, 2001:314).  Results suggest that the money supply was endogenously
determined over the whole period and the inability of the Reserve Bank to achieve monetary
growth targets is due to the endogenous nature of the money supply (Nell, 2001:325).
There is, however, some disagreement between proponents of the endogenous money
hypothesis as to the interest-elasticity of the horizontal money supply function. The two
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schools of thought can be broadly categorised into the horizontalist and structuralist schools,
to which the discussion turns next.
3.2.4.1 Horizontalists versus structuralists
There are two main branches of thought as to how a central bank is able to influence
aggregate demand and aggregate output under the Post-Keynesian notion of an endogenous
money supply. The first is the accomodationist position, which sees the loan supply schedule
of banks as being horizontal and the supply of credit completely satisfies the demand for
credit. The second branch is known as the structuralist position, under which there is a
positively sloped loan supply schedule such that both the demand for, and supply of, credit
determines the amount and price of new loans. The central bank can influence the supply
schedule using the discount rate, and the slope of the supply schedule is influenced by
policies of the central bank (Palley, 1991:398). The structuralist position focuses mostly on
the changes in the velocity of circulation (Garcia, 2006:37). Lavoie (1992:203) asserts that
this distinction is artificial as both descriptions, despite their disagreement of the interest rate
elasticity of loan supply, agree that the broad causation is from bank lending to growth in the
money supply, and not the reverse.
A key point to note within the theory of an endogenous money supply is that it is the
increased desire to buy more goods in each period by firms, households and governments that
induce entrepreneurs to borrow from the banking system. In what Davidson (2006: 146) calls
the “income-generating finance process” (it is the process by which entrepreneurs expand
investment, seek finance and thus generate income) the quantity of money in circulation is
always determined endogenously. The starting point is the recognition that loans create new
deposits as a desire on the part of borrowers to increase their current expenditure over current
income (Howells, 1995:92). Davidson (2006:141) sums up the endogenous money supply
argument when he says:
“Although mainstream economists have not given explicit recognition to Moore’s important contribution,
is fair to say that central bankers in the twenty-first century have discarded the exogenous money supply
concept and instead explicitly developed monetary policies that are more compatible with Moore’s
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endogenous money concept. Basil Moore deserves a niche in the Economist’s hall of fame for wresting
central bank policy from the dead hand of Friedman’s Monetarist analysis”
3.2.5 Post-Keynesians and interest rates: exogenous or endogenous, real or
monetary
Traditionally there have been three main theories of interest rate determination which include
the loanable funds theory, liquidity preference theory and the more recent horizontalist theory
(Smithin, in Arestis and Sawyer, 2006:279). The loanable funds theory is a classical theory
and makes use of the full employment assumption; the liquidity preference theory and the
horizontalist view are both Keynesian. The loanable funds theory will be covered here and
the more Keynesian views left to the next sub-section. The loanable funds theory is derived
from classical theory and views the real interest rate as being determined endogenously by
the equilibrium between savings (time preference) and investment (the marginal productivity
of capital) (Smithin, 2006:280). Classical economists saw the real interest rate as determined
by the interaction between real forces affecting the demand for, and supply of, a fixed amount
of available saving. The nominal rate of interest is determined by the real rate plus the
inflation rate (Moore, 2006:239). The interest rate prevailing at equilibrium is known as the
natural rate of interest, which is consistent with full employment (Smithin, 2006:280).
The loanable funds theory views the economy as that of a barter economy where the amount
of savings to finance investment is limited and as a result money is only seen as a means of
exchange between the buying and selling of real goods (Smithin, 2006:273). Within a credit
money economy however current production can be bought with bank credit and thus
economic agents are not restricted to a fixed savings constraint (Moore, 2006:240). Therefore
the loanable funds theory does not apply to a credit money economy and a more appropriate
theory must be found, leading to both the liquidity preference theory and the horizontalist
view of interest rate determination.
3.2.5.1 Liquidity preference theory and the horizontalist view
Keynes challenged the classical loanable funds theory by developing the liquidity preference
theory; however, the way in which the theory was presented in the IS/LM model did not
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adhere to the more philosophical components outlined by Keynes (Smithin, 2006:280). For
Keynes, interest rates are determined in the money market and are thought of as the rate at
which economic agents will part with liquidity in the face of uncertainty (Moore, 2006:241).
In the Hicksian (1937) IS/LM model the downward sloping money demand curve is a
function of liquidity preference and is presented alongside a vertical money supply function,
which is the result of Keynes’ assumption in the General theory that the central authority can
set the money supply (Moore, 2006:255). In this theory of interest rate determination the
interest rate adjusts endogenously to changes in liquidity preference and the interest rate is
seen as a monetary (rather than real) variable (Moore, 2006:256). In Keynes’ later writings he
acknowledged that the interest rate is an exogenous policy variable set by the central bank but
failed to differentiate between an endogenous and exogenous money economy in the General
theory, as the purpose of the General theory was to explain the theory of aggregate demand
(Moore, 2006:257).
Kaldor (1986) builds on the liquidity preference theory framework of Keynes and modifies
the approach to take into account an endogenously determined money supply (Docherty,
2005:142). Under this view the central bank is seen to determine a short term rate of interest
and provide all liquidity demanded (Docherty, 2005:168). It is argued that a higher level of
expenditures automatically creates the necessary saving to finance the higher expenditures
via Keynes’ income multiplier process (Docherty, 2005:150). The modified theory also took
into account the insight that in the short run savings may not equal investment and this
additional financing is obtained from the central bank (Docherty, 2005:168). This modified
theory allowed Kaldor (1986) to argue against the loanable funds position that higher
government borrowing will raise the level of interest rates and crowd out private investment
as well as explain why the economy may operate at below full employment (Docherty,
2005:152).
The crowding out of private investment occurs because the traditional IS/LM model assumes
that there is a fixed money supply and therefore a fixed supply of savings. One implication of
this analysis is that any attempt by government to increase spending financed by borrowing
will crowd out private investment spending because the increased demand for funds will
increase the endogenously determined interest rate. Within a credit based economy however
banks can create credit and as a result there is no fixed supply of savings constraint and thus
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there is no crowding out of private investment. When a credit money economy is
acknowledged a convincing argument can be made to increase government spending to
increase aggregate production (Lavoie, 1992:166).
The third school is the horizontalist school which extends Keynes’ insight that interest rates
are a monetary phenomenon and Kaldor’s endogenous money supply argument.
Horizontalists view the interest rate as being determined exogenously by the central bank and
the money supply then adjusts endogenously as economic agents adjust their levels of debt
due to any change in the price of credit (Smithin, 2006:281). The horizontalist school differs
from Kaldor’s (1986) modified liquidity preference theory in one important respect in that
there is no income multiplier process operative to ensure savings will equal investments,
discussed below in section 3.3.2
3.3 THE ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY AND AGGREGATE OUTPUT
3.3.1 Introduction
Within a credit money economy it is the expectations of entrepreneurs as to the future state of
effective demand that injects money into the economy based on hiring and production
decisions. Thus, for the economy to reach a steady state of growth, entrepreneurs must expect
a constant rate of growth in effective demand into the future and also that these expectations
are consistently realised (Davidson, 1972:111). It is the expectations of increases in profits
which will encourage entrepreneurs to undertake net investment; however, these expectations
are not likely to be realised in the long run due to an uncertain future and as a result the
economy will follow a “wobbly” growth path (Davidson, 1972:114). If total aggregate
demand is to increase over time then it is necessary for economic agents to deficit-spend and
by implication there must be an increase in the net assets and liabilities for the whole
economy (Moore, 1988:297). The increase in net assets and liabilities is achieved via the
ability of banks to grant credit by creating a deposit against themselves, and this has
implications for the traditional assertion that the savings and investment functions are
independent as well as rendering the income multiplier process inapplicable.
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3.3.2 Increases in aggregate demand
For total aggregate demand to increase over time there must be a net increase in financial
assets and liabilities for the whole economy and this requires economic agents to deficit-
spend, resulting in a higher level of aggregate demand relative to last period’s income
(Moore, 1988:297). The increase in aggregate demand does not necessarily lead to a
reduction in unemployment and it is possible to have a situation in which there is growth in
aggregate demand but no growth in employment due to, for example, technological
improvements which increase productivity at the expense of labour (Davidson, 1972:116).
There are two possible sources of funds that can be used for deficit spending, the first being
drawing down previously accumulated money balances, either by spending directly or by
borrowing from non-bank intermediaries. The second is the creation of new money balances
by banks which result from the purchase of new or existing financial assets. Banks can be
contrasted to nonbank intermediaries in that nonbank intermediaries channel a fixed amount
of surplus savings to deficit units and no new credit money is created. Banks on the other
hand have the unique ability to monetise non-marketable debt (Moore, 1988:295).The
contrast between bank and non-bank intermediaries has important implications for the
balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission under conditions of asymmetric
information and this point will be returned to in the next chapter.
If an economic unit borrows money from a bank in order to purchase goods and services then
there will be an increase in the level of income of the seller (Moore, 1988:296). The increase
in deposit balances at banks by producers as a result of sales is known as “convenience
lending”.  This does not require a simultaneous act of voluntary savings because bank money
is generally accepted as a means of payment and there is no sacrifice of current consumption
that needs to be rewarded. The accumulation of bank deposits by sellers does not represent a
decision to save, and such convenience lending may be short term for an individual; however,
for the economy as a whole convenience lending is long term and lasts as long as the net
increase in the money stock (Moore, 1988:298). The idea of convenience lending is closely
related to Keynes’ finance motive in which an increase in the level of spending is financed by
an increase in the demand for additional liquid resources (Wells, 1981:586).
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Firms require credit mainly to finance increases in working capital and the level of working
capital finance is for the most part independent of the supply of savings in an economy. The
new working capital finance needed to increase production comes from the increase in bank
credit financed by depositors’ increase in convenience lending to the banking system (Moore,
1988:299). The recognition of convenience lending has implications for both the savings and
investment schedules as well as the income multiplier process within the IS/LM model.
As pointed out by Moore (1988), the supply of bank credit for investment purposes is
independent of the supply of savings. The demand for credit is a function of the expectations
of entrepreneurs as to the future state of the economy and the investment schedule can be
drawn as a horizontal line in interest-savings space (Moore, 2006:292).Since the saving to
finance the new investment is created when the loan is created there is no independent supply
of savings schedule and thus the savings schedule falls away (Moore, 2006:293). The
simultaneous creation of a deposit (savings) and loan (investment) by a bank when extending
credit to the private sector means that an autonomous increase in investment does not lead to
an equal amount of savings created via an increase in household income and the income
multiplier process. Instead the savings are created when the loan is granted and thus the
multiplier process plays no role (Docherty, 2005:197).
3.4 SUMMARY
From the above discussion it can be seen that there are serious theoretical deficiencies in the
mainstream IS/LM model. First dealing with the IS curve, it was shown that the investment
and savings schedules are not independent and as a result the Keynesian income-savings
multiplier does not have any significance because investment creates its own savings when
banks create deposits (Moore, 2006:295).
Moore (2006:295) notes there can never be an equilibrium combination of investment and
savings that brings about equilibrium in the product market and the traditional investment
saving relationship “should be banished from the textbooks”.  The role of the IS curve
becomes that of a downward sloping aggregate demand schedule due to the inverse
relationship between aggregate investment and the rate of interest (Moore, 2006:295).
Secondly, the LM curve suffers from the severe criticisms that the money supply is not
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exogenously determined and that the central bank does not target monetary aggregates in
practice. There is also a reduced role for liquidity preference in terms of money demand.
The above leads to the conclusion that there is in fact no IS schedule because the construction
thereof is not consistent with endogenous money principles. Similarly the LM curve is no
longer upward sloping because the central bank sets the discount rate which influences all
other rates and therefore the interest rate is determined exogenously and not endogenously.
The LM curve then becomes a horizontal line (Moore, 2006:297). Moore (2006:297) sums up
the analysis when he says “the IS-LM diagram should be banished from the textbooks as a
confused GE fantasy.”
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF ASSYMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE
CREDIT CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This section will begin with an overview of the traditional IS/LM model in terms of the
channelling of savings to investment under the assumption of perfect information. Next the
credit channel and the transmission of monetary policy is discussed. Thirdly, attention is
focused on an influential paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), which extends the
traditional IS/LM model and accounts for asymmetric information. Following this another
influential paper by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) is considered which specifically focuses on
the effects of asymmetric information, the balance sheet channel of policy transmission and
the effects the balance sheet channel may have on firms of different size within an economy.
4.2 THE TRADITIONAL IS/LM MODEL AND ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
4.2.1 Introduction
The traditional IS/LM model described in the second chapter assumes that markets are
complete and therefore information is perfect. The assumption of perfect information was the
dominant paradigm among the economics profession during the 1970’s (Bernanke, 1993:52).
One of the major works to come out of this school of thought was a paper by Modigliani and
Miller (1958) which showed that under a number of simplifying assumptions, including that
of perfect information, economic decisions by firms depend only on the level of technology
within an economy as well as consumer tastes and preferences. The implication of these
simplifying assumptions is that the decision as to how and what to produce does not depend
on the capital structure of the firm. Thus how much debt to equity a business undertakes in its
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financial operations, and whether this financing is obtained in either the debt market (directly
or indirectly) or equity market is irrelevant. The traditional approach implicitly assumes that
non-money assets such as government bonds, commercial paper, equities and bank loans
(among others) are perfect substitutes, lumped into the category “bonds” and treated as
homogenous (Bernanke, 1993:55).
A firm can therefore choose to borrow directly in the money market or indirectly via a
financial intermediary and the only relevant decision in which type of debt to use is the
relative cost of the funds borrowed. Perfect substitutability between different forms of debt is
however not realistic because economic agents do not have perfect information within credit
markets and it is this asymmetry of information which gives rise to the credit channel of
monetary policy.
4.2.2 Asymmetric information and the credit channel of monetary policy
transmission
During the 1970’s there was an internal shift within the economics profession due to a new
theory of imperfect markets which later became known as the theory of asymmetric
information. The theory of asymmetric information is concerned with the financial structure
of a firm and the effect this has on economic activity (Mishkin, 1991:70). The theory focuses
on differences in information between different parties to a contract. Borrowers have an
informational advantage over lenders which results in adverse selection and moral hazard
problems, and it is asymmetric information that gives rise to the credit channel of monetary
policy transmission.
First, adverse selection arises if a lender cannot tell the difference between good and bad
quality borrowers. If this happens the lender will make a loan at a rate which reflects the
average quality of all borrowers. An implication of this average rate charged on loans is that
high quality borrowers may drop out of the market because the average loan rate is too high
and thus profitable investment projects may not be undertaken, leaving a proportionally
higher level of bad quality borrowers (Mishkin, 1991:71). Secondly, moral hazard arises
when borrowers have an incentive to engage in risky activities that may benefit the borrower;
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however, these risky activities increase the probability of default which may harm the lender.
Moral hazard is seen to affect the efficiency of financial markets (Mishkin, 1991:72).
The credit channel focuses on the channelling of savings by economic agents to the most
productive investments, taking into account asymmetric information within credit markets as
well as the effects that asymmetric information has on the amount of credit a firm can access.
This is particularly relevant if an endogenous money economy is assumed, because firms
must first borrow money in order to undertake production.
4.2.3 Implications of asymmetric information
One implication of asymmetric information within credit markets is that transactions between
borrowers and lenders based only on price (the interest rate) are unlikely to lead to a Pareto-
optimal outcome and the development of institutions may be required to mitigate the
asymmetric information problems to arrive at a fair price (Bernanke, 1993:52). Whenever a
borrower takes out a loan an asymmetric information problem exists and the incentives of the
borrower must be aligned with that of the lender. The cost of aligning as well as monitoring
the incentives of management or borrowers are known as agency costs, and it is these costs
which give rise to the external finance premium (discussed below), defined as the difference
between the cost of external funds and the cost of internally generated funds (Bernanke,
1993:54).
Credit markets have developed a number of ways to help minimise the degree of asymmetric
information. One solution comes in the form of financial contracts which have developed to
limit moral hazard incentives on the part of the borrower by the lender. Another solution to
the asymmetric information problem is the information gathering and monitoring activities of
financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries gather information on the creditworthiness
of borrowers as well as monitor their activities, and both functions serve to reduce the level
of asymmetric information between borrower and lender. Financial intermediaries are suited
to this purpose because of factors such as economies of expertise, economies of scope and
economies of scale. It has been suggested that banks play a particularly important role in the
economy because they channel savings from relatively uninformed economic agents to uses
that are information-intensive and hard to evaluate (Bernanke, 1993:53)
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Asymmetric information has two effects when considered in relation to credit markets. The
first effect is the wedge created between the cost of uncollateralisable external funds and the
cost of funds generated internally through retained earnings. This wedge is otherwise known
as the premium for external funds, which can be thought of as the cost of monitoring and
evaluating the creditworthiness and actions of a borrower by lenders. The second effect of
asymmetric information is the indirect relationship that is created between the value of
collateralisable debt to loan size and the premium for external funds. If, for example, the
lender contributes a greater amount of collateral, then for a given loan size the smaller will be
the premium for external funds because there will be a smaller incentive on the part of the
borrower to misrepresent information to lenders (this is the basic idea behind the balance
sheet channel by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) below).
Studies on the effects of asymmetric information within financial markets have shown results
in line with theoretical predictions, assuming a range of informational structures. The balance
sheet channel of policy transmission arises because of asymmetric information and can be
thought of as having an effect on the net worth of a borrower through economic disturbances.
It is the change in net worth which will affect a borrower’s access to credit, via the external
finance premium, and this increased inability to access credit will have real economic
consequences via output fluctuations (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:48).
4.3 THE BROAD CREDIT CHANNEL AND THE TRANSMISSION OF
MONETARY POLICY
4.3.1 Introduction
The credit channel is a relatively new channel of policy transmission and is made up of the
bank lending channel as well as the balance sheet channel. The credit channel is concerned
with the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet, in line with Post-Keynesian theory, and affects
output through changes in a firm or households ability to access credit. The discussion will
briefly cover the general theory relating to the credit channel and then focus on the balance
sheet channel.
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The credit channel is primarily concerned with the demand for credit, rather than the demand
for money as in the traditional money view of policy transmission. This should not, however,
be taken to imply that the credit channel is opposed to the money channel; rather the credit
channel is seen as complimenting the money, exchange rate and asset channels of monetary
policy transmission (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:28). The credit channel recognises that
credit markets do not operate with perfect information and thus different categories of assets
and liabilities are not perfect substitutes, which implies that banks occupy a unique role in the
financial system. The ability of banks to reduce asymmetric information is seen in their
ability to provide credit at lower cost than would otherwise be the case, which is the primary
reason that the majority of firms use banks as their credit provider rather than entering the
market for direct credit. The credit market is considered efficient if the costs of credit creation
are minimised and the market is channelling an economy’s funds into the most productive
uses (Bernanke, 1993:51).
The credit view hypothesises that monetary policy has an effect on real output by changing
the terms of new bank loans and thereby affecting a firms (or households) access to credit;
this effect on new bank loans is in addition to the effect the central bank has on short term
rates and the resulting influence on output (Bernanke, 1993:56). An important implication of
the dependence of economic agents on indirect access to credit, via banks, is that a
disturbance to the flow of bank credit has important consequences for real output. The credit
view sees monetary policy as having an effect by influencing the flow of bank credit (Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1993:45). As noted, the credit channel is comprised of the bank lending
channel as well as the balance sheet channel of policy transmission; in light of these two sub-
channels the discussion will begin with a brief discussion of a paper by Bernanke and Blinder
(1988) which incorporated asymmetric information into the traditional IS/LM model and
more recent research on the bank lending channel. Following this attention will turn to the
balance sheet channel and its role in policy transmission.
4.3.2 Extending the IS/LM model and the credit channel of policy transmission
Bernanke and Blinder (1988:435) extend the basic Keynesian IS/LM model by taking into
account the heterogeneous nature of bank assets and bank liabilities and thereby take into
account asymmetric information. A graphical representation of the extended model shows a
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negatively sloped “CC curve” (commodities and credit curve) which gives points of
equilibrium between the money and loan markets. The Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model is
discussed because it was one of the first models to incorporate the presence of asymmetric
information within credit markets into the Neo-classical IS/LM model; however, the model is
based on the assumption of an exogenous money supply and thus the transmission of
monetary policy occurs through changes in the amount of bank reserves (the bank lending
channel) which are directly under the influence of the central bank. This is evident in the
model’s use of the money multiplier through which the central bank influences the reserve
base of the banking system (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988:436).
In modern financial economies a central bank will predominantly set the level of a short term
nominal interest rate, rather than target a monetary aggregate, and thus the idea of a money
multiplier no longer has any significance (Disyatat, 2010:5). In a credit money economy the
money supply is endogenously determined and thus Bernanke and Blinder (1988) are
adhering to the traditional IS/LM model described in chapter two. Recent research by
Disyatat (2010) however argues for the existence of a bank lending channel that is in line
with Post-Keynesian endogeneity theory.
Disyatat (2010:2) argues that there is indeed room for a bank lending channel within an
endogenous credit money economy by arguing that an alternative interpretation of the bank
lending channel is that the cost of borrowing funds in the money market will lead to changes
in the supply of bank lending. It is noted that loans drive deposits and that the money
multiplier is a flawed concept in a credit money economy, in line with Moore (1988). It is
also recognised that there is no exogenous limitation to the supply of bank credit except
through regulatory requirements, and that the banking system can always fulfil the demand
for loans in line with a horizontalist approach. In this alternative approach it is the changes in
the underlying values of bank assets and bank liabilities as well as changes in risk perceptions
of lenders to banks in the money market which transmit changes in monetary policy
(Disyastat, 2010:2).
The bank lending channel is seen to operate through changes in the external finance premium
faced by banks when seeking to acquire funds to cover any shortfalls in loans according to
regulatory requirements in the money market. The external finance premium is a function of
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the balance sheet strength of the firm and comes about as a result of asymmetric information
(Disyastat, 2010:8). Disyatat (2010:8) notes “The underlying mechanism at work is thus
largely one and the same as that of the balance sheet channel. But instead of focusing on the
impact of policy on financial frictions at the firm level, the emphasis is instead on the bank
level”. The model is developed by focusing on policy induced changes in a bank’s cost of
external funds and not changes in the supply of funds, therefore a bank lending channel is
plausible even when banks have full access to money markets (Disyastat, 2010:8). A change
in interest rates by the policy authorities will be transmitted via changes in required rates of
return and not through changes in the quantity of deposits, which is in line with Moore’s
(1988) argument that interest rates are exogenous, as discussed above. The only limitation to
credit expansion is bank capital in that it affects a bank’s assets expansion and investors’
perceptions about the riskiness of investing with the bank (Disyastat, 2010:9).
In light of the theoretical complexity of the balance sheet versus bank lending channel of
policy transmission, a full discussion and review is outside of the scope of the study. The
focus here will be on testing for a balance sheet channel of policy transmission from the
viewpoint of the firm and no attempt is made to distinguish between the two channels. Either
a balance sheet channel is operative at firm level, or it is not.
4.3.3 The balance sheet channel and an endogenous money supply
The balance sheet channel is concerned with the channelling of funds to productive
investments, while taking into account the heterogeneous nature of assets and liabilities as a
result of asymmetric information. Given that asymmetric information is present within credit
markets the channelling of funds to productive investments may not be done as efficiently as
predicted by the traditional IS/LM model, and may even break down, which will lead to
changes in output and employment due to changes in investment spending (Bernanke,
1993:51).
The balance sheet channel is otherwise known as the “propagation mechanism” (Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1993:47) or the “financial accelerator effect” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989:28)
because the balance sheet channel is a mechanism which amplifies the impact of economic
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disturbances to a borrower’s spending decisions by altering an economic agents net worth via
changes in the values of assets and liabilities on their balance sheet. The change in net worth
will in turn affect the premium for external funds charged by lenders (the bank) in a way that
will magnify the impact of a shock to the economy, which implies that it is the level of
liquidity that effects investment spending (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:48).
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) wrote an influential paper on the role of a borrower’s balance
sheet over the business cycle. The objectives of the study were twofold; firstly to analyse the
connection between the relative strength of a borrower’s balance sheet and changes in agency
costs (monitoring costs), and secondly to determine if the connection between the net worth
of an economic agent and the level of agency costs is a factor that influences the business
cycle (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989:16). It is assumed that it is costly for lenders to monitor
the activities of borrowers and it is this assumption which makes the Modigliani-Miller
theorem inapplicable, because information is not perfect and the role that financial factors
play in the production of output becomes important (Gallegati, 2005:1925). These monitoring
costs result in a higher cost of external finance relative to internally generated finance, such
as retained earnings, because when asymmetric information is present in credit markets the
equilibrium reached by the market will not be Pareto-optimal (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989:14).
Results suggest that a borrower’s balance sheet plays an important role in the business cycle.
A key insight is that agency costs involved in the undertaking of physical investments are
inversely related to net worth. Another insight is that the agency costs which should be
accounted for when analysing the relationship between different economic variables (such as
investment and lending) go further than only those of monitoring costs, and should include
any deviation from a Pareto-optimal outcome within the credit market (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989:28).
The traditional IS/LM model views savings as being channelled into productive investments
through the selling of bonds by deficit economic units and the required level of savings is
generated by the income multiplier so that savings is equal to investment. As argued above,
the investment and savings relationship is not independent because the required level of
savings is generated when credit is granted by the banking system in the form of loans, thus
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the Keynesian income multiplier no longer plays any role. The balance sheet channel is still
seen to play a role within the Post-Keynesian theory in that banks will grant new credit to
borrowers based on the strength of their balance sheets by adjusting either the loan rate,
collateral requirements or both. Thus a change in a borrower’s balance sheet strength will
lead to changes in aggregate demand as a result of changes in the ability to access credit.
4.3.3.1 Implications of the balance sheet channel
One of the implications of this analysis is that financial accelerator effects are stronger the
deeper the economy is in recession because the ability of a firm to fund investment projects
out of internally generated funds is at its lowest. A second implication is that there will be a
“flight to quality” in credit markets because investors will shift their wealth into safer assets
during an economic downturn and these safe assets include only larger, more well-
established, firms with a large amount of collateral (Bernanke et al, 1996:4). The impact of
the balance sheet channel on the access to credit will be larger for smaller borrowers, under
the expectation that differences in the cyclical behaviour of firms should differ between firms
depending on their ability to access credit (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994:310). One possible
reason for this is that small firms have higher bankruptcy costs due to the proportionately
greater fixed costs associated with evaluation and monitoring by the lender. Another possible
reason is that large borrowers have a greater amount of collateral to pledge than smaller
firms. Small borrowers rely mostly on internally generated funds, as well as indirect debt, for
the financing of a new project; large firms also have access to direct forms of credit in
addition to indirect forms of credit (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:49).
Assume, for example, that the monetary authority undertakes a tightening of monetary policy
by increasing the repo rate. This increase in rates will increase the cost of external funds
faced by any firm because the value of liabilities increases and the value of assets decreases,
which in turn decreases the value of collateral that can be put up against any loans. This leads
to an increased inability on the part of an economic agent to access credit for working capital
or investment purposes because the firm is now seen as more likely to default if a loan is
granted. The increased inability of the firm to access credit to begin production will have real
economic effects because the firm will lack access to credit in order to pay the factors of
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production needed to produce output. A credit hierarchy will emerge within debt markets and
firms may be forced to give up on investment projects which have a positive net present value
because of financing constraints (Gallegati, 2005:1925). Firms and households will therefore
have more limited access to credit when the net position of their balance sheets is relatively
weaker.
4.4 SUMMARY
The traditional IS/LM model assumes that information is perfect; however, during the 1970’s,
there was a shift in economic thought towards a recognition that markets are not perfect and
are characterised by imperfect or asymmetric information. An implication of imperfect credit
markets is that transactions based only on price are unlikely to lead to a Pareto-optimal
outcome. It is asymmetric information that gives rise to the credit channel of monetary policy
transmission and the credit channel is made up of the bank lending channel as well as the
balance sheet channel; the focus here is on the balance sheet channel.
The balance sheet channel is otherwise known as the “propagation mechanism” or the
“financial accelerator effect” because it magnifies the effects of an economic shock by
altering an economic agent’s net worth. The main implication of the balance sheet channel is
that there will be a flight to quality and a credit hierarchy will emerge between small and
large firms as investors move towards safer assets. The flight to quality will make it harder
for small firms to access credit in order to undertake production and thus the balance sheet
channel may have real economic consequences.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LITERATURE REVIEW OF CONSUMTPION BEHAVIOR
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Post-Keynesians have made few efforts to describe the process of consumer choice. There are
however a number of papers that, taken together, form a coherent picture on consumption
behaviour (Lavoie, 1994:539). Post-Keynesians do not accept the traditional Neo-classical
principles of utility maximisation and rational expectations but instead propose an approach
that is based more on psychological and philosophical than on economic grounds. The
sections begins with an overview of some of the more important theoretical flaws in
mainstream microeconomic theory, including rational expectations, utility maximisation,
uncertainty as well as the concept of general equilibrium. Following this an alternative theory
to consumer behaviour is proposed, in line with Post-Keynesian thought.
5.2 NEO-CLASSICAL ANALYSIS AND KEYNES
5.2.1 Introduction
As mentioned above in section 4.2.2, there was a shift in economic thought around the late
1960’s to the early 1970’s, from a predominantly Keynesian approach in the early sixties to a
predominantly New-classical approach in the late seventies. The shift from Keynesian
economics to New-classical economics can be attributed to a rise in inflation and
unemployment as well as a change in economic methodology over the period (Ackerlof,
2007:5). New-classical economists use a macroeconomic theory that makes policy
prescriptions on the basis that firms seek to maximise profits and consumers utility. The
theory is built on five separate neutrality ideas which include, firstly, the life-cycle/permanent
income hypothesis in which consumption does not depend on current income. Secondly, the
Modigliani Miller theorem which states that current profits have no effect on investment,
thirdly, the natural rate theory, fourthly, the rational expectations hypothesis and finally the
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Ricardian equivalence theorem, in which taxes and deficit spending do not influence
consumption. These ideas were in contrast to Keynesian ideas and offered radically different
policy prescriptions. The new theory emphasised economic equilibrium of competitive
markets under conditions of perfect information, regardless of an individual’s preferences
(Ackerlof, 2007:6). The aim of this section is to give a brief overview of Neo-classical
economics and its relation to consumption, and is broken down into three broad sections
which include individual expectations, utility maximisation and risk versus uncertainty.
5.2.2 Individual expectations
Neoclassical theory states that all endogenous variables can be explained as the result of
rational choices made by economic agents to maximise utility (Boland, 1979:959). Gerchev
(2007:313) has defined expectations as “the unobservable opinions about the future that
individuals form in their minds” and has identified two mainstream economic theories of how
individuals form expectations, namely those formed based on adaptive expectations and those
based on rational expectations. Both theories are fundamentally flawed as adaptive
expectations does not, in fact, deal with expectations and rational expectations does not
recognise the human element behind the economic consumer. Under adaptive expectations an
individual’s expectation of future prices is equal to an arithmetic average between the current
realised price and the previous period’s price (Gerchev, 2007:314). According to this
approach it is only the value of past prices that influences supply and thus the forward
looking behaviour of suppliers is lost. Therefore under adaptive expectations history affects
the future rather than expectations (Boland, 1979:315). With the loss of the significance of
expectations under the adaptive expectations hypothesis an alternative theory of expectations
formation has been widely adopted, that of rational expectations.
Under the rational expectations hypothesis an individual is assumed to use all relevant
information when formulating expectations about future economic phenomena. The original
definition of a rational person provided that an individual’s expectation, on average, must
coincide with economic theory because there is a profit to be made from possessing
specialised knowledge about the economy and theory is a good description of reality
(Gerchev, 2007:317). This meaning has since been expanded into a number of different
interpretations; however, for present purposes only an individual’s beliefs about the future are
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always correct (Gerchev, 2007:318) need be acknowledged. The rational expectations
hypothesis ultimately comes down to the assumption that thoughts determine reality
(Gerchev, 2007:324), which is not the case and a better theory of expectations formation must
be found.
A consumer will endeavour to maximise his level of utility given any expectations about
future economic variables and these expectations lead to the theoretical conclusion that
monetary policy is neutral within a rational expectations framework because any change in
the money supply by the central bank (exogenous money) will be correctly anticipated by
economic agents and wages, as well as prices, will change in proportion to the change in the
money supply. Wages and prices change in proportion because both are assumed perfectly
flexible and economic agents have perfect information on all wages and prices. Thus
monetary policy has no effect on the stability of the macro-economy (Ackerlof, 2007:8).
5.2.3 Utility maximisation
The five ideas of neutrality identified with the Neo-classical view are based on the
assumption that individuals seek to maximise utility according to their rational and therefore
correct expectations (Ackerlof, 2007:8). Mainstream microeconomics views consumers as
rational agents who behave according to six axioms which include completeness, transitivity,
reflexivity, non-satiation, continuity and convexity, and it is these six axioms which give rise
to the familiar continuous, convex indifference curves seen in most textbooks. The utility
function is then added to these well behaved indifference curves and the rational person is
assumed only interested in maximising utility (Drakopoulos, 1990:183).
Neo-classical theory assumes that all endogenous variables can be explained by the utility
maximising behaviour of agents given some exogenous consumption constraints, thus there
must then be an assumption made as to which variables are exogenous. In Neo-classical
economics there are a number of different variables which may be considered as exogenous
depending on what is being explained, such as cultural traditions and social institutions
(Boland, 1979:960). The problem with this Neo-classical view of utility maximisation is that
it does not allow for a psychological basis of the individual (the human element)
(Drakopoulos, 1990:184).
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The overall psychological basis implied by Neo-classical theory is one that can be described
as “quantitative egoistic hedonism” (Drakopoulos, 1990:195) or what Samuelson (1938)
describes as the behaviouristic foundation to utility theory (Hollander, 2001:233).The
hedonistic approach views an individual’s quality of life as a balance sheet with respect to all
pleasure (increase in assets) and pain (increase in liabilities) experienced in one’s life;
however, it has been proposed that the direction of influence of pain and pleasure on
happiness is ambiguous and that these are not the only factors that influence an individual’s
quality of life (Hollander, 2001:241).
The behaviouristic foundation to utility measurement regards an individual’s preferences as
stable and consumers choose different consumption baskets from given opportunity sets
(Hollander, 2001:233). Hollander (2001:233) has pointed out two serious shortcomings of the
mainstream theory; firstly the definition of utility, in terms of choices and preferences, is a
definitional chain and implies nothing about the relationship between utility and an
individual’s emotional states. The traditional behaviouristic definition does not have any
empirical validity and a more appropriate definition of utility may be expressed in terms of
psychological wellbeing (Hollander, 2001:228). Secondly, utility cannot be directly measured
and thus observed behaviour must be relied upon in order to determine an individual’s
preferences.  However, the inability to measure utility directly means that any welfare
statements concerning individuals cannot be related to experience and are thus not testable
(Hollander, 2001:228), therefore the behaviorist approach is empirically inadequate
(Hollander, 2001:241).
5.2.4 Probabilities, uncertainty and risk
Probability and uncertainty are widely used terms in economics.  However, their meaning is
often altered between authors and thus an incoherent picture seems to emerge between the
ideas of risk, probability and uncertainty (Lawson, 1988:38). Lawson (1988:39) has proposed
that in order to understand the similarities and differences between the various approaches an
epistemological approach (branch of philosophy that investigates the nature of human
knowledge) should be taken. This is an approach which has widely been ignored by
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economists because economists are primarily concerned with practical matters (Lawson,
1988:39). A realist approach is put forward in which probabilities can be understood in terms
of either objects of knowledge or as forms of knowledge. The theories of Friedman (adaptive
expectations) as well as Keynes can be understood in terms of knowledge as a form and the
rational expectations hypothesis is associated with knowledge as an object (Lawson,
1988:40).
For Friedman, probabilities are seen as the “degree of belief in a given proposition or event,
held by an actual individual at some specific point in time.”(Lawson, 1988:41). These
probabilities are generated internally by the individual and are dependent on specific
individual knowledge or belief. Probabilistic knowledge does not necessarily conform to any
external reality (Lawson, 1988:41). For Keynes probability is a form of rational belief and not
something that can be learned through experience as is the case for Friedman (Lawson,
1988:42). Keynes viewed probabilities as either known or unknown. For a probability to be
unknown an individual must not possess the skills to determine a rational belief even after
obtaining all available information; however, a probability is known but numerically
immeasurable if further information is needed in order to arrive at a decision (Lawson,
1988:43). Finally, rational expectations assumes that external reality can be represented by a
joint probability distribution. The difference between Keynes and Friedman is that Keynes
assumed probabilities are objectively determined, while Friedman believed that probabilities
are subjectively determined (Lawson, 1988:44). The rational expectations hypothesis will be
discussed further in section 5.3.2.1, however the concern here is the different interpretations
of probabilities and uncertainty by Friedman and Keynes.
For Friedman probabilities were assigned to different and mutually exclusive states of the
world and the outcome is seen as uncertain; all states of the world are known but it is
uncertain as to which state of the world will come about (Lawson, 1988:47). Keynes, on the
other hand, viewed uncertainty as the absence of probabilistic knowledge, a situation in
which probabilities cannot be calculated (Lawson, 1988:48). Keynes did not agree with the
mainstream theory of uncertainty but instead viewed probabilities as either indeterminate or
indefinable and saw the traditional interpretation of probability as philosophically incorrect.
For Keynes uncertainty means a situation in which probabilities are not numerically
measurable and thus a probability distribution is not known (Drakopoulos, 1992:323). In the
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General Theory Keynes provides evidence for considering the human element in
consumption as opposed to only viewing consumers as robots attempting to maximise utility.
5.2.5 General equilibrium theory
The micro foundations of Neo-classical theory discussed above underlies mainstream
economic theory and has traditionally assumed that the economy reaches a point of general
equilibrium, and to which the economy will return given any deviations. Followers of this
general equilibrium approach believe that the point is fast approaching where economics can
be viewed as a science and is thus able to generate empirically testable propositions (Kirman,
1989:126). The dominant theoretical basis for consumption is Gary Becker’s household
production approach to consumption activity (Fuller, 1996:595). This approach is made up of
three elements which include global rationality (rational expectations), competition-driven
social relations and household centred production (Fuller, 1996:596). Mainstream
microeconomic theory uses stable and unique indifference curves to represent different levels
of utility; however, the underlying assumptions of uniqueness and stability that lead to an
equilibrium solution have no theoretical justification (Kirman, 1989:137).
One criticism of the traditional approach is that its’ focus on the individual and social
relations only serve to increase utility, thus social interactions are ultimately reducible to
increases in individual utility and there is no other reason to engage in social relations (Fuller,
1996:598). Kirman (1989:126) has argued that if mainstream theory continues to focus on an
individualistic approach when building economic models there can be no testable predictions
and the model will not be a very good description of reality. A second criticism of the Neo
classical general equilibrium is that the evolution of any institutional setting (such as societal
influences) can be explained as the sum of all logical utility maximising choices, which will
maximise an individual’s consumption bundle given fixed budget constraints (Boland,
1979:957). Boland (1979:958) has argued that since the neoclassical view is that an
institution is static, any proposed position will run into methodological failures because the
Neo-classical view considers an economy between two equilibrium points and thus does not
take the dynamics of economic progress into account (Boland, 1979:958).
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A number of propositions, including those given above, have been put forward for the failure
of the general equilibrium model, including assumptions about an individual’s optimising
behaviour as well as mathematical constraints. These propositions, however, do not address
the source of the problem which goes further than just optimising assumptions; the
underlying problem is that traditional theory does not recognise that individuals actually
make decisions interdependently with other individuals and do not act as if in a vacuum
(Kirman, 1989:137). Kirman (1989:138) concludes that economists should not make strong
assertions about the aggregate behaviour of individuals based on traditional general
equilibrium theory, as these models have “no basis in economic theory as it stands”.
5.2.6 Keynes and the traditional theory
The view that individuals attempt to maximise utility implicitly assumes that an individual is
by nature hedonistic; however, Keynes argued that an individual will pursue the good rather
than pursue pleasure (Drakopoulos, 1992:322). Keynes did not explicitly formulate a theory
of consumption and it is sometimes thought that this lack of focus is taken to mean that
Keynes was in agreement with the foundations of microeconomic theory put forth by
classical economics. This is evident in a number of studies that have attempted to incorporate
marginal utility theory into the consumption function as viewed by Keynes, an example of
which is given by Tobin (1956) when explaining an individual’s demand for transactions
balances (Drakopoulos, 1992:319). There are however a number of insights offered by
Keynes that suggest he rejected the classical marginal utility approach (Drakopoulos,
1992:318).
Drakopoulos (1992:322) argues that there is ample evidence that Keynes rejected the
hedonistic ideas on which Neo-Classical consumer theory is based. Keynes viewed the object
of life from a somewhat philosophical point of view and thought that life was about the
pursuit of good, rather than pleasure as under the hedonistic approach. The hedonistic
approach is criticised because it has illogical foundations. Keynes (1936:91) recognised that
consumption is dependent on income, current objective circumstances and “the subjective
needs and the psychological propensities and habits of the individuals composing and the
principles on which the income is divided between them”. The psychological component is
composed of human nature and social practices and is not expected to change over the short
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run; however, “it is necessary to take account of the manner in which changes in the
subjective factors may affect the propensity to consume” (Keynes, 1936:91). For Keynes
habits were an important part of dealing with uncertainty in the short run and a hierarchy of
consumption can also be implied by Keynes as he suggests that an individual will attempt to
satisfy basic needs first, given some level of income, and then only attempt to satisfy higher
needs (Drakopoulos, 1992:326).
Post-Keynesians have built on Keynes’ initial insights and developed a somewhat eclectic
theory of consumer behaviour which incorporates the human element of consumption using
theories from a variety of social sciences such as philosophy, psychology and sociology.
5.3 A POST-KEYNESIAN VIEW OF CONSUMPTION AND CREDIT
5.3.1 Introduction
Post-Keynesians see a number of theoretical deficiencies in the mainstream paradigm of
utility maximisation, rational expectations and definition of uncertainty. Although there is no
concrete theoretical outline of consumption behaviour in the Post-Keynesian school there are
a number of propositions which can be agreed upon as being a necessary part of the
construction of such a theory (Lavoie, 1994:539). Post-Keynesians reject the assumption of
global rationality and advocate a more central role for the effects of socialisation processes on
individuals (Fuller, 1996). Due to the eclectic nature of the theories, which can be thought of
as comprising the possible beginnings of a Post-Keynesian theory of consumption, a
framework for the analysis is borrowed from Lavoie (1994) to give some structure to the
discussion. This study agrees with the general theoretical ideas proposed by Lavoie (1994);
however, it will be argued that social habits and customs are equally or even more important
in consumption behaviour than income as Lavoie (1994) proposes.  The concepts presented
below are by no means mutually exclusive. Following the discussion on consumption the
role of credit will be discussed in section 5.3.3.1 and its relation to this study.
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5.3.2 Framework for analysis
The theory of Post-Keynesian consumer choice can be categorised into six principles,
including procedural rationality, satiable needs, separability of needs, subordination of needs,
growth of needs and non-independence (Lavoie, 1994:543). Each will be discussed in turn.
5.3.2.1 Procedural rationality
The idea of procedural rationality developed out of a dissatisfaction with the traditional
theory of rational expectations, or what Simon (1955:99) refers to as the “economic man”.
The view of rational expectations formation is consistent with a positivist economic
methodology in which assumptions do not need to be empirically proven in order to have
valid scientific content (Gerchev, 2007:323). Gertchev (2007:323) has pointed out that since
rational expectations assumes that the individual always anticipates the future correctly
nothing could be learned and nothing would be worth knowing because the future is known at
the moment any action is taken. Thus the rational expectations hypothesis is self-
contradictory because the purpose of research is to acquire knowledge. Evidence provided by
tests of the rational expectations hypothesis suggests that the hypothesis does not hold
(Gerchev, 2007:324).
Simon (1955:114) proposes an alternative to the traditional theory of rationality with what he
calls “administrative man” who only has limited knowledge of his/her environment as well as
a limited computational capacity, in contrast to the assumed full information and complete
computing capacity under Neo-classical rational expectations. Lavoie (1994) builds on the
idea that an economic agent has limited knowledge and computational capacity and proposes
that consumers are procedurally rational. Consumers will develop an ability to avoid complex
calculations in an uncertain world which may include rules of thumb, social conventions or
seeking other people’s opinion to make decisions. Procedural rationality goes beyond the
problem of utility maximisation based on computational capacity because it is concerned with
a satisfying solution rather than an optimal solution, because in an uncertain world it is
impossible to know the optimal solution (Lavoie, 1994:544). A procedurally rational
economic agent is no less rational than the Neo-classical counterpart; however, the
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environment and rationality adopted to function within this environment are simply different
(Lavoie, 1994:545).
5.3.2.2 Satiable wants and separate needs
The Neo-classical idea of utility can be linked to the satiation of needs because an individual
will maximise utility and thereby gain satisfaction. In the Neo-classical behaviouralist
framework satisfaction can only be obtained if prices are zero or income is infinite because
there is always some level of utility to be gained from extra consumption (Lavoie, 1994:546).
This adherence to the maximisation style of analysis is similar to that of classical physics and
ignores the biological and cognitive sciences that attempt to understand the brain (Camerer,
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004:556). Two such approaches are presented below, namely
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2004) in respect of a biological approach and Hollander
(2001) in respect of a more cognitive approach to understanding satisfaction.
Camerer et al (2004) analyse the implications of consumer behaviour within standard theory
from the physiological brain perspective and note that “the human brain is basically a
mammalian brain with a larger cortex. This means human behaviour will generally be a
compromise between highly evolved animal emotions and instincts, and more recently
evolved human deliberation and foresight” (Camerer et al, 2004:559). Therefore, from the
viewpoint of neuroscience, behaviour is a function of logic as well as emotions and as a result
an individual’s preferences may not be as stable as predicted by standard theory. One reason
offered for the instability of consumption preferences is due to the brain constantly acting to
maintain a state of homeostasis, thus the brain will maintain a stable condition and attempts
to restore this stability if there is a departure for any reason (Camerer et al, 2004:562). The
implication of the brain maintaining a state of homeostasis is that an individual’s preferences
will be state-dependent, in that internal body states affect preferences as well as act as signals
to restore equilibrium. Therefore a consumer’s consumption behaviour will change in
accordance with his/her internal state and the consumption bundle which will achieve the
most satisfaction will change over time, which is in contrast to the stable preferences and
satiation assumptions made in Neo-classical theory (Camerer et al, 2004:563).
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Hollander (2001:240) argues from a more psychological perspective and has proposed an
alternative concept of satisfaction known as subjective well-being, based on literature in the
areas of social psychology and philosophy, and defines subjective well-being as “an attitude
towards one’s life as a whole or some particular domain of one’s life” which is experienced
as a sense of happiness or well-being. Evidence is also provided that suggests empirical data
can be better described by a theory based on an approach which highlights the sociological
aspects of an individual’s environment and not only focuses on a behaviouralist approach
(Hollander, 2001:227). Post-Keynesians tend to see consumer behaviour as in line with
Hollander (2001) in that the behaviouralist approach to satisfaction is not considered
adequate and a more sociological perspective should be adopted.
Post-Keynesian consumption theory views satiation as obtainable with positive prices and a
finite income; satiation is achieved when an individual reaches a threshold level of
consumption beyond which additional consumption of a good will bring no more satisfaction.
This view of consumption leads to the development of a hierarchy of consumption
preferences such that basic needs are fulfilled first, in line with Keynes’ original insights
discussed above. Wants are seen as arising out of needs (Lavoie, 1994:546). Within a
hierarchy structure different categories of needs can be identified which allows a consumer to
break the decision making process down into a series of small decisions (Lavoie, 1994:547).
5.3.2.3 Subordination of needs and growth of needs
Lavoie (1994:550) uses Maslow’s hierarchy of needs together with Keynes’ assertion that
consumption is dependent on psychological and habitual factors to explain how consumers
form a hierarchy of consumption preferences, such that more basic needs will be fulfilled
before higher needs can be satisfied. He then uses this approach to explain why consumers
will move up the hierarchy with an increase in income, which is in contrast to Neo-classical
theory which focuses more on substitution effects (Lavoie, 1994:551). Income allows more
goods to be purchased and thus consumers can satisfy lower order needs as well as higher
order needs.
Trigg (2004:397) sees Maslow’s approach as being problematic because it focuses
exclusively on the individual and the need for social interaction must be overcome to reach
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self-actualisation, in line with Kirman (1989) above. Another criticism of Maslow’s theory is
that it assumes preferences are innate; however, as consumers move away from their basic
needs they rely more on knowledge than instincts in making decisions and it is in this way
that consumers must first discover their preferences before acting upon them. Maslow’s
theory thus views an individual as developing from within rather than being the product of
his/her environment (Trigg, 2004:399).
An alternative theory is put forth by Trigg (2004) following work by Bourdieu (1984) based
on two key elements. The first views individuals as holding an endowment of economic
capital (money and wealth) and cultural capital. Cultural capital is seen as the acquired
knowledge of artistic and intellectual pursuits and is a function of social origin and
educational background. These two types of capital give rise to a “social space” within which
the lifestyles of individuals can be categorised by the size and composition of capital (Trigg,
2004:399). The social space describes both vertical and horizontal dimensions, unlike
Maslow who only considers a vertical dimension. The second element is known as the
habitus and is used to categorise individuals within the social space. The habitus firstly sees
the individual as unconsciously developing behaviour patterns from society and secondly,
society is shaped by the way individuals learn and adapt their specific tendencies to that
society (Trigg, 2004:400). Consumption is mainly determined by income when income is
low; however, the relationship between income and consumption weakens with increases in
income because it is the habitus that is the primary determinant of consumption behaviour
(Trigg, 2004:401).  There are similarities between Maslow and Bourdieu in that there is a
hierarchy to climb; however, Bourdieu’s theory provides for the analysis of luxury tastes as a
social phenomenon, unlike Maslow who sees social phenomena as something to be overcome
(Trigg, 2004:403).
Following the work by Trigg (2004) a more socially orientated approach to the subordination
of needs is advocated here, as opposed to the income orientated approach proposed by Lavoie
(1994). This is not to say that Lavoie is in any way wrong; this is indicated by a quote taken
from Lavoie (1994:540) stating that “the principles put forth to reflect a possible Post
Keynesian approach to consumer choice reflect my own views of the matter. Others
interested in the field might find a different set of principles”. This approach is not in contrast
to Keynes’ (1936:96) original thoughts as he recognises consumption will increase with an
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increase in income as a fundamental psychological law, which is in line with Lavoie (1994),
Keynes (1936:97) however also states that “a man’s habitual standard of life usually has the
first claim on his income” which supports the above argument by Trigg (2004).
5.3.2.4 Non-independence and social norms
Post-Keynesians view consumption behaviour as being dependent on social norms, in
contrast to the Neo-classical view that individuals are independent when making
consumption decisions (Menz, 2008:6). Akerlof (2007:6) suggests that there is a missing
motivation in Neo-classical economics in the sense that preferences are too narrowly defined
and do not take into account the norms of individuals, which reflect their beliefs about how
they, and others, should or should not behave. Sociologists emphasise that the major
determinant of consumption is what people believe they should consume in relation to
different social groups within the society within which that individual lives, and is a function
of a particular individual’s situation as well as how that individual perceives himself or
herself relative to others.  (Ackerlof, 2007:15).
Neo-classical theory does allow for individuals to derive utility from relative comparisons
(such as social comparisons); however the traditional theory views this social reference
standard as being given exogenously. One problem with treating the reference standard as
exogenous is that it does not take into account the finding of social psychology which
suggests that people consciously choose a certain social reference standard (Falk and Knell,
2004:418). Falk and Knell (2004:418) argue that social reference standards are in fact
endogenous so that people choose their social group in a predictable way according to the
motives of both self-enhancement and self-improvement. Self-enhancement refers to the
tendency for people to compare themselves with others that they feel belong to a lower social
reference group. Self-improvement on the other hand refers to choosing a higher reference
group than the one within which the individual currently finds himself or herself (Falk and
Knell, 2004:418). They provide evidence that an individual’s abilities shape their goals and
reference standards (Falk and Knell, 2004:432). This is taken to imply that an individual’s
consumption behaviour is influenced by different social contexts or systems (Menz, 2008:6).
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5.3.3 Possible Extensions to the Post-Keynesian framework
The first area of interest that may offer a guide to future Post-Keynesian consumption theory
is that of neuroscience, and specifically modern technological breakthroughs in neuro-
scientific research equipment. There has been a long history of the reliance of classical
economists on revealed preferences to infer some underlying utility measurement and stable
preference ordering, but utility cannot be directly measured. Camerer et al (2004:556)
propose that the thought process underlying different consumption choices can in fact be
measured directly using recent breakthroughs in neuroscience and suggest that new evidence
in this field can be used to better guide economic theory. Interestingly the human mind is
referred to as the “black box” which is similar to Moore’s (1983) reference to the “black box”
of monetary policy, as it attempts to shed light on the internal mechanisms of economic
behaviour. Among the possible areas suggested in which neuroscience could play a key role
include the direct measurement of variables such as consumer confidence or expectations
because measurements are taken directly from brain activity, rather than asking the individual
consumer (Camerer et al, 2004:573). Neuroscience may also help provide data in support of
certain consumption theories (across all the social sciences) and lend support to a more
unifying theory of consumption behaviour (Camerer et al, 2004:574).
Fuller (1996:600) proposes a second extension to the framework outlined above by Lavoie
(1994) by suggesting that Post Keynesians should focus more on the role that social relations
play in consumption behaviour. He argues that Post Keynesians should view consumption as
“a process of cooperation-seeking behaviour through interpersonal communication in which
goods have a facilitating role”. The procedural rationality outlined by Lavoie (1994) above is
seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a theory of consumption activity, however
Fuller (1996:605) offers an alternative definition such that individuals will be procedurally
rational when investing their non-work time as well as using goods in “communicative,
cooperation-seeking relations with specific others, while circulating within a functional
consumption infrastructure, of which the household is but one component”.
Fuller (1996:601) puts forward four components which should be included in the construction
of a theory of consumption behaviour: firstly consumption should be viewed as a process of
social relations in which goods are used; secondly consumption activity involves actively
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pursuing cooperative and non-monetary personal encounters; thirdly, within such personal
relationships word-of-mouth communication occurs and, fourthly, physical goods are used to
facilitate these interpersonal relationships (Fuller, 1996:601). Lastly, the household as the
unit of consumption activity should be done away with and it should be assumed that
individuals interact with each other in a variety of different environments beyond the
household (Fuller, 1996:604).
5.3.3.1 Post-Keynesian consumption and credit demand
Up to this point in the discussion the Post-Keynesian theory of consumption has not
considered the role of credit in the consumption behaviour of individuals. Dutt (2006)
incorporates consumer debt into a model developed by Steindl (1952) to determine if
consumer borrowing can help an economy out of stagnation (Dutt, 2006:341). The model
developed by Steindl (1952) analysed how the growth of large firms can reduce aggregate
demand as a result of higher prices due to a higher degree of monopoly power. The rise in
profits will be seen in conjunction with a reduction in consumption expenditure and lead to a
reduction in investment spending (Dutt, 2006:339). This model was later developed to
explain stagnation in semi-industrialised, less developed, economies and has been used to
model Post-Keynesian theories of growth; however, these models do not allow consumers to
borrow to finance consumption (Dutt, 2006:340). Evidence has been presented that suggests
consumption expenditure which is financed by borrowing has played a significant part in the
contribution to aggregate demand in countries such as the U.S, Germany, France, Canada and
India (Dutt, 2006:341-342).
The analysis shows that an increase in consumer borrowing has an expansionary effect on
economic output in the short run; however, the effect of borrowing in the long run is
ambiguous in terms of the effects on investment as well as income distribution. The long run
ambiguity stems from the increased debt burden incurred by consumers in order to consume
current output (Dutt, 2006:357). If the increase in consumer debt redistributes income
towards the rich there may be a drop in aggregate demand and growth due to the higher
propensity of the rich to save. This decrease in aggregate demand may be intensified by the
increased interest rates which accompany an increased level of indebtedness, which is in line
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with the theoretical predictions made by the balance sheet channel of monetary policy
transmission (Dutt, 2006:362).
The present discussion makes two contributions to Post-Keynesian theory, the first being that
it analyses the effects of changes in short and medium term credit demand as a result of
changes in interest rates and thus adds to the current literature on the ability of the central
bank to influence household spending via manipulation of interest rates. Secondly the study
adds to the study by Dutt(2006) in that the significance of credit on consumption is analysed
and from this an inference is made about the ability of consumers to deficit spend and thus
help an economy to achieve growth, which is also in line with Moore (1988) above.
5.4 SUMMARY
Keynes did not agree with the mainstream classical economic ideas of rational expectations,
utility maximisation and general equilibrium. Keynes viewed the object of life as the pursuit
of good and not the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure. Post-Keynesians have recognised the
theoretical deficiencies in the mainstream microeconomic approach and instead propose that
consumption behaviour is determined more by social influences than individual pursuit of
utility. Within the Post-Keynesian approach individuals are seen as procedurally rational in
that an individual will seek a satisfying solution rather than an optimal solution. Needs are
satiable and subject to a hierarchy of preferences according to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
Given that an individual has made a choice as to some consumption good, the question then
arises as to the means of payment used to purchase the item and from this standpoint the role
of credit is important in the financing of consumption. It is noted here that the purpose of the
study is not to test a Post-Keynesian theory of consumption per se but rather, firstly, to
determine if changes in the prime rate of interest will affect the level of credit demanded by
households and secondly, to determine if credit plays an important role in the financing of
consumption and by implication plays a role in aggregate spending activity.
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CHAPTER SIX
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL WORK
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The review of empirical work will be discussed in three broad sections. The first section
reviews literature on the theory of an endogenously determined money supply and serves two
purposes. Firstly, the review is conducted to identify possible variables which may influence
the level of a firms short term credit demand and secondly, the review serves to identify the
historical findings of the interest rate elasticity of credit demand. Next, literature on the
balance sheet channel is considered with a specific focus on studies which have used a mix
variable to identify a balance sheet channel of monetary policy, in line with the approach
followed here. Briefly, the mix variable is defined as the ratio of short term bank debt to total
short term debt by all monetary institutions, and is discussed below. Lastly, empirical
literature on the effects that interest rate changes have on household credit demand will be
discussed.
6.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF AN ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY
AND FACTORS INFLUENCING SHORT TERM CREDIT
6.2.1 Introduction
The factors that affect the short term demand for credit by firms are the same factors which
influence the working capital needs of firms. The discussion will thus begin by identifying
the variables which, according to Post-Keynesian theory, are thought to best explain the level
of short term credit demand by firms in order to finance production in a credit money
economy. Following this the relationship between the level of short term credit demand and
changes in the level of interest rates is considered.
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6.2.2 Variables affecting short term bank credit demand by firms
Moore (1983) was one of the first to empirically test the validity of the endogeneity of money
hypothesis using data for the United Kingdom. The choice of variables used to explain
changes in bank lending to firms are in line with theory underlying an endogenously
determined money supply and by implication a demand determined money supply. Firstly, it
is assumed that production costs must be incurred before the receipt of sales proceeds.
Secondly, firms are assumed to set prices over some historical level of unit production costs
and finally, it is assumed that banks are price setters and quantity takers, which implies that
banks have a limited ability to control actual bank lending (Moore and Threadgold, 1985:67).
Total working capital needs of the firm are a function of employment costs, materials costs,
stock-building costs and corporate tax payments (Moore, 1983:547). All explanatory
variables are modelled as first differences because it is only increases in input costs which
lead to an increased demand for working capital finance, while existing costs are financed out
of current sales proceeds (internally generated finance). The variables used to explain
changes in total lending by firms are (Moore, 1983:548):
ΔTLCIC = ΔTLCIC (ΔWB, ΔMBill, ΔPS, ΔTYC) (1)
Where TLCIC is total bank loans to commercial and industrial companies (CIC), WB
represents a proxy for the wage bill of CIC’s, MBill is proxy for the materials costs of CIC’s,
PS represents the current price value of stock levels of CIC’s, TYC is the tax bill of CIC’s
and finally “Δ” is the change in the relevant variable from the previous period. The general
equation modelled found that the one quarter lagged changes in the materials bill (MBill) and
stock building (PS) variables were not statistically significant and the tax variable (TYC) is
either insignificant or wrongly signed. After dropping the insignificant or wrongly signed
variables a number of interest rate variables were added separately, which is discussed in the
next sub-section. The final equation is shown to explain around 49 percent of the variation in
bank lending to CIC’s (Moore, 1983:449).
Moore (1983:552) also considered a second equation which used the total amount of
commercial bank loans as the dependent variable, rather than modelling the demand from
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individual credit segments (such as bank lending to CIC’s). Commercial loans also include
real estate loans and loans to individuals that are determined mainly by changes in household
financing demand for homes and consumer durables respectively. An index of consumer
confidence is included and is expected to vary positively with household demand for houses
and consumer durables. The second equation explained around 60 percent of the variation in
total bank lending and it is concluded that it is possible to identify a single equation that has a
relatively high level of explanatory power when considering changes in credit demand
(Moore, 1983:553). The behaviour of money wage rates as a component of both working
capital demand and disposable income play an important role in the demand for bank credit
by the private sector (Moore, 1983:555).
Another influential study was undertaken by Moore and Threadgold (1985), similar to Moore
(1983) above, to identify the operation of an endogenously determined money supply in the
U.K. The demand for working capital is a function of employment costs, the cost of raw
materials (including the costs of imported basic materials and semi-manufactured goods) and
corporate tax payments. The equation explained around 60 percent of the total variation in the
flow of bank lending to CIC’s, which is greater than the 49 percent found by Moore (1983).
Some lag lengths for the different explanatory variables were, however, not statistically
significant (Moore and Threadgold, 1985:69).
Moore and Smit (1986) use South African data to determine the relationship between bank
credit and production costs such as wages, inventories and interest rates in a similar manner
to Moore (1983). Bank credit is assumed to be a function of working capital demand, which
is in turn a function of the wage bill, the change in inventories and the real interest rate
(Moore and Smit, 1986:88). The change in the wage bill is the largest component of working
capital demand and, when using aggregate data, accounts for over 90% of the variation in
bank credit. The wage bill coefficient is 1.04, indicating that wage increases lead to an
increase in bank credit on a one-for-one basis (Moore and Smit, 1986:87). Adding a change
in inventories variable does not increase the explanatory power of the model (Moore and
Smit, 1986:89). The study showed that there is evidence that the wage bill of companies is an
important variable in influencing the level of bank credit; however the change in inventories
does not seem to significantly influence the level of bank credit.
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6.2.2.1 Adding a round tripping variable
Moore and Threadgold (1985) differ from Moore (1983) in that a “round tripping” variable
(RT) was added to the modelled equation. Round tripping occurs in periods when CIC’s can
earn more on deposits than the costs of borrowing (Howells, 2005:5). The round tripping
variable is defined as the three month CD rate less the banks’ prime rate, where the prime rate
is calculated as the banks’ base rate plus one percent. The RT variable was added to the
general equation including wage and input costs as well as tax payments and found to be
highly statistically significant, improving the overall statistical results. After dropping all
insignificant variables the inclusion of a round tripping variable explains about 66 percent of
the variation in bank lending to CIC’s, as opposed to 60 percent without the RT variable.
Results indicated that raw materials, employment costs and corporate tax payments are
important in determining the level of bank borrowing by firms and bank lending is primarily
demand determined (Moore and Threadgold, 1985:74).
Cuthbertson (1985) follows Moore and Threadgold (1985) in that a round tripping variable is
included to help explain movements in short term credit demand as a result of changes in the
short term financing requirements of firms. Cuthbertson (1985) goes further than Moore and
Threadgold (1985), however, in that the round tripping variable is defined in two ways, rather
than just one as in Moore and Threadgold (1985).  A nested model was estimated and tests
were done on the effects of the variables N and RT, where N= (RLA-RBL) and RT = max
((0, (RLA-RBL)), to determine the effects of modelling a round tripping variable using two
different definitions. RLA is the 3 month local authority rate and RBL is the bank lending
rate. It was found that the effect a round tripping variable on the demand for bank credit may
take place when the interest rate differential between the 3 month local authority rate and the
bank lending rate is negative as well as positive, this supports the use of N over RT.
(Cuthbertson, 1985:101). The net borrowing requirements of firms are found to have a strong
short run impact on lending (Cuthbertson, 1985:108).
In the United Kingdom the theoretical framework set out by Moore (1980) led to three
different models of the demand for bank lending by 1985. The first was used by the Bank of
England (BOE) (Howells, 2005:7). The second model was developed by the UK Treasury
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Department (HMT) and is expressed in real terms, except for the interest rate. The final
model was developed by the National Institute of Economic Research (NISER) which sought
to explain the flow of bank lending in real terms (using nominal interest rates) (Howells,
2005:8). The major differences in these three approaches are in their treatment of interest
rates. The BOE model uses an own real rate of interest and has a low interest elasticity, the
NISER uses nominal rates and an interest rate spread, defined as the return on assets less the
cost of borrowing and the HMT model uses a single nominal interest rate on bank lending
(Howells, 2005:7). Focus will now turn to the interest elasticity of credit demand and will
focus mostly on the BOE model, however the extended model of Cuthbertson (1985) will
also be considered.
6.2.3 The empirically observed interest rate elasticity of short term credit
demand
Interest rates used by Moore (1983:545) included a nominal interest rate (proxied by the bank
prime lending rate), the change in the nominal interest rate, an expected inflation rate, a real
interest rate and finally, the change in the real interest rate. All the above rates were added
separately to equation (1) as well as the equation estimating the total amount of commercial
bank loans. With respect to short term bank lending to CIC’s all attempts were unsatisfactory;
however, the change in the real interest rate variable proved to be the best, showing a weakly
statistically significant coefficient, with an expected negative relationship to total lending to
CIC’s. The results of the nominal interest rate will be discussed further because the approach
adopted here uses a nominal interest rate to identify the size and lag length effects of a
change in the repo rate on credit demand by firms.
The coefficient estimates of the interest elasticity of loan demand imply that the monetary
authorities’ ability to restrict the growth in company borrowing is limited because the
estimates are not statistically significant, thus loan demand appears to be highly interest
inelastic to short run changes in interest rates (Moore, 1983:550). Results with reference to
total commercial bank loans showed all results to again be unsatisfactory, suggesting that the
interest inelasticity of total bank lending is quite high for both consumers and firms (Moore,
1983:553). The limited ability of interest rates to help explain bank lending is taken as an
71 | P a g e
indication that the monetary authority has a limited ability to control the amount of credit
expansion, especially over the short term as a result of a positive expectations effect (Moore,
1983:554). Moore and Threadgold (1985) analyse the relationship between different
measures of the interest rate and the level of bank credit in the same way as Moore (1983)
and results suggest that interest rates were statistically significant, but did not have much of
an effect on changes in bank lending (Moore and Threadgold, 1985:70).
The studies by Moore (1980) and Moore and Threadgold (1985), among others, initially
established two cornerstones of the Post Keynesian view of the money supply. The first being
that it is previous changes is the operating conditions of firms that give rise to changes in the
flow of new loans. Secondly, the interest elasticity of the demand for credit is low, which is
taken to imply that the ability of a central bank to control credit and influence money growth
is limited (Howells, 2005:5). The above studies have found evidence that the working capital
needs of firms are an important determinant of short term bank lending. The present analysis
will use variables that influence the working capital needs of firms to determine the size and
lag length effects of a change in the repurchase rate on short term lending by firms.
6.3 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL WORK ON THE BALANCE SHEET
CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY AND THE MIX VARIABLE
6.3.1 Introduction
A number of authors have studied the credit channel, and more specifically the balance sheet
channel, and there have been two main approaches followed to identify a credit channel of
monetary policy transmission. The first is the use of a mix variable and the second is with the
use of Romer dates following a study by Romer and Romer (1989). The focus here will be on
studies using the mix variable; however, a few studies which have used Romer dates are
included to give a broader view of empirical findings. Generally, using disaggregated data is
more appropriate for analysing the effects of a balance sheet channel because disaggregated
data is better suited to measuring a firm’s movement between bank debt and non-bank debt as
well as the movement of funds between small versus large firms. The discussion will begin
with the pioneering study by Kashyap, Wilcox and Stein (1993) (KWS hereafter) using
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aggregate data and move on to other measurements of the mix variable, as well as the effects
that interest rates have on credit demand in different countries. The studies chosen for
discussion relate to the United States and Europe and results are in line with a balance sheet
channel of policy transmission. Next the results of two studies using South African data are
discussed.
6.3.2 The mix variable and credit demand in the U.S
Kashyap, Wilcox and Stein (1993) recognise that there may be independent effects
originating from the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet, which in turn implies that some
borrowers rely on bank credit (indirect credit) to a larger extent than direct credit (Kashyap et
al, 1993:78). Firms are assumed to have two sources of financing, indirect debt in the form of
bank loans and direct debt in the form of commercial paper (Kashyap et al, 1993:80).
The major contribution of KWS (1993) is the construction of a mix variable in an attempt to
distinguish between a bank lending channel and the traditional money channel of monetary
policy transmission. The mix variable is defined as the ratio of bank loans to the sum of bank
loans and commercial paper. The logic behind using this ratio is that a fall in the mix variable
will imply that a bank lending channel is operative as opposed to the operation of the more
traditional money channel (Kashyap et al 1993:84). If the money channel is operative a
tightening of monetary policy should not have a large influence on the mix variable because a
tighter monetary policy has an output induced effect on all credit demand and both direct and
indirect sources of finance will decrease in proportion, thus the mix variable will be
unchanged (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:51-52). If, however, a tighter policy stance leads to a
reduction in the supply of bank credit and an increase in direct credit extension the mix
variable is expected to decrease, which is interpreted as evidence of a bank lending channel
because there is an excess demand for credit as a result of a decrease in bank loans (Kashyap
et al, 1993:79).
The analysis performed causality tests between a variable of interest (including the mix
variable) regressed on itself and an interest rate indicator. The mix variable was found to be
influenced by the Fed funds rate and decreases significantly when the Fed funds rate rises.
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Results of the effect of interest rates on loan demand showed that the influence of the Fed
funds rate on loan demand was the weakest (Kashyap et al, 1993:88).
It is noted that the paper by KWS (1993) identifies a bank lending channel through which
monetary policy operates, under the more traditional assumption of an exogenously
determined money supply.  The KWS (1993) study is examined however because the
methodology used (i.e. the inclusion of a mix variable) is followed by many subsequent
authors in testing for a balance sheet channel of policy transmission. One such study was
done by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) which calculated the mix variable differently to that of
KSW (1993).
The calculation of the mix variable as defined in KWS (1993) has been criticised by a
number of authors, including Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), who argue that the definition of
the mix variable is limited in its application to firms. The study by Oliner and Rudebusch
(1996) will be discussed for three reasons. Firstly, the definition of the mix variable is altered
slightly and this new definition is used to calculate the mix variable in the econometric model
below. Secondly, the mix variable was used to find evidence of a balance sheet channel and
finally a VAR model was used in conjunction with impulse response analysis to identify the
response of the mix variable to a shock in the Fed funds rate, which is in line with the
approach adopted here.
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) review the KWS (1993) study and make some observations
about the methodology and data used. Specifically, Oliner and Rudebush (1996) investigate
the mix variable for bank and non-bank debt separately using disaggregated data for small as
well as large firms, rather than aggregate data as in KWS (1993). For small firms the debt
mix is essentially set at one because almost no commercial paper is issued and thus the mix
variable defined by KWS (1993) cannot capture the relative shift in the financing mix for
small firms. This is a serious shortcoming because it is thought that small firms will
experience the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock to a greater extent than large
firms. The mix variable is modified from the one used by KWS (1993) in that the mix is
defined as the ratio of short term bank debt to total short term debt, where total short term
debt includes bank loans, commercial paper and other debt (such as loans from finance and
insurance companies) (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996:301-302).
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The study finds that when using disaggregated data the results suggest that following a
monetary policy contraction there is a shift in all types of financing from small to large firms,
which suggests the existence of a “broad credit channel” (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996:301).
Here the broad credit channel is seen to emphasise the presence of asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders and recognises that this asymmetric information may increase
the cost of all types of debt after a monetary contraction, which is in line with the theory
underlying the balance sheet channel. Given that information asymmetries are worse for
small firms, the external finance premium is likely going to be significantly higher (Oliner
and Rudebusch, 1996:301).
The study concludes that bank debt does not behave very differently to non-bank debt after a
monetary policy shock and, based on disaggregated data, it appears clear that a contraction in
monetary policy does not influence the supply of bank debt relative to other forms of finance.
Rather the interpretation of the mix variable results suggest that there is a broad credit
channel operative which recognises asymmetric information and results in a redirection of
credit from small to large firms, in line with the balance sheet channel (Oliner and
Rudebusch, 1996:308).
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) analyse the financial accelerator mechanism, which states that
the balance sheet channel will amplify the impact of disturbances to a borrowers net worth as
discussed above. A VAR model is estimated and the financial variables of interest include
total bank loans, consumer loans, business bank loans, commercial paper and a mix variable
(calculated as in KWS (1993)), among others (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:55-56). Impulse
response functions are used to determine the effects of a one standard deviation increase in
the Fed funds rate on different variables in order to capture shifts in exogenous monetary
policy actions (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:53).
The study concluded that the balance sheet channel of policy transmission is operative.
Findings indicate that the sharpest changes in the demand for credit occurred between small
and large firms and not between bank and non-bank credit. After a monetary policy
contraction bank loans to consumers decline while loans to firms increase slightly. Following
a rise in the Fed Funds rate both short term bank and non-bank borrowing by large firms
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increases, which may reflect an increased demand for credit to smooth the impact of
declining sales. Small firms, however, do not appear to borrow in order to smooth the impact
of declining sales as larger firms do (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:62). This phenomenon is
labelled the “flight to quality” (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:60).
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996:1) follow the theoretical ideas set out by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) with respect to the balance sheet channel discussed above, and set out to
analyse the “financial accelerator” mechanism by focusing on the principle-agent view of
credit markets. The study uses Romer dates and so only a brief review is given. The study
focuses on cross sectional data and examines the shift in credit between small and large firms
following a monetary policy contraction, in a similar manner to Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)
(Bernanke et al, 1996:1).  Results implied that a balance sheet channel is operative and this
conclusion is based on evidence that firms who face relatively higher agency costs struggle
more during an economic downturn than firms with lower agency costs and this reduction in
output by firms with higher agency costs will magnify the effects of the downturn (Bernanke
et al, 1996:14). These results are in line with evidence of a balance sheet channel of policy
transmission presented in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996).
All the studies discussed above have used data for the United States and the Federal funds
rate as an indicator of monetary policy and results were in line with a balance sheet channel
of policy transmission. Attention will now turn to evidence of a balance sheet channel found
in the U.K and OECD countries.
6.3.3 The mix variable and credit demand in the U.K. and OECD countries
Iturriaga (2000) explores the way in which monetary policy decisions affect real investment
and aggregate output, with a specific focus on the credit channel (Iturriaga, 2000:425). The
study compares the reaction of non-financial companies, using aggregate balance sheet data
across twelve OECD countries, to changes in the interest rate set by the monetary policy
authority. The model used is based upon that developed by KWS (1993) but the traditional
mix variable has been altered slightly. The study uses two mix variables including the short
term bank finance ratio and the long term bank finance ratio (Iturriaga, 2000:427). Results
indicated that a credit channel is operative and the strength of the credit channel depends on
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the financial system. Countries which have a more market based financial system tend to
have more alternatives to bank financing and thus the ability of monetary policy to effect
output via the credit channel is less effective than in countries without strong market based
approaches (Iturriaga, 2000:432).
Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007:675) use data for the United Kingdom with the aim of
determining whether or not a balance sheet channel is operative. The main contribution of the
paper is to investigate the sensitivity of investment to the cash flow position of a firm when
monetary policy tightens. A monetary policy indicator is used, similar to Romer dates
(tailored to suite the United Kingdom) to test for a balance sheet channel. Firms are classified
according to three criteria which include size and firm financial policy, i.e. leverage and
dividend policy (Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2007:675). Results suggested that investment is
positively related to cash flow. This indicates that smaller firms have much higher investment
sensitivity to cash flow than larger firms, which increases in times of monetary policy
tightness and the existence of a balance sheet channel in the transmission of monetary policy
is confirmed. Furthermore the importance of the balance sheet channel is greater the more
market orientated the economy in line with Iturriaga (2000) (Angelopoulou and Gibson,
2007:698).
Overall the mix variable has been used in a number of studies for the United States and
Europe. Following the paper by KWS (1993), which uses a mix variable to identify a bank
lending channel of monetary policy transmission, a number of authors have used the mix
variable to successfully identify a balance sheet channel of policy transmission based on
asymmetric information in credit markets which is in line with Post-Keynesian theory. Oliner
and Rudebusch (1996) altered the mix variable slightly and used disaggregated data for the
United States to identify a broad credit channel. Similar approaches have been used by
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Bernanke et al (1996) who found that a balance sheet
channel is operative within the U.S. Iturriaga (2000) used the mix variable with aggregate
balance sheet data for 12 OECD countries and concludes that a balance sheet channel is
present and that the strength of the balance sheet channel is greater the more market
orientated the economy. The mix variable is thus suited to testing for the presence of a
balance sheet channel of policy transmission under an endogenous money supply.
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There have been very few studies on the credit channel, and specifically the balance sheet
channel, in South Africa and no study was found which makes use of a mix variable to
determine if a balance sheet channel of policy transmission is operative. Due to the lack of
research the few studies found on both sub-channels will be discussed; however, it is noted
that both studies use the underlying model of credit market frictions developed by Bernanke
and Blinder (1988) which assumes an exogenous money supply.
6.3.4 Review of the credit channel in South Africa
Ludi, Ground, Joubert and Chen (2005) investigate the possible existence of a bank lending
channel in South Africa. The aim of the study is to determine if bank loans in South Africa
are supply or demand driven, which is relevant for the testing of both channels of policy
transmission. If bank loans are demand driven then an increase in the repo rate will lead to a
decrease in bank loans due to the increased cost of borrowing, and it is this increased cost of
borrowing that will lead to a drop in aggregate demand (Ludi et al, 2005:4).
The results implied that a long run demand equation is estimated because there is a negative
relationship between the repo rate and loans with an interest rate coefficient of -0.168 and an
estimated long run interest elasticity of bank credit demand of -0.484. This finding disproves
a bank lending channel in South Africa because the bank lending channel is most effective
when loans are supply driven (Ludi et al, 2005:13).  A VECM is then estimated to obtain the
short run dynamics between loans and interest rates and the results used to conduct impulse
response functions over ten quarters, assuming an increase in the repo rate. Loans decrease
over the 10 quarters analysed, reaching a maximum decrease of about -0.009 at between 6
and 7 quarters, which is consistent with demand driven loans (Ludi et al, 2005:15).
It is concluded that bank lending is demand driven and this “tends to disprove the fact that the
bank lending channel has effectively worked as a tool of monetary policy in South Africa,
since this would imply supply driven loans” (Ludi et al, 2005:17). It is noted that the
disproving of the bank lending channel in South Africa does not necessarily prove that a
balance sheet channel is operative; however, bank loans were found to be demand driven
which is in line with a possible balance sheet channel.
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Burger (2008) takes a broader view and tests for a credit channel in South Africa. The model
used in the study follows that developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), discussed above,
which assumes an exogenous money supply. The model is augmented by including a variable
to represent the external finance premium (EFP). The EFP is charged by lenders as a result of
weaker borrower balance sheets and is therefore a supply side phenomenon. The EFP
variable is added to the factors determining the supply of credit by banks in an attempt to
distinguish between supply and demand factors affecting aggregate credit movements
(Burger, 2008:4). It is concluded that there is evidence of a bank lending channel but only
very limited evidence for a balance sheet channel; this is attributed to the central bank not
being more tolerant of higher levels of inflation when there is a higher level of risk which
affects balance sheets (Burger, 2008:20).
Studies on the credit channel, and specifically the balance sheet channel, have shown mixed
results using different approaches to test for such channels. Ludi et al (2005) refuted a bank
lending channel but opened up the possibility of a balance sheet channel by finding that bank
loans are demand determined. Burger (2008) found that there was evidence of a bank lending
channel and limited evidence of a balance sheet channel. Both studies are however based on
the underlying assumption of an exogenously determined money supply which is not in line
with Post-Keynesian theory. This discussion thus serves to add to the existing literature in
South Africa by using the mix variable to test for a balance sheet channel of policy
transmission in line with Post-Keynesian theory of an endogenous money supply.
6.4 REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE OF CONSUMPTION
AND CREDIT
6.4.1 Introduction
Since Hall (1978), the academic community has focused on testing the LCH/PIH and its
implication that monetary policy can only influence consumption by influencing permanent
income. Unlike academic circles, however, central banks acknowledge that consumption is
influenced by credit variables and thus ask how monetary policy actions affect various credit
variables as well as the effect this policy action will have on aggregate consumption
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(Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997:208). This review will focus on a more Post-Keynesian view of
consumption and the LCH/PIH is not considered to hold because of the assumptions of
rational expectations and utility maximisation as discussed earlier.
6.4.2 Consumption and credit
Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) study the relationship between aggregate consumption and
different measures of credit conditions, using data for the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Japan and France. One of the questions addressed by Bacchetta and Gerlach
(1997) is: do credit market variables help in predicting changes in consumption (Bacchetta
and Gerlach, 1997:208)? A unique insight was to use a credit “wedge”, defined as the
difference between the interest rate charged by lenders and that charged to borrowers. The
lending rate is proxied by the bank prime lending rate and the borrowing rate is proxied by
either a time deposit rate or a T-bill rate (Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997:211). Results support
the hypothesis that credit constraints influence aggregate consumption. Credit is found to be a
significant predictor of consumption in all five countries and is often stronger than income.
The borrowing/lending wedge was found to be statistically significant for the U.S and Canada
and to a lesser extent Japan, which is taken to imply that credit restrictions are reflected in the
cost of borrowing (Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997:235).
Gross and Souleles (2001) test if liquidity constraints and interest rates are practically
relevant by analysing a U.S data set containing a panel of thousands of individual credit card
accounts. The data is used to answer two questions. Firstly the response of debt to changes in
credit limits is analysed and secondly, the sensitivity of debt to interest rates, as well as the
interaction of interest rates with liquidity constraints (Gross and Souleles, 2001:2). Liquidity
constraints here are defined as quantity constraints rather than as a wedge between borrowing
and lending rates (Gross and Souleles, 2001:5).
The long run effect of interest rates on debt levels shows that an individual’s borrowing is in
fact influenced by interest rates and thus economic agents are interest rate sensitive, in line
with liquidity constraints (Gross and Souleles, 2001:22). An impulse response function (using
an increase in interest rates) shows that there is an immediate response in the level of debt to
an increase in rates and estimates are larger and more significant than in previous studies
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(Gross and Souleles, 2001:23). Results also suggest that there is an asymmetric response in
credit demand, as a result of increasing and decreasing interest rates. Debt levels are shown to
decline when interest rates increase but increase more strongly in response to decreases in
interest rates. This asymmetry implies that an individual’s total amount of debt may increase
over time. Evidence also suggests that consumers transfer balances between credit accounts
when interest rates change (Gross and Souleles, 2001:24).
A large part of consumption studies have found the elasticity of consumption with respect to
interest rates to be close to zero. New methodologies have however been developed which
suggest elasticity’s of between -0.73 to below unity in the U.S, Italy and Bangladesh (Karlan
and Zinman, 2005:2). Karlan and Zinman (2005) note that these earlier studies were subject
to measurement and identification problems and estimate the elasticity of consumer demand
for credit with respect to price and maturity, using randomised trials implemented by a South
African lender (Karlan and Zinman, 2005:2-3). The lender offers high interest, short term
credit with fixed repayments to the working poor, which make up a large part of the South
African population (Karlan and Zinman, 2005:5).
Estimation of the extensive price elasticity of loan demand revealed that a 1% increase in the
monthly loan rate will reduce loan applications by 0.3%, for loans at a rate below the average
lending rate of the borrower. For interest rates charged above the lender’s average rate, a 1%
increase in the monthly loan rate will decrease loan applications by 1.7%. Borrowers subject
to higher interest rates therefore exhibit a loan price sensitivity that is six times larger than
borrowers subject to lower rates and there is thus an asymmetry in the loan demand function.
The kink exhibited by the credit demand curve is consistent with at least four explanations of
asymmetry (Karlan and Zinman, 2005:12). These include selection, competition and
contemporaneous substitution, intertemporal substitution as well as behavioural explanations
(Karlan and Zinman, 2005:4). Intensive Margin results for unconditional borrowing showed
an implied elasticity of -0.32. Estimated coefficients for loan sizes and rates conditional on
borrowing showed an implied elasticity of -0.13. These estimates are low compared to recent
estimates obtained in other studies (Karlan and Zinman, 2005:14).
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6.5 SUMMARY
Bank lending by firms was shown to be highly influenced by the working capital demands of
firms, however the interest elasticity of credit demand was shown to be low or statistically
insignificant. A balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission was shown to be
operative in the U.S, the U.K and Europe (among others), and it was shown that the mix
variable can be used to identify a balance sheet channel. It was also shown that credit
variables do in fact play an important role in the determination of consumption behaviour.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Various studies have used VAR models together with past information about central bank
operating procedures to examine the effects of monetary policy on the real economy
(Bernanke and Mihov, 1998:870). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) use a VAR model to analyse
the effects of changes in monetary policy on aggregate demand, as well as determine the
transmission mechanism through which policy operates. The Federal Funds rate is the policy
variable of interest because it is a good predictor of movements of real macroeconomic
variables (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992:901). The effects of a change in the Federal Funds rate
on non-policy variables, such as short term bank credit, can be identified with the impulse
response function (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992:902). Gertler and Gilchrist (1993:53) follow
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and estimate a VAR model, using a one standard deviation
impulse in the Federal Funds rate to capture changes in monetary policy and examine the
effects of these changes in the Fed Funds rate on aggregate (and disaggregated) bank and
non-bank credit. Following the above studies a VAR model will be estimated to determine
the effect that a change in interest rates has on the level of short term credit demand, by firms
as well as households.
A mix variable is included when estimating the firm VAR model to test for a balance sheet
channel of policy transmission, in line with Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and
Rudebusch (1996). The mix variable is defined as the ratio of short term bank debt to total
short term debt by all monetary institutions. The studies by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) and
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) both use aggregated as well as disaggregated data and both
studies conclude that there is a shift in financing from small to large firms due to
informational asymmetries. Only aggregate data could be obtained for present purposes and
thus disaggregated data is not considered, which has implications for the interpretation of the
mix variable, discussed below.
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The VAR methodology has not been used as frequently when testing consumption, however
the model has been used by Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) as well as Chrystal and Mizen
(2005), which is in line with the approach followed here.
7.2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE VECTOR
AUTOREGRESSIVE (VAR) MODEL
A VAR of the following form will be set out (Brooks, 2008:291). Suppose there are g variables:
Yt = β0 + β1Yt-1 + β2Yt-2 + … + βkYt-k + µt (2)
Where - β0 is a vector of gx1 intercept terms
- βi is a vector of gxg coefficient matrix for i= 1,2,…,k
- k is lag length
-Yt is a vector of gx1 dependent variables
-Yt-k is a vector of gx1 variables
- ut is a white noise error term (has zero mean and constant variance)
The VAR approach is convenient to use here because there is no need to differentiate
between endogenous and exogenous variables; all variables are treated as endogenous. By
treating each variable as endogenous there is no need to identify a structural system of
equations, which is a requirement if a simultaneous equation approach is followed (Brooks,
2008:291). The VAR framework models the variables as a result of their own lagged values
and the lagged values of other endogenous variables in the model. An advantage of using a
VAR model is that only lagged values of the endogenous variables appear on the right-hand
side of the equations and simultaneity is therefore not an issue, thus OLS estimation yields
consistent estimates (E-Views, 2008:345). Another advantage of using a VAR model is that it
allows the value of a variable to be determined by its own lagged values as well as lagged
values of other variables and is thus more flexible than autoregressive models using only one
variable, this allows the VAR model to capture more features in the data (Brooks, 2008:291).
84 | P a g e
7.3 VAR MODELLING PROCEDURE
7.3.1 Introduction
The modelling procedure will start by determining the order of integration of the time series
variables used. Following stationarity tests, a VAR model is estimated guided by the
recommended lag length selection criteria of the Schwartz, Akaike and Hannan-Quinn
information criteria (using stationary variables) and the optimal lag length determined.
Thirdly, stability and autocorrelation tests are done to determine the statistical properties of
the estimated VAR model and following this the VAR estimates are presented. Lastly block
exogeneity Wald tests, impulse response functions and variance decompositions are
estimated.
7.3.2 Unit root testing
The first step in the analysis is to determine which time series have a unit root and which do
not, i.e. which series are non-stationary. There are several reasons why testing the series for
stationarity is important. Firstly if a series is non-stationary a shock to the variable will persist
indefinitely, secondly, using a data series that is non-stationary can lead to spurious
regressions and finally, non-stationary time series violate the standard assumptions of
asymptotic analysis (Brooks, 2008:319-320). Two unit root tests are done to determine the
order of integration of each variable. The first test is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test and the second is the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test.
The ADF test, as opposed to the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, is used to determine the order of
integration of a non-stationary time series because the error terms may be correlated at more
than two lags (Gujarati, 2003:817). The optimal lag length for the ADF test is determined
using the Schwarz information criteria with a maximum lag length of 10, as it is assumed that
this lag length will fully account for any non-stationarity in the data. The objective of using
an information criterion is to choose the lowest value (Brooks, 2008:232). The ADF test
equations used are given below (Gujarati 2003:817):
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∆Yt =  β1 + δYt-1 + ∑αi∆δYt-1 + εt (3)
∆Yt =  β1 + β2t + δYt-1 + ∑αi∆δYt-1 + εt (4)
where εt is a white noise error term and ∆Yt-1= (Yt-1 – Yt-2). Equation (3) is used if the stochastic
process is difference stationary and equation (4) is used if the series is trend stationary.
This test has been widely used in other studies; however, there are a number of shortcomings
of the ADF test. Firstly, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the time
series depends on the lag length used. The lag length can be chosen using information
criteria, such as the Schwarz or Akaike criteria, or can be chosen using the partial
autocorrelation function (PACF) (Drake and Chrystal, 1994:484). Information criteria are
used here to determine the optimal lag length and the PACF is not considered. Secondly,
most Dickey-Fuller based tests will fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root more often
than is necessary, which may lead to model misspecification (Gujarati, 2003:819). Finally, it
has been suggested that the standard ADF test may not pick up a unit root in the data due to a
structural break because there is an implicit assumption of time invariance for the intercept
and slope coefficients of the time series within the ADF test (Gregory and Hansen,
1996:102).
For these reasons the study will also use the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, Shin (KPSS)
test which runs a regression of a dependent variable (say Yt) on an intercept variable and time
trend variable using OLS and the residuals are then used to calculate the test statistic. This
method has the following advantages: the variance of the error tem can be corrected for
autocorrelation using the Newey-West technique (Verbeek, 2004:271), does not suffer from
small sample problems (Burger, 2008:11) and is not dependent on lag length selection, as is
the ADF test.
(5) = ∑ / ( )
Two diagnostic tests are done, the first is concerned with the stability of the VAR model and
is conducted using an AR unit roots graph, while the second test is concerned with serial
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correlation, and is conducted using an autocorrelation LM test. When analysing the
stationarity of the VAR model using the AR roots graph the estimated VAR is stationary if all
roots lie inside the unit circle (E-views, 2007:348).
A Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autocorrelation is used to detect the presence of serial
correlation between the residuals in the VAR model and reports test statistics for serial
correlation up to a specified lag order. Lagged residuals of the explanatory variables are run
against the residuals of a dependent variable and tested for statistical significance following
the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation. The LM test follows the Chi squared
distribution asymptotically (E-Views, 2008:350).
Due to the VAR model having several lagged values of the same variables, each estimated
coefficient may not be statistically significant. The significance of the estimated coefficient(s)
is tested jointly using the standard F-test (Gujarati, 2003:850). The F-test is used to determine
the overall significance of the regressions, which can be done because the VAR model is run
using the OLS method (Gujarati, 2003:822). Once the above steps are completed, Granger
causality/ block significance tests, impulse response functions and variance decompositions
are carried out.
7.4 BLOCK SIGNIFICANCE AND CAUSALITY TESTS
It is often difficult to determine which sets of variables have a significant effect on each of
the dependent variables within a VAR model when the model includes a large number of
lags. The evaluation of the significance of the variables included in the VAR model occurs on
the basis of joint tests using the F-test framework on all lags of a certain variable in a given
equation (Brooks, 28:297).
One feature of a VAR model is that it allows the testing of correlation between variables.
Granger (1969) developed a way to test correlation which is defined as: a variable (yt) is said
to Granger-cause another variable (xt), if (xt) can be better predicted by using past values of
(yt) as opposed not including past values of (yt) (Asteriou and Hall, 2007:281). It must be
noted that Granger-causality does not mean that a movement in one variable necessarily
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causes movements in another variable, but rather Granger causality means that there is a
correlation between the current value of one variable and past values of other variables
(Brooks, 2008:298). The estimation procedure is as follows (Asteriou and Hall, 2007:281):
Yt = α1 + βiXt-i) + γiYt-j) + e1t (6)
Xt = α2 + ζiXt-i) + δjYt-j) + e2t (7)
Where Yt and Xt are two variables of interest and it is assumed that e1t and e2t are white
noise error terms.
The F-test is conducted following the null hypothesis that neither the sum of the βi or δj
coefficients are jointly equal to zero (Asteriou and Hall, 2007:282-283). If lagged X terms in
equation (6) are statistically different from zero as a group and lagged Y values from
equation (7) are not statistically different from zero then Xt is said to Granger-cause changes
in Yt, and vice versa. If both variables are statistically different from zero then there is bi-
directional causality between variables, however if both variables are not statistically
different from zero then Xt and Yt are independent (Asteriou and Hall, 2007:282).
7.5 IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS AND VARIANCE
DECOMPOSITION
The impulse response function traces the effects of an exogenous shock to the different
endogenous variables in the VAR model (Brooks, 2007:340). The shock is applied to the
error term of each individual equation within the VAR model and this shock can be traced for
several periods into the future (Gujarati, 2003:854). If the VAR model is stationary the
impulse response function is given as:
Yt = Φiεt-i) (8)
The coefficientΦi can be interpreted as the response of one variable to a one standard
deviation shock to another variable one period ago (Aziakpono, 2006:7). If the data series are
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stationary the shock should die out over time, because there is no unit root in the time series
(Brooks, 2008:299). The generalized impulse response function will be used because one of
its advantages is that the ordering of the variables within the VAR is invariant, i.e. it does not
matter what order the variables are run within the model (Aziakpono, 2006:8). The Impulse
response function will be run using a lag length of 24, i.e. two years.
Variance decomposition analysis focuses on the forecast error variance of a variable that
results from shocks in other variables. Variance decomposition can be used to determine the
relative strength of innovations in a variable and is generally used as a convenient method of
providing a breakdown of the change in the value of a variable as a result of changes in both,
the same variable, as well as other variables of interest in previous periods (Kasri, 2010:51).
7.6 VARIABLES CHOSEN FOR INCLUSION IN FIRM AND HOUSEHOLD
VAR MODELS
The first step in the analysis is to determine which variables should be included in the VAR
model for both households and firms. The inclusion of explanatory variables within the VAR
is guided by theory and empirical research. Two separate VAR models are estimated, one for
the short term credit demand of firms and another for household credit demand.
7.6.1 Variables included in firm model
The present study is primarily interested in the effects of changes in the repo rate on short
term credit demand. The money supply is assumed to be endogenously determined and the
demand for short term credit is a function of the level of working capital required by firms.
Factors affecting the working capital needs of firms include raw material and labour costs and
following this line of reasoning the following variables are included in the VAR model:
LTL = (LWB, S, PPI, RT, DR, MIX) (9)
The equation has been modified to use the log of total short term lending (LTL) to firms by
the banking sector, as well as the log of the wage bill (LWB), because the study is interested
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in the percentage change in bank lending to the private sector as a result of a change in the
repurchase rate and the logarithm of a variable will give the percentage change in that
variable. Explanatory variables considered included the wage bill (LWB), stockbuilding (S),
secondary tax on companies (TAX) and the Producer Price Index (PPI). The TAX variable is
excluded from the list of variables because Moore (1983) found that the tax variable was
either not significant or showed the wrong expected relationship with bank lending to ICC’s.
A nominal interest rate (DR) is included in models by Moore (1983) and Moore and
Threadgold (1985). The inclusion of a nominal interest rate is of primary importance because
the effect that interest rates have on credit demand is the primary aim of the study. A round
tripping (RT) variable is included following studies by Moore and Threadgold (1985) as well
as Cuthbertson (1985), which both found the round tripping variable to help explain
movements in credit demand by firms.
Lastly a mix (LMIX) variable is added following studies by Kashyap et al (1993), Gertler and
Gilchrist (1993), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) and Iturriaga (2000) to help identify a balance
sheet channel of policy transmission through which changes in interest rates have an effect on
credit demand and ultimately real economic activity. As discussed above the mix variable is
calculated as the ratio of short term bank debt to total short term debt. Evidence of a balance
sheet channel is indicated by a decrease in the LMIX variable because a decrease in the
LMIX variable implies that firms are shifting from bank into non-bank debt. The mix
variable will be dealt with in more detail in the next sub-section.
Total lending to the private sector is expected to have a positive relationship with wages
(LWB), changes in inventories (S), the round tripping variable (RT) and the Producer Price
Index (PPI), while the interest rate is expected to have a negative relationship with bank
lending to companies. The mix variable (LMIX) has no a priori relationship with bank
lending, the purpose of the mix variable is to help identify a balance sheet channel via the
response of bank and non-bank forms of credit as interest rates change, as explained by
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) above.
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7.6.1.1. Interpretation of the mix variable
A secondary, yet subordinate, aim of the study is to identify a balance sheet channel within
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. It is noted at the outset that the credit
channel is made up of both the bank lending channel as well as the balance sheet channel of
monetary policy transmission, however no attempt is made to distinguish between the two as
discussed in section 4.3.2. The underlying approach followed is that there is either a balance
sheet channel or there is not. The balance sheet channel will be identified against the more
traditional money view of policy transmission. With this in mind attention will now turn to
the interpretation of movements in the mix variable.
KWS (1993) were among the first to use a mix variable to identify a bank lending channel of
policy transmission using aggregate data. It is noted at the outset that the argument here is
that the traditional bank lending channel is theoretically flawed, however the study is
considered because the mix variable has been used in other studies which have interpreted the
results somewhat differently. The logic behind the mix variable is that a decrease in the mix
variable implies that a bank lending channel is operative because a move towards a more
contractionary monetary policy by the central bank will decrease the supply of bank loans to
firms and firms will then move into the direct debt market to satisfy their demand for funds
(thereby increasing the denominator). If however there is no change in the mix variable then
the money channel is operative because there will be a proportional decrease in both direct
and indirect forms of financing due to a decrease in the total demand for funds as a result of
higher borrowing costs. Evidence given by KWS (1993) showed the mix variable to decrease
when measured using aggregate data and this implies that a bank lending channel is operative
and operates according to monetarist principles. This interpretation is not in line with Post-
Keynsian theory and an alternative interpretation of the mix variable is offered which is in
line with the evidence presented by KWS (1993). In an economy with heterogeneous agents
aggregate results must be treated with caution (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996:308). Gertler and
Gilchrist (1993) as well as Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) follow KWS (1993) by using a mix
variable, however movements in the mix variable are interpreted somewhat differently and it
is this alternative interpretation that is followed here.
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Gertler and Gilchrist (1993:54) found that the mix variable declined following a policy
contraction when calculated using aggregate data which is in line with KWS (1993);
however, the decline in the mix variable is due to an increase in commercial paper and not a
decrease in bank loans to firms. When disaggregated data is used it is shown that bank loans
to large firms actually increase, whereas bank loans to small firms initially increase (to a
lesser extent than large firms) before decreasing. This implies that a greater amount of credit
flows to large firms as opposed to small firms following a policy contraction (Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1993:58). When only short term credit is considered in constructing the mix
variable, results showed that bank loans actually increased following a policy contraction (as
did nonbank debt), with a greater amount of credit again flowing to large firms as opposed to
small firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:59). Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) showed similar
results to Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) in that more credit flows to larger firms following a
tighter monetary policy than it does to small firms when the mix variable is calculated using
disaggregated data. When calculating the mix variable using aggregate data evidence showed
a decrease in the mix variable, however bank credit to larger firms increased which is not in
line with the interpretation by KWS (1993). It was found that there was a reallocation of
credit between small and large firms, rather than between bank and non-bank sources of debt
(Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996:303).
The interpretation of the decrease in the mix variable offered by KWS (1993) is that the drop
in the mix variable is due to a decrease in bank lending and increase in non-bank lending.
Both the studies by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) also found
the mix variable to decrease when measured using aggregate data however, when the mix
variable is measured using disaggregated data evidence showed bank lending to large firms
actually increases and thus “…it appears clear that one cannot argue monetary contractions
limit the supply of bank debt relative to other forms of finance” (Oliner and Rudebusch,
1996:308). The observation in the studies by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and
Rudebusch (1996) was that the aggregate mix variable decreased (as in KWS (1993)) because
non-bank forms of debt were increasing, rather than bank forms of debt decreasing (as in
KWS (1993)), which opens up the possibility that the behaviour of the mix variable could
explain the effect of credit flowing from smaller to larger firms in line with the balance sheet
channel (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:60). This interpretation is also noted by Oliner and
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Rudebusch (1996) who interpret the decrease in the aggregate mix variable as the result of a
shift of short term credit away from small firms to larger firms.
In conclusion movements in the mix variable are taken to imply that credit market frictions
are present within the economy and a decrease in the mix variable implies that funds are
shifting from smaller firms to larger firms and larger firms are in turn increasing their level of
non-bank debt. This occurs because during economic downturns large firms can satisfy most
of their short term credit needs, while smaller firms may not be able to satisfy their credit
needs, and this will result in a decline in the mix variable (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993:60).
7.6.2. Variables included in the household model
The choice of variables used in the household VAR model is guided by the framework
presented by Lavoie (1994) discussed in section 5.3.2 as well as the contribution made by
Dutt (2006) and the primary aim of the study. Dutt (2006) recognises the importance of the
role of credit in consumption expenditure and aggregate demand. Consumption is seen to be a
function of the six principles outlined by Lavoie (1994). The primary aim of the study is to
determine the size and lag length effects of a change in the prime rate on the level of
household credit extension and therefore household credit and the prime interest rate are
included as variables in the VAR model. A credit variable is added following Dutt (2006) to
determine if consumption does in fact influence credit extension and by implication provide
support for the argument that an increase in credit financed consumption will lead to an
increase in aggregate demand.
Consumers are viewed as procedurally rational in the sense that they have a limited
computational capacity as well as operate in a highly uncertain world and as a result may not
correctly predict future outcomes, for example wage increases. It was proposed above that
social influences and background identity affect an individual’s consumption habits more
than the individual’s level of income once a certain income level is reached and all basic
needs have been satisfied. The testing of the hypothesis of which of the above two factors
influence consumption to a greater degree is outside the scope of the discussion as the aim
here is to determine the size and lag length effects of changes in household credit demand as
a result of changes in the prime lending rate of South African Banks.
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For simplicity consumption is assumed to be a function of income as data is more readily
available. The assumption that consumption is a function of income is in line with Keynes’
original theory and an income variable is included in the model (Keynes, 1936:90). If credit
is found to have a relationship with consumption then this implies that any changes in the
ability of households to access credit for whatever reason may have real economic impacts.
The following VAR models are considered:
LCREDIT = LCREDIT (LCONS, LINC, PR) (10)
Compared to
LCREDIT = LCREDIT (LCONS, LINC, PR, DUM1) (11)
and
LCREDIT = LCREDIT (LCONS, LINC, PR, DUM2, LINC*DUM2) (12)
where LCONS represents the consumption of real, seasonally adjusted, non-durable goods
and services. Similar measures of consumption have been used by Campbell and Mankiw
(1990). LINC represents real, seasonally adjusted, household disposable income which
follows similar measures of income by Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) and Chrystal and Mizen
(2005). Both variables are modelled in logarithms as this gives changes in percentage value.
LCREDIT is represented by total credit by all monetary institutions to the household sector,
modelled in logarithmic form, and PR is the prime overdraft rate of South African
commercial banks. A credit variable is added following the by Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997),
Chrystal and Mizen (2005) and Dutt (2006).
A dummy variable (DUM1) is added to the model to account for the introduction of the
National Credit Act on the 1st of June 2007, as in equation (11). The dummy variable
(DUM1) will take a value of 1 for the period after the first of June 2007 and zero otherwise.
The dummy variable will be added to the above variables and the results of each OLS
regression compared. This is an econometrically acceptable method of determining the
explanatory significance of a dummy variable within an OLS equation (A VAR is a series of
OLS equations) as the equation without the dummy variable (equation 10) can be thought of
as an unrestricted version of the equation with the dummy variable and standard F-test used
to determine the explanatory power of the dummy variable equation.
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After examining the graphical representation of the LCREDIT series (Appendix 2) for the
unit root test there is an argument for the inclusion of a second dummy variable (DUM2)
within the VAR model, as in equation (12), because of the marked change in the slope of the
LCREDIT series. The DUM2 variable will take a value of 1 for the period between
December 1999 and December 2007 and zero otherwise. A slope dummy is also included for
the LINC variable (LINC*DUM2) because consumers may have formed exponential
expectations of future income which led to an exponential increase in credit demand between
December 1999 and December 2007.
LCREDIT is expected to have a positive relationship with LCONS and LINC, while PR is
expected to have a negative relationship with LCREDIT.
7.7 DATA SOURCES AND TIME SERIES VARIABLES USED
Data were collected from Thompson Data Stream (TDS) and the South African Reserve Bank
website for the period January 1995 to March 2011, unless otherwise stated data used were
(throughout) collected from TDS. March 2011 was chosen as an end date because some
series were converted from a quarterly to a monthly frequency and the first quarter of the year
consists of January through March. Adjustment from quarterly to monthly frequency was
done using the quadratic match average method of interpolation. Both firm and household
data are recorded at current prices and seasonally adjusted using the X11 filter. Current,
seasonally adjusted data was used (as opposed to using seasonally adjusted real data) because
price effects are assumed to be a factor that determines both the demand for working capital
as well as household credit demand given future income expectations. Price effects are
retained for firms because when firms borrow for working capital purposes they take into
account nominal rather than real factors, such as wage costs or the cost of input prices, while
households use prices in determining the nominal amount of credit to borrow today to
supplement current consumption based of future expectations of income.
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7.7.1 Data used for firm VAR model
The time series data for S and PPI were collected from the South African Reserve bank
website. The WB, S and PPI time series were only available at quarterly frequency and
converted to monthly frequency. Total short term lending by banks (representing lending for
working capital finance) to firms (LTL) is calculated as: advances by South African banks to
the domestic private sector less mortgage advances by banks less investment advances by
banks, seasonally adjusted and modelled in logarithmic form. Wages (LWB) are seasonally
adjusted and modelled in logarithmic form. The Producer Price Index (PPI) is used as a proxy
for the price of imported materials variable (MBill) used by Moore (1983). The import price
index was considered for inclusion rather than the PPI because it is a closer approximation to
the (MBill) variable used by Moore (1983), however the PPI was chosen instead as it
represents a broader measure of the cost of inputs than simply considering imported input
goods. The stockbuilding variable is proxied by the change in inventories (S) and is
seasonally adjusted, as an absolute measure of inventories was not available for South Africa.
The round tripping (RT) variable used is calculated as the excess of the three month Treasury
Bill rate less the prime overdraft rate charged by banks (Moore and Threadgold, 1985:69) and
the interest rate variable included is the Reserve Bank discount rate (DR).
The mix variable (LMIX) follows the definition set out by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996)
using short term credit measures because the focus of the study is on short term credit
demand, rather than total credit demand, and thus only short term measures of bank and non-
bank credit are used in constructing the mix variable. The mix variable is calculated as the
ratio of short term bank lending to the private sector (LTL) to total short term domestic credit
extension by all monetary institutions. Total short term domestic credit extension is defined
as the sum of discount bills, leasing finance, other loans and total loans and advances by all
monetary institutions, refer to appendix 1.
7.7.2 Data used for household VAR model
The income variable (LINC) is proxied by nominal, seasonally adjusted household disposable
income. Household credit (LCREDIT) is proxied by nominal, seasonally adjusted credit
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extended by all monetary institutions to households. Household consumption (LCONS) data
was taken from the SARB and is proxied by current, seasonally adjusted consumption of non-
durable goods and services. All three variables above are converted to logarithmic form. The
interest rate is represented by the SA bank prime lending rate (PR) - refer to appendix 1.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
RESULTS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The results are presented below for firms and households separately as follows: firstly a
graphical analysis is done with respect to of the short term bank lending and the mix variable
for firms and consumer credit for households. These series are discussed to better understand
the possible factors affecting the series and their relationship with each respective interest
rate. An informal graphical analysis of time series variables thought to contain a structural
break is also conducted to informally determine if the use of the KPSS test is a better
statistical test of stationarity than the ADF test because the ADF test does not account for
structural breaks. Formal unit root test results are then reported. Thirdly VAR model lag
length selection results as well as stability and autocorrelation test results are presented with
the VAR estimation results. Finally results of the Granger causality/block exogeneity tests,
impulse response functions and variance decompositions are discussed.
8.2 ANALYSIS OF FIRM VAR RESULTS
8.2.1 Graphical analysis of firm data
Figure 8.2.1 (a): Short term bank lending
There are two periods in the LTL series where a sharp
drop in short term bank lending can be identified. In the
first period there is a sharp decrease in short term
lending at around December 2002 to around November
2003. Short term bank lending then rises back to its
original level at around October 2005. The second
noticable drop in short term bank lending is the period
between September 2008 and October 2008. To better
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understand these movements a graph of the raw, seasonally adjusted data is given below
(ie the data before logarithmic convertion):
Figure 8.2.1 (a1): Seasonally adjusted short term lending
The decrease in bank lending from December 2002 to
November 2003 is likely the result of geopolitical
uncertainty and higher interest rates. Two phases of
economic development can be identified in 2003. The
first half of 2003 was a period of global uncertainty as a
result of the US invasion of Iraq, which broke out in
March 2003, and other geopolitical issues which tested
the strength of the global financial system. The global
uncertainty caused by the invasion of Iraq was added to by the SARS outbreak in the Asia
pacific region and parts of North America (SARB, 2003:1). The global economic position in
2003 had a significant impcat on the South African economy in two ways. Firstly, there was a
reduction in demand for South African exports which in  turn lead to a decrease in real GDP
growth and secondly, there was an appreciation of the rand which reduced the
competitiveness of South African exports (SARB, 2003:2).
The second period of decline in total lending is in 2008 from September to October. There
was a severe downturn in the global economy in the last months of 2008 which had an impact
on the South African economy (SARB, 2009:29). The collapse of a major U.S investment
bank (Lehman Brothers) in September 2008 led to a drop in the confidence of investors
globally and “shock and extreme risk aversion paralysed financial markets and liquidity
disappeared as a standard assumption underlying transactions – that the counterparty is a
growing concern – was negated” (SARB, 2009:34). This decrease in liquidity may be seen in
the drop in short term bank lending, however this was likely the result of a supply side
reaction by banking institutions, as opposed to a decrease in demand by firms,  as the reason
for the decrease in confidence was an increased level of debt, as well as bad debts, by the US
consumer and financial institutions.
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Figure 8.2.1 (b): Wages
There may be a structural break in the wages series as
the series seems to increase sharply between April 2002
and September 2002. The sharp increase is likely the
result of human error on the part of Thompson Data
Stream. Statistics South Africa shows gross salaries and
wages for the second and third quarters to be
R84 045 877 and R89 399 049 respectively (Statistics
South Africa, 2002:10). It is noted that the third quarter
figures differ from earlier releases in that the figures include 11 289 people in the reserve
forces (Statistics South Africa, 2002:2). The figures recorded by Thompson Data Stream for
the same period show a value of 84 045 877 for the second quarter and a figure of 118 240
327 for the third quarter, which is substantially greater than the third quarter figure given by
Stats SA. The TDS series is still used however as there was no comparable series given by
the SARB and no attempt is made to correct the suspected measurement error.
Figure 8.2.1 (c): Mix variable
The mix variable shows a sharp decline at around
the same time periods as the short term bank lending
(LTL) variable. The two seasonality adjusted
variables, ie numerator and denominator, are
considered below:
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Figure 8.2.1 (c.1): Seasonally adjusted raw data Figure 8.2.1 (c.2): Logarithmic data
Where MIST is short term lending by all monetary institutions to the domestic private sector
and LMIST is the logarithm of the MIST variable. Graph (c.1) shows that the decline in the
mix variable is likely the result of a decrease in short term bank lending, rather than an
increase in short term private sector credit extension by all monetary institutions. Graph (c.2)
shows similar results to (c.1), however the logarithm of the mix and total short term lending
variables are also compared with the discount rate. The short term credit extension variables
show a stable relationship up to December 2002, when bank credit extension dropped.
Following this drop the relationship between the credit variables does not seem to be as stable
as prior to December 2002. The mix variable does not seem to be very responsive to changes
in the discount rate and seems to be influenced more by global economic factors. This lack of
response of the mix variable, and therefore the variables used to calculate the mix variable,
may imply that short term bank lending does not respond in a meaningful way to changes in
monetary policy and thus monetary policy may in fact have a limited ability to curb short
term spending within the domestic economy.
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8.2.2. Unit root test results using firm data (refer to appendix 2)
Table 8.2.2.1
Variable ADF test KPSS test
LTL I(1) None N/A
LWB I(1) Trend and
Intercept
I(1) Trend and
Intercept
S I(1) None N/A
PPI I(1) Trend and
Intercept
I(1) Trend and
Intercept
RT I(1) None N/A
DR I(1) None I(1) Intercept
LMIX I(1) None N/A
LWB and PPI are shown to contain a unit root in both the ADF and KPSS tests, and are thus
taken to be first difference stationary. The possible structural break in the LWB series was
not found to influence the unit root test results. The ADF test showed all variables to be first
difference stationary except for the S variable, which was shown to be second difference
stationary when assuming a no trend and no intercept functional form.
The KPSS test shows mixed results for the LTL, S, RT and LMIX variables. An informal
graphical analysis of these series strongly indicates that the series do not have a trend or
intercept and thus the ADF test will be relied on when determining the stationarity of these
variables because the KPSS test does not test for a unit root under a no trend and no intercept
functional form. All graphs can be seen in appendix 2.
A second ADF test was then run on the S variable using the ADF test; however the test is
conducted using an automatically minimised Schwarz criterion, because the lag length of the
test influences the estimates of the ADF test and a minimised Schwarz criterion implies an
optimal lag length. Using an automatically minimised Schwarz criterion the S variable was
shown to be first difference stationary under all assumed functional forms. Thus all variables
are modelled as first difference stationary.
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8.2.3 VAR estimation results (refer to appendix 3)
The first step in determining the most appropriate VAR model is to select the appropriate lag
length. A lag length selection test was done using a maximum lag length of 10. The Schwartz
and Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggest an optimal lag length of 1 and the Akaike
criterion shows an optimal lag length of 8. A VAR model with a lag length of 1 is estimated
and an LM autocorrelation test, with a maximum lag length of 12, is conducted to determine
the extent of serial correlation within the residuals and results suggest that serial correlation is
present. If there is serial correlation in the residuals one of the assumptions of the Classical
Linear Regression Model (CLRM) is violated, this will affect the estimated coefficients
within an OLS regression and by implication VAR model coefficients.
One of the assumptions of the CLRM is that the covariance between the error terms over time
is zero (Brooks, 2008:139). If there is serial correlation in the residuals the coefficient
estimates of an OLS regression are unbiased, however they are not efficient (i.e. the
coefficient estimates are not best linear unbiased estimates), so that standard error estimates
may be incorrect, which will in turn influence the magnitude of the t-statistics. If the standard
error estimate of a variable is not accurate then the wrong inferences could be made about the
influence that variable has on an independent variable in an OLS regression (Brooks,
2008:149). If the serial correlation in the residuals is positive then standard error estimates
will be biased downward and this will lead to an increase in the probability of a type I error,
i.e. the tendency to reject the null hypothesis when it is correct (Brooks, 2008:150).
A VAR model with a lag length of one is estimated as suggested by the Schwarz and
Hannan-Quinn information criteria, however due to the level of serial correlation within the
residuals at a lag length of 1 a second VAR model is estimated with a lag length of 8, as
suggested by the Akaike criteria. Results of the LM test for serial correlation on a VAR
model with an estimated lag length of 8 suggest that there is a smaller amount of
autocorrelation compared to lag 1.
The problem with going from 1 lag to 8 lags, however, is that an increased lag length
consumes degrees of freedom within the VAR model and thus the model is estimated using
fewer observations from within the sample data. The lag length can be increased at the
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expense of degrees of freedom, but the increase in lag length is likely to decrease the amount
of autocorrelation between the residuals and more favourable LM tests results will be
obtained. The increase from lag 1 to lag 8 is acceptable because the data used is of monthly
frequency and the number of observations included after adjusting for the degrees of freedom
required by a model with a lag length of 8 is 186, compared with a total sample of 195
observations, and therefore the sample still includes data for 15, 5 years which is a large
enough sample size.
A second reason for the use of the higher lag length, apart from still having a sufficient
sample size, is that the reliability of standard error estimates is seen as more important than
having a relatively larger sample size because it is argued that more accurate standard error
and t statistics estimates in a smaller sample size is better than having a larger sample size
with inaccurate standard error estimates. Since lag 8 is indicated as the lag which minimizes
the Akaike information criterion, any increase in lag length from lag 8 is seen as an
unnecessary use of extra degrees of freedom. Therefore the final VAR model is estimated
using 8 lags. An AR unit roots test shows that all unit roots lie inside the unit circle and thus
the VAR is stable.
8.2.3.1 Coefficient estimates of firm VAR model
The Schwarz and Akaike criteria for the model as a whole are around -6.33 and -13.25
respectively. Only the individual results for the LTL variable (taken as the dependent
variable) will be discussed as the focus here is on the effects of the repo rate on bank lending.
The estimates of the VAR model show an R-squared of about 0.42 and an adjusted R-squared
of around 0.16. The F statistic is around 1.64, with a critical value of around 1.43 and 1.66 for
the 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. Thus all variables do jointly influence
LTL at the 5% level of significance but not at the 10% level of significance. Only three
variables were found to be individually statistically significant, these were the fifth lag of the
LTL series, the first lag of the DR series and the fifth lag of the LMIX variable, with
coefficient estimates of -1.13, 0.05 and 6.37 respectively. The LTL and DR coefficient
estimates are not in line with expectations. All other variables and lag lengths were not found
to be statistically significant.
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The LWB variable showed the correct expected relationship with LTL at lags 1, 3, 4 and 7,
with coefficient estimates ranging from between 0.09 at lag 3 to about 4.09 at lag 4, with the
first lag showing a coefficient of about 2.33. The S variable shows the correct expected
relationship at lags 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7. The coefficient estimates of the S variable with the
correct expected relationship with LTL range from around 0.002 at lag 8 to around 0.22 at lag
4, with lag one showing a coefficient of about 0.15. The PPI has the correct expected
relationship with LTL at lags 1, 3, 6 and 7 with coefficient estimates ranging between 0.0019
and 0.0105. RT shows the correct relationship at lags 4, 5 and 7 and coefficient estimates
range from 0.0030 to 0.0063.
As mentioned above it is difficult to interpret the results of individual coefficient estimates
within a VAR model with a large lag length and it is for this reason Granger-causality tests,
impulse response functions and variance decompositions are used, to which attention is now
turned.
8.2.4 Granger-causality test results (refer to appendix 7)
First the results relating to the influence that changes in the repo rate (DR) have on the level
of short term bank lending (LTL) will be discussed. Next the results concerning the LMIX
variable will be covered and the implications these results have for a balance sheet channel of
policy transmission.
Table 8.2.4.1
There is a unidirectional relationship
between DR and LTL, where DR is
seen to Granger-cause LTL at the
10% level of significance. Thus the
repo rate does have a statistically
significant relationship with short
term bank lending, in line with
expectations.
Dependent variable: D(LTL)
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob.
D(LWB) 5.947960 8 0.6531
D(S) 4.512514 8 0.8082
D(PPI) 5.723173 8 0.6782
D(RT) 3.883333 8 0.8675
D(DR) 14.52011 8 0.0692
D(LMIX) 12.92518 8 0.1144
All 57.63259 48 0.1608
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All variables were not found to be jointly significant in influencing LTL, which is not in line
with expectations. LWB, PPI and RT are all independent of LTL implying that none of these
variables have a relationship with LTL, which is not in line with expectations because LWB,
PPI and RT are expected to positively influence LTL.
There is unidirectional causality between LTL and S, such that LTL is seen to Granger-cause
S. This is not in line with expectations because the level of inventories should have an effect
on short term bank lending, and not vice versa, because entrepreneurs will increase the level
of working capital finance in order to increase the level of inventories. Next, results
concerning the LMIX variable are discussed.
Table 8.2.4.2
DR is shown to Granger-cause
changes in LMIX but not vice-versa,
which is in line with expectations.
LTL is shown to be independent of
LMIX. It is argued that there is
indirect and weak evidence of a
balance sheet channel of policy
transmission which can be inferred
from the definition of the mix
variable.
If LTL does not have a significant relationship with LMIX but movements in DR have a
significant relationship with LMIX, then the movement in the LMIX variable must be the
result of movements in non-bank sources of finance brought about by changes in the repo
rate. Changes in non-bank sources of finance result from changes in the repo rate and thus
there is indirect evidence of a balance sheet channel of policy transmission because firms are
shifting into non-bank sources of finance. The shift from indirect to direct sources of finance
is possible only for large firms as their creditworthiness relative to other firms makes this
form of financing more attractive which indicates that credit is moving from smaller to larger
firms.
Dependent variable: D(LMIX)
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob.
D(LTL) 12.49059 8 0.1306
D(LWB) 5.617179 8 0.6900
D(S) 4.730909 8 0.7859
D(PPI) 5.782416 8 0.6716
D(RT) 3.415110 8 0.9057
D(DR) 14.64514 8 0.0664
All 58.99442 48 0.1328
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It must be noted that the direction of the change in non-bank sources of finance cannot be
determined using this method and the inference of a balance sheet channel is made assuming
that non-bank sources of financing are increasing, in line with the interpretation of the mix
variable adopted here. The direction and magnitude of the change in the mix variable will,
however, be analysed below using impulse response functions.
8.2.5 Impulse response function results (refer to appendix 9)
Figure 8.2.5.1:- Effect of a shock to DR on LTL
The LTL variable increases initially to its maximum
value of around 0.0258% at lag 2 and drops to around
-0.0114%  at lag 3, reaching a minimum value of around
-0.018223%  at lag 5. The initial increase in LTL can be
interpreted as being in line with expectations because it
was shown by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993:59) and
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996:303) above that short term
bank lending initially increases following a policy
shock. The impulse response function then hovers
around zero, eventually dying out at around lag 24. The results show that the magnitudes of
the movements in LTL as a result of a shock to DR are not large, although statistically
significant as shown by the Granger-causality test. The magnitudes of changes in LTL are
small and this implies that the central bank has a limited ability to influence the level of bank
credit extension in the short term.
Figure 8.2.5.2:- Effect of a shock to DR on LMIX
The LMIX variable initially increases to a maximum of
around 0.0044% at lag 2, before decreasing at lag 3 to
around -0.0021%, which follows the LTL impulse
response function above quiet closely. The LMIX
reaches a minimum decrease at lag 5 of around
-0.0034%. Movements in the LMIX variable are not
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particularly large, and are smaller than movements in the LTL variable above.
At first there does not seem to be a balance sheet channel of policy transmission because the
mix variable initially increases following a contractionary monetary policy shock, which is
contradictory to expectations. The mix variable is expected to decrease following a policy
contraction because short term funds flow away from smaller firms to larger firms, in line
with the interpretation offered above. A balance sheet channel can, however, be indirectly
inferred the relative size of the shifts in the LMIX variable compared to the LTL variable is
examined, as well as factors influencing the LMIX variable. This inference relies only on the
definition of the mix variable and is taken as very weak evidence of a balance sheet channel
of policy transmission.
The results indicate that, in response to a contractionary policy shock, the increase in the
magnitude of LTL is greater than the magnitude of the LMIX variable to the same shock. It
was also seen that Granger-causality tests showed the LMIX variable to be influenced by DR,
but not by LTL. Therefore if LTL does not influence the LMIX variable then the change in
the LMIX variable must come from changes in non-bank sources of financing. Since the
increase in LTL is greater than the increase in LMIX, the smaller increase in the LMIX
variable must be the result of an increase in non-bank sources of financing relative to bank
credit extension. A simple numerical example will clarify the argument.
It is remembered that the mix variable is calculated as the ratio of short term bank debt to
short term debt by all monetary institutions, where short term debt by all monetary
institutions is made up of bank as well as non-bank debt. If the level of short term bank debt
increases, and there is no increase or decrease in non-bank forms of financing, then there will
be no change in the mix variable in line with the money view interpretation of the mix
variable offered by KWS (1993). Another way of looking at the same problem is to only look
at the relative increases of LTL and LMIX as a result of a contractionary policy shock. If
bank debt rises by R3, where bank lending was originally at Y and assuming no change in
non-bank sources of financing, then the increase in the mix variable will be equal to 1
because (3+Y)/(3 +Y+0) = 1. If the mix variable shows a change of less than one, however, it
can be interpreted as an increase in the denominator relative to the numerator, i.e. non-bank
financing.
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An increase in the mix variable is therefore in line with the interpretation that a rise in the
short term rate of interest leads to a shift of funds between small and large firms. This is
because the change in the LMIX variable following a policy shock is smaller than the change
in LTL, following the same policy shock, and since LTL is not found to influence LMIX the
change in LMIX must be the result of an increase in non-bank sources of debt.
8.2.6. Firm variance decomposition results (refer to appendix 11)
Table 8.2.6.1
First dealing with the effects of DR in
movements of LTL, in the first period all of the
variation in LTL is due to itself accounting for
100% of the change in LTL, decreasing to
69.3% at lag 24. The DR variables accounts for
around 4.21% of the variation in LTL at lag 2,
9.21% at lag 12 and 9.337% at lag 24. Thus the
DR variable accounts for an increasing share of
the movement in LTL, reaching a maximum of
9.38% at lag 18, however the magnitude of the
influence that DR has on LTL is small in
relation to the overall movement in LTL.
Secondly, the relationship between DR, LTL and LMIX shows that the DR variable accounts
for 0.008% of the variation in the LMIX variable at lag 1, 3.87% at lag 2 and increasing to
9.32% at lag 24. LTL accounts for 97.61% of the movement in LMIX at lag 1, decreasing to
80.45% at lag 6 and reaching 66.73% at lag 24.  Thus DR is found to have a small effect on
the movement in the LMIX variable, while the LTL variable by far has the greatest impact on
the movements in the LMIX variable. The small influence of DR is found to be statistically
significant in relation to movements in LMIX, but the large influence of LTL in movements
of the LMIX was not found to be statistically significant, as indicated by the Granger
causality tests above. This result again indicates that the central bank has a limited ability to
influence the level of short term credit extension to firms.
Panel Period D(LTL) D(LMIX) D(DR)
D(LTL) 1
2
6
12
18
24
100
92.655
82.227
71.774
70.147
69.300
0
0.585
5.216
11.289
11.093
11.257
0
4.209
8.234
9.212
9.384
9.337
D(LMIX) 1
2
6
12
18
24
97.605
90.709
80.449
69.203
67.688
66.735
2.262
3.081
6.836
13.173
12.919
13.121
0.008
3.866
8.120
9.207
9.384
9.316
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8.3 ANALISYS OF HOUSEHOLD VAR RESULTS
8.3.1 Graphical analysis of household data
Figure 8.3.1 (a): Household credit
Up to around December 1999 the LCREDIT series
increases and appears to flatten off, increasing at a
decreasing rate. The series then seems to increase at
an increasing rate between about December 1999 and
December 2007, after which the series starts to
increase at a decreasing rate. There are a number of
reasons for this increase, which include firstly a
strengthening of the overall economy that led to an
accelerated increase in private sector credit extension
in June 2001 (SARB, 2001:54). There was also a strong household demand for durable as
well as non-durable goods which increased from June 2000 to March 2001. Credit extension
for durable and non-durable goods reached a record high, up to that point in time, in the first
quarter of 2001 (SARB, 2001:58). Finally, during 2005 lower interest rates, favourable
lending and borrowing conditions, wealth effects from real-estate and financial markets and
strong consumer confidence contributed to the growth in credit extension (SARB, 2005:47).
Figure 8.3.1 (a1): Graphical analysis of LCREDIT and PR
The graph shows that movements in the PR variable
do not have a significant influence on LCREDIT
which implies that changes in the prime rate of
interest does not have a significant effect on
household credit demand.
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8.3.2 Unit root test results using household data (refer to appendix 2)
Table 8.3.2.1
Variable ADF test KPSS test
LCREDIT I(1) Trend and
Intercept
I(d) > 2 Trend and
Intercept
LCONS I(1) Trend and
Intercept
I(1) Intercept
LINC I(1) Trend and
Intercept
I(1) Trend and
Intercept
PR I(1) None I(1) Intercept
LINC and PR are in line with expectations and are first difference stationary when estimated
under both the ADF and KPSS test. The LCREDIT and LCONS variables however give
mixed results.
The ADF test showed LCREDIT to be first difference stationary under both the trend as well
as trend and intercept functional forms, but second difference stationary assuming a no trend
and no intercept functional form. The LCONS series was shown to be first difference
stationary under the no trend no intercept, as well as intercept, functional forms but is shown
to be second difference stationary under the trend and intercept functional form.
The KPSS test showed the LCREDIT series to be first difference stationary under the
intercept functional form, but stationary at a higher order of integration than two, under the
trend and intercept functional form. The LCONS series is shown to be level stationary
assuming no trend and no intercept, but first difference stationary using a trend and intercept
functional form.
Given these differing results a second ADF test was performed on the LCREDIT and LCONS
variables. The ADF test is used, as opposed to the KPSS test, because both the LCREDIT and
LCONS series do not seem to exhibit a structural break based on informal graphical analysis.
The second ADF test estimated automatically minimises the Schwartz criteria, which implies
an optimal lag length. Thus the two problems identified with unit root testing above do not
apply, refer to LCREDIT and LCONS graphs in appendix 2. Results showed the LCREDIT
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and LCONS series to be first difference stationary under all assumed functional forms and
thus all variables are modelled as first difference stationary.
8.3.3 Analysis of household VAR results (refer to appendix 4)
8.3.3.1 Lag length selection and dummy variables
Lag length selection criteria with a maximum lag length of 10 showed the Akaike criteria to
be minimized at lag 10. This could mean that the Akaike criteria could not be minimized due
to an insufficient maximum lag length. The maximum lag length for the lag length selection
criteria was then increased to 14, which showed that the Akaike criterion is minimized at lag
13. Lag length selection criteria suggest that the household VAR model should be run with a
lag length of 3 according to the Schwarz criterion, a lag length of 4 according to the Hannan-
Quinn criterion, while the optimal lag length suggested by the Akaike criterion is 13.
A first VAR model was then run with a lag length of 3, but the LM autocorrelation test is not
satisfactory. A second VAR is run with a lag length of 4 and the LM test was again found to
be unsatisfactory. Following this a third VAR model is estimated using a lag length of 13 and
the LM test is satisfactory. As already mentioned, there is somewhat of a trade-off between
the lag length (degrees of freedom) and the amount of serial correlation in the residuals. Due
to the loss of efficiency in the OLS estimates, as a result of autocorrelation in the residuals,
the final household VAR model will be estimated with a lag length of 13 as the reliability of
standard error estimates is seen as more important than having a relatively larger sample size.
Any additional lags beyond 13 are seen as an unnecessary use of degrees of freedom as the
LM test was satisfactory. The number of observations included after accounting for 13 lags
are 181, which is still a sample size of 15.08 years and the loss of the degrees of freedom is
seen as acceptable. The VAR was found to have a stable AR unit roots graph.
Next the two dummy variables were included, i.e. DUM1, DUM2 and LINC*DUM2, and
compared to the model not including dummy variables, results are presented in appendix 5
and appendix 6 respectively. The information criterion for the model including the DUM1
variable as a whole showed mixed results. The Schwarz criterion increased to about -22.66
from about -22.71 and the Akaike criterion decreased to about -26.47, from about -26.45. The
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model including both DUM2 and LINC*DUM2 showed both information criteria to increase.
Both sets of dummy variables were not found to be statistically significant when taking
LCREDIT as the dependent variable. It is concluded, mainly from the fact that the DUM1,
DUM2 and LINC*DUM2 are statistically insignificant (when the LCREDIT variable is the
dependent variable) along with the increase in the Schwartz criterion in both dummy variable
models that the final VAR model will not include either of the dummy variables.
8.3.3.2 Coefficient estimates of VAR model
The VAR results indicate that the Schwarz and Akaike criteria for the model as whole are
around -22.71 and -26.45 respectively. Next only the results relating to the LCREDIT
variable as the dependent variable will be discussed because the focus of the study is on the
effect of interest rates on credit demand. The R-squared term was about 0.57 and the adjusted
R-squared was around 0.39. The F statistic is about 3.21 with a 5% critical value of around
1.5 and a 1% critical value of 1.76, thus all variables are jointly statistically different from
zero at the 1% level of significance. The final VAR model shows that 3 lags of the LCREDIT
variable are statistically significant. The LCONS variable is statistically significant at lags 10
and 12 but only lag 10 shows the correct expected relationship with a coefficient estimate of
about 1.389. The LINC variable is significant at lag 3 but has the incorrect expected
relationship. The PR variable is statistically significant at lag 6 and shows the correct
relationship with a coefficient estimate of -0.001.
Next attention is turned to the Granger-causality, impulse response function and variance
decomposition results which give a somewhat more meaningful interpretation of the VAR
results.
8.3.4 Granger causality test results (refer to appendix 8)
The results are presented in two sections, the first is concerned with the influence that the
prime rate (PR) has on household credit demand (LCREDIT) in line with the primary aim
and the second deals with the influence of consumption (LCONS) spending by households on
the demand for credit (LCREDIT) in order to better understand the role of credit in
consumption and possible real economic impacts of restricted access to credit. The
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relationship between consumption (LCONS) and income (LINC) will also be analysed in line
with the Keynesian assumption that consumption spending is a function of income.
Table 8.3.4.1
Causality tests indicate that both
LINC and LCONS Granger-cause
LCREDIT, however PR was not
found to Granger-cause
LCREDIT. All variables were
found to jointly influence
LCREDIT.
PR was found to be independent of LCREDIT which is not in line with expectations as
LCREDIT is expected to be influenced by, but not influence, PR. This result is in line with
graph 8.3.1 (a1) which shows that LCREDIT does not react significantly to PR. This implies
that the central bank has a limited ability to influence the demand for credit by households
and as a result monetary policy may not be effective in the short to medium term.
There is unidirectional causality between LCONS and LCREDIT where LCONS Granger-
causes LCREDIT which is in line with expectations. The statistically significant relationship
between household credit demand and consumption lends support to the proposition by Dutt
(2006) that credit has a role in consumption spending and by implication has real economic
effects. Next attention will be focus on the relationship between LCONS and LINC.
Table 8.3.4.2
No variables were found to
individually Granger-cause
LCONS and all variables did not
jointly influence LCONS.
LINC was found to have
unidirectional Granger-causality
with LCONS where LCONS
Granger-causes LINC, which is
Dependent variable: D(LCREDIT)
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob.
D(LCONS) 50.49846 13 0.0000
D(LINC) 28.69280 13 0.0072
D(PR) 8.784235 13 0.7890
All 77.26037 39 0.0003
Dependent variable: D(LCONS)
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob.
D(LCREDIT) 16.34071 13 0.2312
D(LINC) 7.966908 13 0.8457
D(PR) 18.02979 13 0.1564
All 44.03528 39 0.2669
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not in line with expectations because the level of income is expected to influence the level of
consumption and not vice versa. In light of this evidence the resulting analysis must be read
with caution as one of the underlying assumptions of Keynesian consumption theory has not
been borne out in the empirical results.
8.3.5 Impulse response function results (refer to appendix 10)
Firstly the effects of a shock to the prime rate of interest is analysed with
reference to its effect on credit extension in line witht the main aim of the study.
Next the influence of consumption on credit extension is discussed in line with
the ideas by Dutt (2006) and finally the relationship between consumption and
income is analysed.
Figure 8.3.5.1:- Effect on LCREDIT of a shock to PR
LCREDIT initially increases over the first two months
but the magnitude of the increase is only 0.000291%,
which is not a large increase. This increase is not in
line with expectations as credit demand is predicted to
decrease following a policy contraction. The most
significant drop in LCREDIT is between month 6 and
month 7, decreasing to a minimum value of around -
0.0005%. The impulse then moves around 0, with the
effect of the shock dying out at around month 24. This
result indicates that a change in the prime rate of interest has a very small impact on credit
extended by all South African monetary institutions (in line with graph 8.3.1 (a1))), however
the movement in credit demand is not in line with expectations.
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Figure 8.3.5.2:- Effect on LCREDIT of a shock to LCONS
LCREDIT begins by increasing over two months,
dropping during month three and then increasing to
its highest level in month 6 of 0.000832%. This result
is in line with expectations because an increase in
consumption is expected to be in part financed by
credit. The series reaches its lowest point of -
0.000584% in month 15. The increase in LCREDIT
as a result of a shock to LCONS is not large in
magnitude, although the shift is statistically significant as shown by the Granger causality
results. Thus there is a statistically significant relationship between consumption and credit,
however changes in credit demand as a result of changes in consumption are small.
8.3.6 Household variance decomposition results (refer to appendix 12)
Firstly the influence of PR in the movement of LCREDIT will be discussed as this is the
main aim of the study. Following this discussion the effects of LCONS on LCREDIT will be
considered.
Table 8.3.6.1
Estimates indicate that a large
proportion of the variation in LCREDIT
is due to its own innovations and not
due to the PR variable. In the first
period all of the variation in LCREDIT
is due to itself, reaching a minimum
value of 74.47% in month 24. PR influences the movement in the LCREDIT variable by
0.907% in month 2, with a maximum impact of 3.6% in month 24.
The LCONS series seems to contribute a greater portion to the total variation in LCREDIT
than both LINC and PR; however LINC contributes towards a greater proportion to the
movements in LCREDIT than PR. The LCONS contributes around 0.27% to the movement
Panel Period LCREDIT LCONS LINC PR
LCREDIT 1
2
6
12
18
24
100.00
97.845
81.604
77.062
75.59
74.474
0
0.266
9.868
11.422
13.2
13.724
0
0.983
6.787
7.925
7.617
8.182
0
0.907
1.741
3.591
3.593
3.619
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in LCREDIT at lag 2, 11.42% at lag 12 and 13.72% at lag 24. It would also seem that
LCONS and PR have a one period lag when influencing the change in LCREDIT.
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CHAPTER NINE
DISCUSSION
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The results of the empirical tests above are discussed beginning with firms and then focusing
on households.
9.2. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED RESULTS RELATING TO FIRMS
9.2.1 The relationship between interest rates and short term credit demand
The central aim of the study is to determine the size and lag length effects of a change in the
repo rate by the central bank and the effect this action has on short term credit demand by
firms. The results of the Granger-causality tests indicate that the repo rate does influence the
level of short term bank lending by firms; however, the impulse response function shows this
relationship to be small in magnitude. A shock to the repo rate was shown to increase short
term bank lending by a maximum of only 0.03% in the second month, with the shock
hovering around zero for about two years, before dying out. This implies that although there
is a statistically significant relationship between the repo rate and short term bank lending,
the size effect of this relationship is small and the central bank may have a limited ability to
influence the degree of short term lending by firms through policy actions. A comparison
with (although not strictly comparable) Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) who show (using US
data) total short term bank loans to increase by about 2% over 9 months after a shock to the
Fed funds rate, before returning to normal after about two years and therefore a shock has a
larger effect over a longer period than results presented here.
Variance decomposition results show that the repo rate is responsible for around 4.21% of the
movement in short term bank lending in the second month, increasing steadily over two
years, reaching a maximum contribution of about 9.38% after a year and a half. This again
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indicates that changes in the repo rate do not have a significant influence on the movement in
short term bank lending. Next results will be compared to the study by Ludi et al (2005)
which uses South African data.  It is noted that Burger (2008) also performed a study using
South African data but none of the results presented are comparable and no comparisons will
be made.
Impulse response function results by Ludi et al (2005:15) show that a shock to the repo rate
will lead to a decrease in loans over two years, reaching its lowest point of around -0.009%
after a year and a half; this is not in line with the results found here as it was shown that bank
lending initially increases for two months and then decreases over the next three months to a
minimum value of -0.018%, thus the results of this study give a larger decrease in loans after
a shock to the repo rate over a shorter period of time. The time taken for the shock to die out
also differed between studies as any shock to the repo rate will die away after a short period
of time according to results obtained here; however, Ludi et al (2005) showed a shock to the
repo rate to persist after two years.
Variance decomposition results were in line with Ludi et al (2005) in that most of the
variation in the movement of loans is accounted for by itself. Ludi et al (2005) showed that
the contribution of loans to movements in itself to be 100% in the first month, decreasing
over two years. Evidence here suggests that loans contribute to a minimum value of 69.3 % to
movements in itself after two years while Ludi et al (2005) show a value of around 40%. The
contribution of the repo rate to overall movements in loans was shown to increase over the
period from an initial value of 0 to a maximum value of around 10% after two years, in line
with the results in this study.
Therefore results here differ from Ludi et al (2005) in that they show loans to reach their
minimum decline over a shorter time frame of 5 months as opposed to a minimum decline
after a year and a half and remaining low over two years. Variance decomposition results
showed loans to have a greater influence on itself than Ludi et al (2005) with  results here
showing a value of 69.3% as opposed to a value of 40%, however variance decomposition
results regarding the influence of the repo rate on movements in loans were in line. The
results, despite giving different quantitative measurements, both agree that changes in
monetary policy have a limited ability to influence the level of bank borrowing.
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9.2.2 Evidence of a balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission
A second question addressed here is if a balance sheet channel of policy transmission can be
identified through which changes in the repo rate are thought to influence changes in short
term bank lending. The results discussed should be compared to other studies using South
African data; however, no such study was found that uses a mix variable and thus no
comparisons can be made. These results should rather serve as a comparison for any future
studies that might consider the use of a mix variable in conjunction with South African data.
Given that the mix variable increases following a shock to the repo rate evidence of a balance
sheet channel could not be found. This is because the interpretation of the mix variable
followed here predicts a decrease in the mix variable following a policy contraction as being
in line with a balance sheet channel of policy transmission. There is, however, indirect and
weak evidence of a balance sheet channel of policy transmission.
Granger causality tests indicate that the repo rate does influence the mix variable, but short
term bank lending was not shown to have an influential relationship with the mix variable.
This may be interpreted as very weak evidence for a balance sheet channel of policy
transmission due to the definition of the mix variable. The movement in the mix variable is
smaller in magnitude than movements in short term bank lending, where short term bank
lending increases to a maximum of around 0.03% in the second month, while the mix
variable increases to a maximum of around 0.004% in the same month. Both series hover
around zero, eventually dying out after two years. This indicates that the increase in short
term bank lending, as a result of a shock to the repo rate, is not accompanied by one-for-one
increase in the mix variable. This difference in the magnitude of movements between bank
lending and the mix variable implies that there are changes to non-bank sources of debt.
Changes to non-bank sources of finance can be inferred because the mix variable is found to
be significantly influenced by the policy shock (DR), therefore the mix variable does not
remain unchanged. A smaller movement of the mix variable than in short term bank lending
implies that non-bank sources of debt are increasing, due to the fact that the denominator
must be greater than the numerator in order for the movement in the mix variable to be less
than 1. Thus if the repo rate influences the mix variable but the mix variable is not influenced
by short term bank lending then the movement in the mix variable must result from the
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effects that changes in the repo rate have on movements in non-bank sources of finance,
which is only available to larger more credit worthy firms because of the problems of
asymmetric information in credit markets. This logic implies that the mix variable is moving
because firms are moving between bank and non-bank sources of finance due to an increase
in the repo rate.
Variance decomposition results showed that short term bank lending was the primary
determinant of the movements in the mix variable, accounting for 97.61% in the first month,
80.45% after 6 months and 66.74% after two years. The repo rate has an increasing influence
on movements in the mix variable, starting with a minimum impact of 0.008% in lag 1,
reaching a maximum impact of 9.38 % after 18 months and dropping to 9.32% after two
years. As can be seen, the influence of short term lending in movements of the mix variable
are the largest, however the influence of short term lending on the mix variable was not found
to be statistically different from zero. The repo rate was found to have a statistically
significant impact on the mix variable, but the influence of the repo rate on the mix variable
is small, with a maximum value of only 9.38%. This implies that changes in the repo rate do
have a statistically significant effect on bank versus non-bank sources of finance but the
effect of this change in interest rates in small.
9.3. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED RESULTS RELATING TO
HOUSEHOLDS
9.3.1 Changes in household credit demand and interest rates
An aim of the present study is to determine the effects that changes in the prime rate of
interest, charged by South African banks, have on household credit demand. The inability of
the National Credit Act dummy variable (DUM1) to increase the predictive power of the
VAR model implies that the Act has not had a significant influence on the level of credit
extended to households, while the inability of both income dummy variables (DUM2 and
LINC*DUM2) to add explanatory power to the VAR model can be taken as evidence that
consumers did not increase their demand for credit exponentially between December 1999
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and December 2007 and by implication did not form exponential expectations of income over
the same period. Therefore the final VAR model does not include any dummy variables.
Granger causality test results for the final VAR model show that changes in the prime rate of
interest are independent of the level of household credit extended by all South African
monetary institutions.  The inability of the prime rate to influence the level of household
credit demand was also seen in figure 8.2.1 (c2) above. Therefore consumers do not take into
account the price of credit when making consumption decisions and do not react significantly
to changes in the prime rate of interest; this implies an inability on the part of the central bank
to influence aggregate consumption by manipulating interest rates.
The impulse response function shows that the response of household credit to a shock in the
prime rate is small in magnitude, with the largest increase in household credit being
0.000291% in month 2 (not in line with expectations), while the largest decrease in credit
demand occurred between months 6 and 7, decreasing by only -0.0005%, then hovers around
zero with the effect of the shock dying out after two years. Thus a shock to the prime rate
does not have a sizeable impact on credit demand and the effect of the shock dies out after
two years. The movements between credit extension and the prime rate are however, not
statistically different from zero as shown by the Granger causality results.
Variance decomposition results show that changes in the prime rate of interest do not greatly
contribute to the overall movements in household credit extension. The movement in
household credit is entirely due to itself in the first month, but decreases over two years. A
change in the prime rate of interest has an increasing effect on movements in household
credit over two years, contributing to 0.525% of the movement in household credit in month
1, 1.686% after 6 months and 5.624% after 1 year, having its largest effect after two years
with a magnitude of 6.403%. It can be concluded that the effect of the prime interest rate on
overall changes in household credit has an increasing influence but the influence is small in
magnitude and not statistically significant.
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9.3.2 Credit and consumption within a Post-Keynesian framework
A secondary aim is to determine if consumption does indeed play a role in household credit
demand and by implication lend support to Dutt’s (2006) hypothesis that access to credit will
have real economic effects. As was noted above the demand for credit was influenced by
consumption spending as indicated by the Granger-causality tests. This implies that credit
extension plays a significant role in the consumption process and any changes in credit
conditions could potentially have real economic effects as a result of a lack of access to
consumption finance. These results also support the view expressed by Moore (1988) that it
is necessary for economic units to deficit-spend in order for the economy to grow. These
results must be read with caution as Granger-causality results also show that there is uni-
directional Granger-causality from consumption to income which is not in line with economic
theory.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
The primary aim of the present study was to determine the size and lag length effects of
changes in credit demand by both firms and households as a result of changes in interest
rates. It was argued that the underlying assumption of an exogenously determined money
supply as in the traditional IS/LM model does not give the correct relationship between the
money supply and output in a modern financial economy. Rather the money supply is seen to
be determined endogenously, where it is the demand for short term credit by firms which
injects money into the economy and therefore it is the demand for credit which is the relevant
variable of interest (as opposed to the demand for money). Changes in the repurchase rate by
the central bank will influence the rate at which firms can borrow for working capital
purposes and thus influence real output.
A secondary aim was to determine if a balance sheet channel can be identified through which
changes in monetary policy are thought to influence real economic variables. Another
underlying assumption of the traditional IS/LM model, challenged here, is the assumption of
perfect information. The assumption of perfect information leads to the conclusion that bank
and non-bank sources of finance are perfect substitutes; it is, however argued that credit
markets are characterised by asymmetric information and that banks play a unique role in the
economy by reducing the level of asymmetric information and in turn the price of external
funds.
The findings related to the interest rate elasticity of credit demand by firms and households
will be discussed, and attention then turn to the findings relating to the presence of a balance
sheet channel of policy transmission for both firms and households.
The demand for credit is the variable of interest here because the economy is assumed to
operate under an endogenously determined money supply. An implication of assuming an
endogenous money supply is that the demand for short term credit on the part of firms is a
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function of their working capital needs, where working capital needs are in turn a function of
labour and raw material input costs. The monetary policy authority can influence the level of
economic output by influencing the level of the repurchase rate, which will in turn have an
effect on the price of short term credit needed to finance working capital and therefore real
economic activity.
The results of the estimated VAR model suggest that a change in the repo rate is found to
have a statistically significant influence on the level of short term credit demand but this
influence is small in magnitude as shown by the impulse response function. This implies that
the central bank has a very limited ability to influence the level of short term borrowing by
firms.
The approach adopted in testing the interest rate elasticity of demand for households is based
upon a Post-Keynesian view of consumption in that consumers are seen to be influenced
more by social factors than seeking to maximise pleasure when making consumption
decisions. The study extends the Post-Keynesian framework by considering the role of credit
in the consumption process and the implications this may have for the real economy. Results
of the household VAR model show that a change in the prime rate of interest by South
African banks does not have a statistically significant relationship with household credit and
the magnitude of changes in household credit was very small. This implies that changes in the
prime rate do not significantly affect household demand for credit. It was also found that both
dummy variables did not increase the predictive power of the VAR model and therefore the
National Credit Act has not had any statistically significant effect on household credit
extension and consumers did not possess exponential income expectations.
A second aim of the study, with reference to households, is to identify if consumption
influences the level of household credit demand and lend support to the theoretical
proposition of Dutt (2006) that credit spending by households may lead to economic growth
in the short term. Results showed that consumption did have a statistically significant
relationship with household credit demand and this is taken to imply that increased
consumption financed through credit may lead to economic growth, in line with Moore
(1988). Another implication of this result is that an increased inability on the part of the
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household to access credit may lead to a decrease in consumption spending and in turn
leading to real economic consequences.
An underlying assumption of the traditional IS/LM model is that credit markets are perfect,
and by implication bank and non-bank sources of finance are perfect substitutes. This
assumption was challenged and it was argued that credit markets do not operate under
conditions of perfect information implying that bank and non-bank sources of finance are not
perfect substitutes and that there is a difference in financing costs between these two sources
of finance. One effect of asymmetric information is to drive a wedge between the cost of
external versus the use of internal funds which results in the emergence of a credit hierarchy
in which credit will flow to relatively large firms, as opposed to relatively small firms, after
an adverse economic shock. This is because larger firms are seen as less of a credit risk due
to a lower probability of default. A mix variable was used to determine the extent of
movements between bank and non-bank sources of financing. If the mix variable decreases
following a monetary policy shock it is taken as evidence of a balance sheet channel of
monetary policy transmission.
There was mixed evidence of a balance sheet channel of policy transmission. The mix
variable was shown to increase following a monetary policy contraction which is not in line
with expectations and provides evidence against a balance sheet channel of policy
transmission. Due to the way in which the mix variable was defined, however, the variable
showed very indirect evidence of a balance sheet channel of policy transmission. The
significant influence of the repo rate, as well as insignificant influence of short term bank
lending, coupled with the different changes in the magnitude of each variable is interpreted as
a movement into non-bank sources of finance.
Areas for further research might include the use of disaggregated data to determine the
existence of a balance sheet channel of policy transmission in South Africa, as well as the
different elasticities of credit demand between small and large firms.
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APPENDIX 1
CALCULATION OF VARIABLES
Firm variables
Credit (Monthly data):- current prices not seasonally adjusted
= SA bank assets: advances to the private sector less
SA bank mortgage advances less
SA bank investment advances
Then seasonally adjust and convert to logarithmic form
Wage bill (Quarterly data):- Current prices, not seasonally adjusted
SA wages (Methodology break at Q3 2009)
Then seasonally adjust current data
Quarterly data was converted to monthly data
Then converted to logarithmic form
Producer Price Index (Quarterly):- Price index (2000=100), seasonally adjusted
Converted to monthly data
Stockbuilding Variable (Quarterly Data):- Current price, seasonally adjusted
Change in Inventories is converted to monthly data
RT (Monthly):-
= 3month Treasury Bill rate less Prime Lending Rate by SA banks
Interest Rate: South African Reserve Bank discount rate
MIX = SA bank lending to private sector less
SA bank mortgage advances less
SA bank investment advances
(divided by)
Total short term domestic credit
Extension by all SA Monetary Institutions
The log of the mix variable (LMIX)is calculated as the ratio of the log of each individual
variable and not the log of the mix ratio.
Where
Total Domestic credit extension by all SA monetary institutions
= discount bills + leasing finance + other loans + total loans and advances
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Household Variables
Income Variable (Quarterly) :- current prices not seasonally adjusted
= Household disposable income
seasonally adjusted and then converted to monthly frequency.
The monthly variables were then convert to logarithmic form
Credit (Quarterly):- current prices not seasonally adjusted
=Lending by all monetary institutions to the South African household
sector
Seasonally adjusted and converted to monthly frequency
Convert to logarithmic form
Consumption (Quarterly):- current price not seasonally adjusted
= Consumption of non-durable goods plus consumption of servives
Seasonally adjusted and converted to monthly frequency
Convert to logarithmic form
Interest Rate (Monthly):- Prime lending rate charged by South African Banks
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APPENDIX 2
UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS
Firm - ADF test
Null Hypothesis: series contains a unit root
LTL LWB S PPI RT DR LMIX
Level
Intercept 0.1836 0.9516 0.4792 0.9977 0.3754 0.9091 0.1849
Trend and Intercept 0.4674 0.7558 0.7682 0.9635 0.1350 0.2031 0.4232
None 0.7265 0.9999 0.1200 0.9991 0.4338 0.2553 0.5780
1st Diff.
Intercept 0.0001* 0.0015* 0.1851 0.0073* 0* 0.0009* 0.0001*
Trend and Intercept 0.0008* 0.0085* 0.4531 0.0137** 0.0003* 0.0053* 0.0007*
None 0* 0.0227* 0.0313** 0.0849*** 0* 0.0001* 0*
2nd Diff.
Intercept 0*
Trend and Intercept 0*
None 0*
Where significance levels are * at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%
Firm – KPSS test
Null: Series is stationary
LTL LWB S PPI RT DR LMIX
Level
Intercept 0.623272** 1.719138* 0.261012 1.675759* 0.942710* 1.248978* 0.728621**
Trend and
Intercept
0.107201 0.273379* 0.184877** 0.300463* 0.099025 0.120479*** 0.108982
1st Diff.
Intercept 0.053153 0.078387 0.323646 0.272363 0.5** 0.085084 0.053238
Trend and
Intercept
0.053231 0.071143 0.143594*** 0.042952 0.5* 0.060854 0.051357
2nd Diff
Intercept 0.106887 0.139467
Trend and
Intercept
0.073584 0.092146
Where significance levels are * at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%
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Additional ADF test for S when automatically minimizing the Schwartz
criterion
When the Schwartz criterion is minimized the S variable is
shown to be first difference stationary.
Graphical representation of the S, RT and MIX series
Households - ADF test
Null Hypothesis: Series contains a unit root
LCREDIT LCONS LINC PR
Intercept 0.9855 0.4579 0.7330 0.8879
Trend and Intercept 0.9738 0.2915 0.9991 0.2715
None 0.9680 0.9999 1 0.2791
1st Diff.
Intercept 0.2920 0.0380** 0.0003* 0.0013*
Trend and Intercept 0.6053 0.1165 0.0009* 0.0079*
None 0.0224** 0.0432** 0.0290** 0.0001*
2nd Diff.
Intercept 0* 0*
Trend and Intercept 0* 0*
None 0* 0*
Where significance levels are * at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%
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Intercept 0.9986 0*
Trend and
Intercept
0.9994 0*
None 0.1200 0*
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Household – KPSS test
Null: Series is stationary
LCREDIT LCONS LINC PR
Level
Intercept 1.683561* 1.728848* 1.734396* 1.214028*
Trend and Intercept 0.339480* 0.080744 0.139807*** 0.118946
1st Diff.
Intercept 0.259997 0.143910 0.270956 0.084545
Trend and Intercept 0.227876* 0.073928 0.106880 0.061659
2nd Diff.
Intercept 0.122982
Trend and Intercept 0.121118***
Where significance levels are * at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%
ADF test for LCONS and LCREDIT series with a minimized Schwarz criterion
LCONS LCREDIT
Level
Intercept 0.4579 0.9855
Trend and Intercept 0.9707 0.9738
None 1 1
1st Diff.
Intercept 0* 0*
Trend and Intercept 0* 0*
None 0.0173** 0*
Graphical results of LCREDIT and LCONS series
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APPENDIX 3
LAG LENGTH SELECTION CRITERIA AND VAR RESULTS- FIRMS
Lag length selection criteria
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: D(LTL) D(LWB) D(S) D(PPI) D(RT) D(DR) D(LMIX)
Exogenous variables: C
Date: 12/28/11   Time: 11:43
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 184
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 1097.963 NA 1.67e-14 -11.85829 -11.73598 -11.80872
1 1245.393 282.0413 5.73e-15 -12.92819 -11.94973* -12.53161*
2 1274.490 53.44941 7.13e-15 -12.71185 -10.87724 -11.96826
3 1342.941 120.5331 5.80e-15 -12.92327 -10.23251 -11.83267
4 1412.453 117.1126 4.69e-15* -13.14623 -9.599314 -11.70862
5 1453.784 66.48991 5.19e-15 -13.06287 -8.659810 -11.27826
6 1500.934 72.26125 5.43e-15 -13.04276 -7.783541 -10.91113
7 1561.414 88.09084 4.97e-15 -13.16754 -7.052175 -10.68891
8 1612.172 70.06790* 5.13e-15 -13.18665* -6.215131 -10.36101
9 1647.850 46.53673 6.32e-15 -13.04185 -5.214177 -9.869195
10 1700.572 64.75616 6.59e-15 -13.08230 -4.398480 -9.562640
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
LM test for serial correlation in a VAR model with a lag length of 1
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 193
Lags LM-Stat Prob
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The results show that there is serial correlation in the
residuals up lag lengths 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 12 with the LM
test being significant at the 1% level for 2 of these lag
lengths.
LM test for serial correlation in a VAR model with a lag length of 8
The LM test shows that there is serial correlation up to
lag lengths 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 with only 1 of these lags
being significant at the 1% level. This is the chosen lag
length.
1 55.70665 0.2372
2 65.96120 0.0533
3 155.3667 0.0000
4 52.51962 0.3393
5 62.81197 0.0888
6 64.35265 0.0696
7 57.50729 0.1893
8 69.16497 0.0304
9 40.95007 0.7864
10 56.66312 0.2108
11 61.10496 0.1149
12 79.66149 0.0037
Probs from chi-square with 49 df.
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h
Date: 12/28/11   Time: 11:46
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 186
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1 43.73375 0.6859
2 56.17467 0.2240
3 50.02472 0.4325
4 62.14376 0.0984
5 71.90455 0.0182
6 85.06963 0.0011
7 69.58462 0.0281
8 48.40925 0.4970
9 70.57342 0.0234
10 49.64502 0.4474
11 41.58138 0.7651
12 44.00338 0.6754
Probs from chi-square with 49 df.
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AR unit roots graph for VAR at lag length of 8
No unit root lies outside the unit circle
Vector autoregressive estimates for firms
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 12/28/11   Time: 11:48
Sample (adjusted): 1995M10 2011M03
Included observations: 186 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
D(LTL) D(LWB) D(S) D(PPI) D(RT) D(DR) D(LMIX)
D(LTL(-1)) 0.213030 0.022206 0.905911 5.175908 -2.737830 1.471279 0.084287
(0.55321) (0.02607) (0.50442) (4.63972) (1.54701) (2.38156) (0.09900)
[ 0.38508] [ 0.85181] [ 1.79595] [ 1.11556] [-1.76976] [ 0.61778] [ 0.85142]
D(LTL(-2)) -0.563663 -0.050023 1.217678 7.064523 -0.841519 -0.893416 -0.084071
(0.57604) (0.02714) (0.52524) (4.83121) (1.61085) (2.47985) (0.10308)
[-0.97852] [-1.84282] [ 2.31835] [ 1.46227] [-0.52241] [-0.36027] [-0.81558]
D(LTL(-3)) 0.604161 0.009558 0.414362 2.643167 -1.511237 2.823396 0.125456
(0.58248) (0.02745) (0.53111) (4.88523) (1.62887) (2.50758) (0.10423)
[ 1.03722] [ 0.34823] [ 0.78018] [ 0.54105] [-0.92778] [ 1.12595] [ 1.20359]
D(LTL(-4)) 0.022366 -0.037284 -0.153037 5.483840 1.129904 2.764224 0.001132
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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(0.56149) (0.02646) (0.51198) (4.70924) (1.57019) (2.41724) (0.10048)
[ 0.03983] [-1.40908] [-0.29892] [ 1.16448] [ 0.71960] [ 1.14355] [ 0.01127]
D(LTL(-5)) -1.131518 0.005048 0.883046 6.153731 -1.923863 2.388442 -0.157780
(0.55105) (0.02597) (0.50245) (4.62161) (1.54097) (2.37226) (0.09861)
[-2.05340] [ 0.19440] [ 1.75749] [ 1.33151] [-1.24848] [ 1.00682] [-1.60005]
D(LTL(-6)) 0.649098 -0.012786 1.344400 7.755459 -2.732803 1.385549 0.121924
(0.55942) (0.02636) (0.51008) (4.69181) (1.56438) (2.40829) (0.10011)
[ 1.16031] [-0.48504] [ 2.63566] [ 1.65298] [-1.74690] [ 0.57532] [ 1.21793]
D(LTL(-7)) 0.596732 -0.003594 2.204107 11.66827 0.740291 4.297049 0.146763
(0.57941) (0.02730) (0.52831) (4.85948) (1.62028) (2.49436) (0.10369)
[ 1.02990] [-0.13164] [ 4.17200] [ 2.40114] [ 0.45689] [ 1.72271] [ 1.41547]
D(LTL(-8)) 0.804135 0.006763 0.031104 1.883857 -0.624970 0.659891 0.198022
(0.58710) (0.02767) (0.53533) (4.92403) (1.64180) (2.52749) (0.10506)
[ 1.36966] [ 0.24446] [ 0.05810] [ 0.38258] [-0.38066] [ 0.26109] [ 1.88481]
D(LWB(-1)) 2.316019 0.954900 1.730705 27.81716 -0.958001 10.80141 0.415587
(1.83732) (0.08658) (1.67528) (15.4095) (5.13796) (7.90968) (0.32879)
[ 1.26054] [ 11.0289] [ 1.03308] [ 1.80519] [-0.18646] [ 1.36559] [ 1.26400]
D(LWB(-2)) -2.846661 0.013648 0.742702 -12.25132 3.443419 -3.061875 -0.557520
(2.33141) (0.10986) (2.12580) (19.5535) (6.51965) (10.0367) (0.41721)
[-1.22101] [ 0.12423] [ 0.34938] [-0.62656] [ 0.52816] [-0.30507] [-1.33632]
D(LWB(-3)) 0.113276 -1.187201 -3.273412 3.119543 3.708262 5.764199 0.115265
(2.06190) (0.09716) (1.88006) (17.2931) (5.76599) (8.87651) (0.36898)
[ 0.05494] [-12.2185] [-1.74112] [ 0.18039] [ 0.64313] [ 0.64938] [ 0.31239]
D(LWB(-4)) 4.090247 1.065885 2.247458 34.71093 -3.881767 7.709301 0.707054
(3.04058) (0.14328) (2.77243) (25.5013) (8.50281) (13.0897) (0.54411)
[ 1.34522] [ 7.43900] [ 0.81065] [ 1.36114] [-0.45653] [ 0.58896] [ 1.29946]
D(LWB(-5)) -3.866601 -0.101275 2.688172 -31.61895 1.115946 -11.10317 -0.746078
(2.97081) (0.14000) (2.70881) (24.9161) (8.30770) (12.7894) (0.53163)
[-1.30153] [-0.72341] [ 0.99238] [-1.26902] [ 0.13433] [-0.86816] [-1.40339]
D(LWB(-6)) -0.592213 -0.598350 -0.349862 -0.415645 2.024078 9.048804 -0.026944
(2.07288) (0.09768) (1.89007) (17.3852) (5.79670) (8.92378) (0.37094)
[-0.28570] [-6.12550] [-0.18510] [-0.02391] [ 0.34918] [ 1.01401] [-0.07264]
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D(LWB(-7)) 1.782083 0.489437 -1.010693 23.66849 5.640872 -0.334075 0.267522
(2.32994) (0.10980) (2.12447) (19.5412) (6.51556) (10.0304) (0.41694)
[ 0.76486] [ 4.45771] [-0.47574] [ 1.21121] [ 0.86575] [-0.03331] [ 0.64163]
D(LWB(-8)) -3.070547 -0.161652 2.238616 -22.11751 -0.170287 -1.899377 -0.498611
(1.82398) (0.08595) (1.66312) (15.2977) (5.10065) (7.85224) (0.32640)
[-1.68344] [-1.88072] [ 1.34604] [-1.44581] [-0.03339] [-0.24189] [-1.52760]
D(S(-1)) 0.147870 0.002672 0.705591 0.841302 -0.221188 0.027507 0.025488
(0.09687) (0.00456) (0.08832) (0.81242) (0.27088) (0.41701) (0.01733)
[ 1.52653] [ 0.58537] [ 7.98866] [ 1.03555] [-0.81655] [ 0.06596] [ 1.47037]
D(S(-2)) -0.133192 0.001386 0.174194 -2.008076 -0.059287 -0.396920 -0.017984
(0.11319) (0.00533) (0.10321) (0.94934) (0.31654) (0.48729) (0.02026)
[-1.17669] [ 0.25976] [ 1.68776] [-2.11523] [-0.18730] [-0.81454] [-0.88786]
D(S(-3)) -0.047532 -0.003607 -0.645148 0.184879 0.265940 -0.117168 -0.010540
(0.10948) (0.00516) (0.09982) (0.91820) (0.30615) (0.47131) (0.01959)
[-0.43417] [-0.69908] [-6.46287] [ 0.20135] [ 0.86865] [-0.24860] [-0.53801]
D(S(-4)) 0.174188 -0.000268 0.522918 1.782948 -0.353737 0.526797 0.027142
(0.12652) (0.00596) (0.11536) (1.06111) (0.35380) (0.54466) (0.02264)
[ 1.37678] [-0.04497] [ 4.53289] [ 1.68027] [-0.99981] [ 0.96720] [ 1.19881]
D(S(-5)) -0.130129 0.000845 0.005935 -1.853341 0.443002 -0.571841 -0.024491
(0.12224) (0.00576) (0.11146) (1.02519) (0.34183) (0.52623) (0.02187)
[-1.06457] [ 0.14668] [ 0.05325] [-1.80780] [ 1.29599] [-1.08668] [-1.11961]
D(S(-6)) -0.015737 0.002676 -0.435601 0.028592 0.160950 0.205798 -0.004817
(0.10625) (0.00501) (0.09688) (0.89114) (0.29713) (0.45742) (0.01901)
[-0.14811] [ 0.53439] [-4.49617] [ 0.03208] [ 0.54168] [ 0.44991] [-0.25333]
D(S(-7)) 0.009101 -0.001296 0.340301 0.628996 -1.002065 0.494901 0.002418
(0.11331) (0.00534) (0.10332) (0.95033) (0.31687) (0.48780) (0.02028)
[ 0.08032] [-0.24277] [ 3.29375] [ 0.66187] [-3.16243] [ 1.01456] [ 0.11926]
D(S(-8)) -0.009769 -0.000471 -0.004786 -0.842963 0.655668 -0.379129 -0.001199
(0.09466) (0.00446) (0.08632) (0.79395) (0.26472) (0.40753) (0.01694)
[-0.10319] [-0.10557] [-0.05544] [-1.06173] [ 2.47679] [-0.93030] [-0.07080]
D(PPI(-1)) 0.004706 9.08E-05 0.017647 0.296349 0.025115 0.007346 0.000542
(0.01032) (0.00049) (0.00941) (0.08652) (0.02885) (0.04441) (0.00185)
[ 0.45620] [ 0.18676] [ 1.87606] [ 3.42505] [ 0.87056] [ 0.16541] [ 0.29385]
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D(PPI(-2)) -0.006845 0.000123 0.010805 0.120909 -0.015167 0.036858 -0.001218
(0.01087) (0.00051) (0.00991) (0.09118) (0.03040) (0.04680) (0.00195)
[-0.62956] [ 0.23924] [ 1.08993] [ 1.32600] [-0.49885] [ 0.78750] [-0.62615]
D(PPI(-3)) 0.001876 -0.000410 -0.010881 -0.001419 -0.000420 0.029013 0.000523
(0.01096) (0.00052) (0.00999) (0.09193) (0.03065) (0.04719) (0.00196)
[ 0.17111] [-0.79377] [-1.08866] [-0.01544] [-0.01369] [ 0.61483] [ 0.26662]
D(PPI(-4)) -0.003263 0.000612 0.010280 -0.029138 0.009129 0.012135 -0.001053
(0.01065) (0.00050) (0.00971) (0.08929) (0.02977) (0.04583) (0.00191)
[-0.30654] [ 1.21942] [ 1.05895] [-0.32633] [ 0.30663] [ 0.26477] [-0.55254]
D(PPI(-5)) -0.021608 7.22E-05 -0.000479 0.083456 -0.008951 0.049049 -0.003739
(0.01096) (0.00052) (0.00999) (0.09193) (0.03065) (0.04719) (0.00196)
[-1.97125] [ 0.13984] [-0.04795] [ 0.90778] [-0.29202] [ 1.03941] [-1.90628]
D(PPI(-6)) 0.010516 -3.50E-05 -0.016623 -0.009450 -0.036308 0.037573 0.002006
(0.01110) (0.00052) (0.01012) (0.09310) (0.03104) (0.04779) (0.00199)
[ 0.94731] [-0.06688] [-1.64236] [-0.10151] [-1.16963] [ 0.78624] [ 1.00970]
D(PPI(-7)) 0.001916 -0.000137 -0.001274 0.018432 0.030895 -0.067098 0.000615
(0.01158) (0.00055) (0.01056) (0.09716) (0.03239) (0.04987) (0.00207)
[ 0.16540] [-0.25064] [-0.12057] [ 0.18972] [ 0.95369] [-1.34544] [ 0.29654]
D(PPI(-8)) -0.008144 0.000361 -0.014027 -0.168533 -0.075270 0.029626 -0.001471
(0.01127) (0.00053) (0.01027) (0.09450) (0.03151) (0.04851) (0.00202)
[-0.72283] [ 0.67962] [-1.36534] [-1.78344] [-2.38889] [ 0.61077] [-0.72940]
D(RT(-1)) -0.028279 0.001117 -0.002496 -0.037555 -0.581789 0.414795 -0.004912
(0.03076) (0.00145) (0.02805) (0.25799) (0.08602) (0.13242) (0.00550)
[-0.91931] [ 0.77039] [-0.08900] [-0.14557] [-6.76339] [ 3.13230] [-0.89238]
D(RT(-2)) -0.039649 0.003184 0.050830 0.189251 -0.557458 0.151525 -0.006148
(0.03633) (0.00171) (0.03313) (0.30473) (0.10161) (0.15642) (0.00650)
[-1.09125] [ 1.85940] [ 1.53429] [ 0.62104] [-5.48648] [ 0.96872] [-0.94559]
D(RT(-3)) -0.032328 0.001214 0.001978 -0.160823 -0.439464 -0.017288 -0.005781
(0.03857) (0.00182) (0.03517) (0.32346) (0.10785) (0.16603) (0.00690)
[-0.83824] [ 0.66795] [ 0.05625] [-0.49720] [-4.07480] [-0.10413] [-0.83771]
D(RT(-4)) 0.006340 -0.003620 -0.013498 -0.242600 -0.507054 0.079974 0.001499
(0.03759) (0.00177) (0.03428) (0.31528) (0.10512) (0.16183) (0.00673)
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[ 0.16866] [-2.04365] [-0.39380] [-0.76947] [-4.82342] [ 0.49417] [ 0.22289]
D(RT(-5)) 0.006786 -0.000242 0.001608 -0.046580 -0.334530 0.056126 0.000841
(0.03705) (0.00175) (0.03378) (0.31071) (0.10360) (0.15949) (0.00663)
[ 0.18318] [-0.13873] [ 0.04759] [-0.14991] [-3.22910] [ 0.35192] [ 0.12687]
D(RT(-6)) -0.003332 -0.000374 0.025535 0.121677 -0.220713 -0.003926 0.000377
(0.03612) (0.00170) (0.03294) (0.30295) (0.10101) (0.15550) (0.00646)
[-0.09225] [-0.21996] [ 0.77531] [ 0.40164] [-2.18503] [-0.02525] [ 0.05826]
D(RT(-7)) 0.003040 -0.000709 0.008417 0.128417 -0.081839 0.247517 0.000109
(0.03274) (0.00154) (0.02985) (0.27458) (0.09155) (0.14094) (0.00586)
[ 0.09286] [-0.45941] [ 0.28197] [ 0.46769] [-0.89391] [ 1.75619] [ 0.01853]
D(RT(-8)) -0.021085 -0.002347 0.004993 0.426650 0.070992 0.060074 -0.003138
(0.02749) (0.00130) (0.02506) (0.23054) (0.07687) (0.11833) (0.00492)
[-0.76706] [-1.81217] [ 0.19920] [ 1.85067] [ 0.92356] [ 0.50766] [-0.63794]
D(DR(-1)) 0.052274 -0.000653 0.025178 -0.006511 0.034113 0.254014 0.008770
(0.02044) (0.00096) (0.01864) (0.17141) (0.05715) (0.08799) (0.00366)
[ 2.55772] [-0.67753] [ 1.35107] [-0.03798] [ 0.59687] [ 2.88701] [ 2.39793]
D(DR(-2)) -0.020616 -0.000168 -0.028957 0.078786 -0.004591 0.148832 -0.003975
(0.02141) (0.00101) (0.01952) (0.17953) (0.05986) (0.09215) (0.00383)
[-0.96310] [-0.16619] [-1.48359] [ 0.43884] [-0.07670] [ 1.61504] [-1.03771]
D(DR(-3)) -0.003149 0.000894 -0.002526 0.145487 0.055045 0.072805 -0.000482
(0.02157) (0.00102) (0.01967) (0.18095) (0.06033) (0.09288) (0.00386)
[-0.14596] [ 0.87961] [-0.12842] [ 0.80402] [ 0.91236] [ 0.78386] [-0.12489]
D(DR(-4)) -0.031113 0.002212 -0.014903 -0.087934 -0.199007 -0.074666 -0.005620
(0.02141) (0.00101) (0.01952) (0.17954) (0.05986) (0.09216) (0.00383)
[-1.45343] [ 2.19323] [-0.76353] [-0.48977] [-3.32436] [-0.81021] [-1.46695]
D(DR(-5)) 0.030503 -0.001447 -0.010578 -0.290438 -0.071648 0.002865 0.005500
(0.02228) (0.00105) (0.02031) (0.18684) (0.06230) (0.09591) (0.00399)
[ 1.36922] [-1.37845] [-0.52076] [-1.55444] [-1.15007] [ 0.02987] [ 1.37970]
D(DR(-6)) -0.020078 0.000857 -0.000471 0.071599 -0.168813 -0.051412 -0.003736
(0.02282) (0.00108) (0.02081) (0.19139) (0.06381) (0.09824) (0.00408)
[-0.87984] [ 0.79737] [-0.02263] [ 0.37410] [-2.64536] [-0.52332] [-0.91490]
D(DR(-7)) -0.038777 0.001210 -0.003119 -0.003502 -0.078031 -0.077137 -0.007405
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(0.02272) (0.00107) (0.02072) (0.19056) (0.06354) (0.09781) (0.00407)
[-1.70669] [ 1.13005] [-0.15054] [-0.01838] [-1.22812] [-0.78862] [-1.82135]
D(DR(-8)) 0.008035 -0.002401 -0.001010 -0.046319 -0.104431 0.048748 0.001578
(0.02255) (0.00106) (0.02057) (0.18916) (0.06307) (0.09710) (0.00404)
[ 0.35624] [-2.25930] [-0.04910] [-0.24486] [-1.65573] [ 0.50205] [ 0.39095]
D(LMIX(-1)) -3.135004 -0.137652 -4.884474 -28.09254 13.41270 -7.865386 -0.791975
(3.08385) (0.14532) (2.81189) (25.8642) (8.62382) (13.2760) (0.55186)
[-1.01659] [-0.94721] [-1.73708] [-1.08616] [ 1.55531] [-0.59245] [-1.43511]
D(LMIX(-2)) 2.869708 0.252776 -6.408977 -41.63314 3.606420 6.689012 0.432593
(3.18787) (0.15022) (2.90673) (26.7366) (8.91470) (13.7238) (0.57047)
[ 0.90020] [ 1.68266] [-2.20487] [-1.55716] [ 0.40455] [ 0.48740] [ 0.75831]
D(LMIX(-3)) -4.502750 -0.056139 -1.283034 -17.36749 8.996665 -16.35750 -0.897765
(3.20004) (0.15080) (2.91783) (26.8387) (8.94874) (13.7762) (0.57265)
[-1.40709] [-0.37228] [-0.43972] [-0.64711] [ 1.00536] [-1.18737] [-1.56774]
D(LMIX(-4)) -0.762175 0.225054 1.422245 -30.59378 -6.893729 -13.75954 -0.128527
(3.09833) (0.14601) (2.82509) (25.9857) (8.66432) (13.3384) (0.55445)
[-0.24600] [ 1.54141] [ 0.50343] [-1.17733] [-0.79565] [-1.03158] [-0.23181]
D(LMIX(-5)) 6.386108 -0.052941 -5.263649 -31.79239 11.98071 -9.860644 0.892098
(3.04263) (0.14338) (2.77430) (25.5185) (8.50856) (13.0986) (0.54448)
[ 2.09888] [-0.36924] [-1.89729] [-1.24586] [ 1.40808] [-0.75280] [ 1.63844]
D(LMIX(-6)) -3.796642 0.071602 -7.071338 -37.75874 16.03064 -5.410720 -0.726724
(3.08496) (0.14537) (2.81290) (25.8735) (8.62693) (13.2808) (0.55205)
[-1.23069] [ 0.49253] [-2.51390] [-1.45936] [ 1.85821] [-0.40741] [-1.31640]
D(LMIX(-7)) -3.051331 0.027570 -12.06891 -63.03295 -4.366639 -23.26864 -0.767621
(3.19593) (0.15060) (2.91408) (26.8042) (8.93725) (13.7585) (0.57191)
[-0.95475] [ 0.18306] [-4.14158] [-2.35160] [-0.48859] [-1.69122] [-1.34220]
D(LMIX(-8)) -3.923199 -0.007466 -0.387583 -8.274957 2.247490 -2.075107 -1.005614
(3.27321) (0.15425) (2.98454) (27.4523) (9.15335) (14.0912) (0.58574)
[-1.19858] [-0.04840] [-0.12986] [-0.30143] [ 0.24554] [-0.14726] [-1.71682]
C 0.016827 0.002237 -0.057683 0.051663 0.011071 -0.241506 0.001120
(0.02134) (0.00101) (0.01946) (0.17900) (0.05968) (0.09188) (0.00382)
[ 0.78842] [ 2.22443] [-2.96416] [ 0.28862] [ 0.18550] [-2.62850] [ 0.29316]
R-squared 0.415746 0.750560 0.749277 0.382331 0.527305 0.414860 0.415121
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Adj. R-squared 0.162117 0.642276 0.640437 0.114196 0.322104 0.160845 0.161220
Sum sq. resids 1.678420 0.003727 1.395434 118.0625 13.12542 31.10641 0.053748
S.E. equation 0.114066 0.005375 0.104006 0.956668 0.318979 0.491055 0.020412
F-statistic 1.639188 6.931396 6.884160 1.425890 2.569701 1.633212 1.634972
Log likelihood 173.9115 742.1376 191.0838 -221.6511 -17.36137 -97.60762 493.9521
Akaike AIC -1.257113 -7.367071 -1.441761 2.996248 0.799585 1.662448 -4.698409
Schwarz SC -0.268578 -6.378536 -0.453226 3.984783 1.788120 2.650983 -3.709874
Mean dependent 0.002578 0.004330 -0.025368 0.535971 0.005430 -0.051075 -0.000241
S.D. dependent 0.124613 0.008987 0.173449 1.016465 0.387418 0.536055 0.022288
Determinant resid covariance (dof
adj.) 7.36E-16
Determinant resid covariance 5.68E-17
Log likelihood 1631.344
Akaike information criterion -13.25101
Schwarz criterion -6.331259
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APPENDIX 4
LAG LENGTH SELECTION CRITERIA AND VAR RESULTS-
HOUSEHOLDS
Lag length selection criteria
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: D(LCREDIT) D(LCONS) D(LINC) D(PR)
Exogenous variables: C
Date: 01/25/12   Time: 13:41
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 180
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 2173.649 NA 3.99e-16 -24.10722 -24.03626 -24.07845
1 2264.732 177.1052 1.73e-16 -24.94147 -24.58669 -24.79762
2 2277.298 23.87552 1.80e-16 -24.90331 -24.26472 -24.64439
3 2361.834 156.8617 8.40e-17 -25.66483 -24.74242* -25.29083
4 2395.136 60.31326 6.94e-17 -25.85707 -24.65084 -25.36800*
5 2406.534 20.13542 7.32e-17 -25.80593 -24.31588 -25.20178
6 2442.941 62.70217 5.85e-17 -26.03268 -24.25882 -25.31346
7 2464.975 36.96790 5.50e-17 -26.09972 -24.04204 -25.26542
8 2477.553 20.54403 5.74e-17 -26.06170 -23.72020 -25.11232
9 2498.628 33.48495 5.46e-17 -26.11808 -23.49276 -25.05363
10 2518.768 31.10510 5.26e-17 -26.16408 -23.25495 -24.98455
11 2532.239 20.20662 5.47e-17 -26.13599 -22.94303 -24.84138
12 2570.487 55.67254 4.33e-17 -26.38319 -22.90641 -24.97351
13 2591.748 30.00106* 4.15e-17* -26.44164* -22.68105 -24.91688
14 2604.870 17.93343 4.36e-17 -26.40966 -22.36525 -24.76983
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
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LM test for serial correlation in with a lag length of 3
The LM test shows autocorrelation at lags 1,3,4,5,
6,7,8,9 and 12 with 4 of these lags significant at the
1% level of significance.
LM test for serial correlation with a lag length of 4
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag
order h
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 191
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1 60.19555 0.0000
2 21.07398 0.1757
3 107.7444 0.0000
4 39.12040 0.0010
5 25.12952 0.0676
6 28.13785 0.0304
7 30.15850 0.0172
8 28.35068 0.0287
9 27.04229 0.0410
10 14.56924 0.5564
11 7.883526 0.9523
12 32.92492 0.0076
Probs from chi-square with 16 df.
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag
order h
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 190
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1 21.47480 0.1610
2 25.02487 0.0694
3 84.40835 0.0000
4 28.95875 0.0242
5 19.61454 0.2381
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Results show that there is serial correlation at lags 2,
3,4,6,9 and 12 with 2 lags being significant at the
1 % level of significance.
LM test for serial correlation with a lag length of 13
Results indicate that there is autocorrelation at lags
3, 6 and 9 with 2 of these lags being significant at the
1% level of significance. This is the chosen lag
length.
6 66.19237 0.0000
7 14.88115 0.5334
8 20.96959 0.1797
9 29.34693 0.0217
10 9.088687 0.9097
11 6.217941 0.9856
12 30.99129 0.0135
Probs from chi-square with 16 df.
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag
order h
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 181
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1 20.09366 0.2160
2 18.63928 0.2878
3 35.57439 0.0033
4 16.69061 0.4059
5 14.00390 0.5984
6 24.86114 0.0723
7 13.98000 0.6002
8 20.19567 0.2115
9 37.40838 0.0018
10 14.19199 0.5844
11 22.03475 0.1421
12 11.52232 0.7762
Probs from chi-square with 16 df.
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AR unit roots graph at lag length of 13
No unit roots lie outside the unit circle.
Household VAR estimation results
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 01/25/12   Time: 14:04
Sample (adjusted): 1996M03 2011M03
Included observations: 181 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
D(LCREDIT) D(LCONS) D(LINC) D(PR)
D(LCREDIT(-1)) 0.133045 -0.011471 -0.065155 6.215206
(0.08606) (0.02529) (0.08106) (15.1138)
[ 1.54594] [-0.45348] [-0.80381] [ 0.41123]
D(LCREDIT(-2)) -0.016638 0.006406 0.014862 9.606522
(0.08222) (0.02417) (0.07745) (14.4402)
[-0.20235] [ 0.26509] [ 0.19191] [ 0.66526]
D(LCREDIT(-3)) 0.193283 0.016595 0.101258 14.64882
(0.08125) (0.02388) (0.07653) (14.2692)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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[ 2.37882] [ 0.69492] [ 1.32315] [ 1.02660]
D(LCREDIT(-4)) -0.019188 0.024603 -0.010447 -11.40330
(0.08327) (0.02447) (0.07843) (14.6234)
[-0.23044] [ 1.00529] [-0.13320] [-0.77980]
D(LCREDIT(-5)) 0.166523 -0.024631 0.003410 -34.23313
(0.08166) (0.02400) (0.07691) (14.3407)
[ 2.03925] [-1.02627] [ 0.04434] [-2.38713]
D(LCREDIT(-6)) 0.106039 0.054284 -0.081026 3.461561
(0.08354) (0.02455) (0.07868) (14.6710)
[ 1.26932] [ 2.21083] [-1.02978] [ 0.23595]
D(LCREDIT(-7)) 0.073227 -0.037920 0.098801 -4.252642
(0.08639) (0.02539) (0.08137) (15.1719)
[ 0.84762] [-1.49341] [ 1.21422] [-0.28030]
D(LCREDIT(-8)) 0.143365 0.018188 -0.021090 10.27873
(0.08705) (0.02559) (0.08199) (15.2883)
[ 1.64685] [ 0.71085] [-0.25721] [ 0.67233]
D(LCREDIT(-9)) 0.240801 0.028220 0.174312 11.46305
(0.08676) (0.02550) (0.08171) (15.2362)
[ 2.77555] [ 1.10669] [ 2.13318] [ 0.75235]
D(LCREDIT(-10)) -0.038788 0.005447 -0.062294 11.96445
(0.09044) (0.02658) (0.08518) (15.8830)
[-0.42888] [ 0.20491] [-0.73129] [ 0.75329]
D(LCREDIT(-11)) 0.029584 -0.020416 0.047855 2.262202
(0.08646) (0.02541) (0.08144) (15.1846)
[ 0.34215] [-0.80336] [ 0.58763] [ 0.14898]
D(LCREDIT(-12)) -0.087836 -0.028463 -0.101444 -1.241650
(0.08418) (0.02474) (0.07928) (14.7831)
[-1.04347] [-1.15042] [-1.27949] [-0.08399]
D(LCREDIT(-13)) -0.107164 0.030092 0.028031 0.186644
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(0.08169) (0.02401) (0.07694) (14.3459)
[-1.31186] [ 1.25332] [ 0.36433] [ 0.01301]
D(LCONS(-1)) 0.075549 1.034509 0.144477 56.39837
(0.30382) (0.08930) (0.28616) (53.3560)
[ 0.24866] [ 11.5851] [ 0.50488] [ 1.05702]
D(LCONS(-2)) -0.419004 0.108175 0.140476 -89.81285
(0.41402) (0.12169) (0.38995) (72.7088)
[-1.01205] [ 0.88897] [ 0.36024] [-1.23524]
D(LCONS(-3)) 0.615118 -1.329453 0.677388 86.56695
(0.41622) (0.12233) (0.39203) (73.0965)
[ 1.47785] [-10.8673] [ 1.72790] [ 1.18428]
D(LCONS(-4)) 0.470389 1.278454 -0.150795 30.17890
(0.58275) (0.17128) (0.54887) (102.341)
[ 0.80719] [ 7.46421] [-0.27474] [ 0.29489]
D(LCONS(-5)) -0.362904 0.037143 0.017744 -197.6032
(0.63576) (0.18686) (0.59881) (111.651)
[-0.57082] [ 0.19877] [ 0.02963] [-1.76982]
D(LCONS(-6)) -0.441528 -1.109581 -0.107341 148.1632
(0.64792) (0.19043) (0.61026) (113.787)
[-0.68145] [-5.82660] [-0.17589] [ 1.30212]
D(LCONS(-7)) 1.167594 0.941467 0.281979 -26.72895
(0.69155) (0.20326) (0.65135) (121.448)
[ 1.68838] [ 4.63193] [ 0.43292] [-0.22009]
D(LCONS(-8)) -0.436724 0.036620 0.125498 -28.30416
(0.62825) (0.18465) (0.59173) (110.332)
[-0.69514] [ 0.19832] [ 0.21209] [-0.25654]
D(LCONS(-9)) -1.017715 -0.680616 -0.421519 146.8943
(0.63929) (0.18790) (0.60213) (112.271)
[-1.59194] [-3.62227] [-0.70005] [ 1.30839]
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D(LCONS(-10)) 1.389633 0.473419 0.235754 -70.48053
(0.58850) (0.17297) (0.55429) (103.352)
[ 2.36129] [ 2.73700] [ 0.42532] [-0.68195]
D(LCONS(-11)) -0.099312 0.042659 0.275446 -26.92763
(0.44251) (0.13006) (0.41678) (77.7120)
[-0.22443] [ 0.32800] [ 0.66089] [-0.34651]
D(LCONS(-12)) -1.830543 -0.262504 0.193732 21.00669
(0.43418) (0.12761) (0.40894) (76.2497)
[-4.21610] [-2.05705] [ 0.47374] [ 0.27550]
D(LCONS(-13)) 0.584564 0.097508 -0.432489 -1.693299
(0.34932) (0.10267) (0.32902) (61.3476)
[ 1.67341] [ 0.94970] [-1.31449] [-0.02760]
D(LINC(-1)) 0.111793 -0.023663 0.680038 11.55891
(0.09056) (0.02662) (0.08530) (15.9044)
[ 1.23444] [-0.88899] [ 7.97250] [ 0.72678]
D(LINC(-2)) 0.022050 0.025178 0.058613 16.27016
(0.09714) (0.02855) (0.09149) (17.0590)
[ 0.22700] [ 0.88189] [ 0.64065] [ 0.95376]
D(LINC(-3)) -0.306863 0.040521 -1.346803 -22.85496
(0.10055) (0.02955) (0.09470) (17.6575)
[-3.05198] [ 1.37117] [-14.2217] [-1.29434]
D(LINC(-4)) 0.187673 -0.081980 0.848072 36.97707
(0.16034) (0.04713) (0.15102) (28.1586)
[ 1.17047] [-1.73957] [ 5.61563] [ 1.31317]
D(LINC(-5)) -0.004447 0.021069 0.054088 5.073578
(0.15779) (0.04638) (0.14861) (27.7100)
[-0.02818] [ 0.45430] [ 0.36395] [ 0.18310]
D(LINC(-6)) -0.162983 0.052852 -1.286726 -20.66717
(0.16830) (0.04947) (0.15852) (29.5571)
[-0.96839] [ 1.06844] [-8.11713] [-0.69923]
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D(LINC(-7)) 0.140905 -0.067467 0.810199 31.09322
(0.19430) (0.05711) (0.18300) (34.1221)
[ 0.72520] [-1.18142] [ 4.42725] [ 0.91123]
D(LINC(-8)) -0.028732 -0.004486 0.011608 -9.273192
(0.16029) (0.04711) (0.15097) (28.1500)
[-0.17925] [-0.09521] [ 0.07689] [-0.32942]
D(LINC(-9)) 0.071023 0.042930 -1.001444 -10.58275
(0.16726) (0.04916) (0.15754) (29.3742)
[ 0.42462] [ 0.87327] [-6.35681] [-0.36027]
D(LINC(-10)) 0.111314 -0.036375 0.633384 16.76905
(0.16673) (0.04900) (0.15703) (29.2799)
[ 0.66765] [-0.74230] [ 4.03343] [ 0.57272]
D(LINC(-11)) -0.059449 -0.004600 -0.015662 -9.626781
(0.09894) (0.02908) (0.09319) (17.3758)
[-0.60086] [-0.15817] [-0.16806] [-0.55403]
D(LINC(-12)) 0.137611 0.006638 -0.548426 0.317439
(0.09982) (0.02934) (0.09402) (17.5309)
[ 1.37853] [ 0.22625] [-5.83298] [ 0.01811]
D(LINC(-13)) 0.035270 0.004896 0.349764 10.68735
(0.09101) (0.02675) (0.08572) (15.9823)
[ 0.38756] [ 0.18304] [ 4.08050] [ 0.66870]
D(PR(-1)) 0.000558 0.000203 -0.000112 0.209191
(0.00051) (0.00015) (0.00048) (0.08916)
[ 1.09951] [ 1.35979] [-0.23327] [ 2.34627]
D(PR(-2)) -0.000281 -0.000201 -0.000357 0.340092
(0.00052) (0.00015) (0.00049) (0.09086)
[-0.54289] [-1.31962] [-0.73164] [ 3.74283]
D(PR(-3)) -0.000154 -0.000322 -1.75E-05 -0.007935
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09702)
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[-0.27842] [-1.98454] [-0.03355] [-0.08179]
D(PR(-4)) 0.000406 0.000440 2.68E-06 -0.204189
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09691)
[ 0.73573] [ 2.71111] [ 0.00516] [-2.10690]
D(PR(-5)) 0.000125 -7.75E-05 -0.000294 -0.061380
(0.00058) (0.00017) (0.00055) (0.10186)
[ 0.21553] [-0.45461] [-0.53869] [-0.60257]
D(PR(-6)) -0.001135 -0.000231 0.000139 0.274575
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09725)
[-2.04869] [-1.41906] [ 0.26697] [ 2.82329]
D(PR(-7)) 1.13E-05 4.75E-06 -0.000295 -0.058446
(0.00058) (0.00017) (0.00054) (0.10104)
[ 0.01972] [ 0.02808] [-0.54460] [-0.57847]
D(PR(-8)) -8.43E-05 0.000107 -0.000210 -0.254521
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09575)
[-0.15463] [ 0.67021] [-0.40901] [-2.65817]
D(PR(-9)) 5.14E-05 0.000134 -0.000248 -0.039317
(0.00056) (0.00017) (0.00053) (0.09871)
[ 0.09150] [ 0.80828] [-0.46862] [-0.39829]
D(PR(-10)) 0.000464 -0.000252 -0.000272 0.150619
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09600)
[ 0.84885] [-1.56655] [-0.52833] [ 1.56903]
D(PR(-11)) -5.40E-05 -4.16E-05 0.000139 0.042001
(0.00054) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09447)
[-0.10036] [-0.26309] [ 0.27389] [ 0.44461]
D(PR(-12)) -8.50E-05 0.000228 0.000166 -0.177173
(0.00051) (0.00015) (0.00048) (0.08987)
[-0.16613] [ 1.51845] [ 0.34424] [-1.97153]
D(PR(-13)) 0.000382 -0.000259 -0.000515 -0.010724
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(0.00049) (0.00014) (0.00046) (0.08616)
[ 0.77788] [-1.79292] [-1.11343] [-0.12446]
C 0.000939 0.001058 0.001974 -0.499420
(0.00146) (0.00043) (0.00138) (0.25663)
[ 0.64246] [ 2.46405] [ 1.43442] [-1.94609]
R-squared 0.565886 0.763540 0.842827 0.397059
Adj. R-squared 0.389527 0.667477 0.778975 0.152114
Sum sq. resids 0.001158 0.000100 0.001028 35.72509
S.E. equation 0.003008 0.000884 0.002833 0.528301
F-statistic 3.208722 7.948397 13.19979 1.621014
Log likelihood 825.4855 1047.114 836.3253 -109.9786
Akaike AIC -8.535752 -10.98468 -8.655529 1.800869
Schwarz SC -7.599175 -10.04811 -7.718952 2.737445
Mean dependent 0.004188 0.003742 0.003573 -0.052486
S.D. dependent 0.003850 0.001533 0.006027 0.573737
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.46E-17
Determinant resid covariance 3.66E-18
Log likelihood 2606.171
Akaike information criterion -26.45493
Schwarz criterion -22.70862
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APPENDIX 5
VAR ESTIMATES WHEN INCLUDING DUM1 (NATIONAL CREDIT ACT)
The results for the National Credit Act dummy variable (DUM1) show that the dummy
variable is not statistically significant when LTL is taken as the dependent variable. The R-
squared did not increase significantly (from about 0.5658 to about 0.5661) and the adjusted
R-squared decreased, although not significantly (from about 0.39 to about 0.385
respectively). The F-statistic decreased to about 3.127 from about 3.209.
The information criterion for the model as a whole showed mixed results. The Schwarz
criterion increased to about -22.66 from about -22.71 and the Akaike criterion decreased to
about -26.47 from about -26.45. Thus it is concluded, mainly from the lack of the statistical
significance of the dummy variable (except when LINC is taken as the dependent variable),
the drop in the F-statistic when LTL is taken as the dependent variable and the increase in the
Schwarz criterion that the dummy variable for the National Credit Act does not add
predictive power and is not included in the final VAR model.
Estimates
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 01/25/12   Time: 14:07
Sample (adjusted): 1996M03 2011M03
Included observations: 181 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
D(LCREDIT) D(LCONS) D(LINC) D(PR)
D(LCREDIT(-1)) 0.131333 -0.014199 -0.079548 6.921837
(0.08659) (0.02523) (0.07961) (15.1868)
[ 1.51665] [-0.56270] [-0.99926] [ 0.45578]
D(LCREDIT(-2)) -0.017936 0.004338 0.003949 10.14234
(0.08266) (0.02409) (0.07599) (14.4962)
[-0.21699] [ 0.18011] [ 0.05197] [ 0.69965]
D(LCREDIT(-3)) 0.192188 0.014851 0.092055 15.10068
(0.08164) (0.02379) (0.07505) (14.3183)
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[ 2.35403] [ 0.62426] [ 1.22652] [ 1.05464]
D(LCREDIT(-4)) -0.020022 0.023274 -0.017461 -11.05895
(0.08363) (0.02437) (0.07688) (14.6660)
[-0.23943] [ 0.95511] [-0.22712] [-0.75405]
D(LCREDIT(-5)) 0.166032 -0.025414 -0.000719 -34.03040
(0.08197) (0.02389) (0.07536) (14.3765)
[ 2.02542] [-1.06393] [-0.00954] [-2.36708]
D(LCREDIT(-6)) 0.106006 0.054231 -0.081303 3.475138
(0.08384) (0.02443) (0.07708) (14.7042)
[ 1.26434] [ 2.21976] [-1.05483] [ 0.23634]
D(LCREDIT(-7)) 0.072798 -0.038604 0.095193 -4.075522
(0.08672) (0.02527) (0.07972) (15.2086)
[ 0.83947] [-1.52771] [ 1.19408] [-0.26797]
D(LCREDIT(-8)) 0.143052 0.017688 -0.023726 10.40816
(0.08738) (0.02546) (0.08033) (15.3241)
[ 1.63717] [ 0.69472] [-0.29537] [ 0.67920]
D(LCREDIT(-9)) 0.241344 0.029085 0.178875 11.23901
(0.08709) (0.02538) (0.08007) (15.2746)
[ 2.77105] [ 1.14603] [ 2.23409] [ 0.73580]
D(LCREDIT(-10)) -0.036629 0.008888 -0.044139 11.07306
(0.09110) (0.02655) (0.08375) (15.9777)
[-0.40205] [ 0.33481] [-0.52702] [ 0.69303]
D(LCREDIT(-11)) 0.032112 -0.016386 0.069115 1.218378
(0.08726) (0.02543) (0.08022) (15.3033)
[ 0.36801] [-0.64445] [ 0.86161] [ 0.07962]
D(LCREDIT(-12)) -0.085527 -0.024781 -0.082020 -2.195302
(0.08490) (0.02474) (0.07804) (14.8888)
[-1.00744] [-1.00175] [-1.05094] [-0.14745]
D(LCREDIT(-13)) -0.104995 0.033548 0.046268 -0.708744
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(0.08236) (0.02400) (0.07571) (14.4441)
[-1.27484] [ 1.39791] [ 0.61110] [-0.04907]
D(LCONS(-1)) 0.067025 1.020924 0.072803 59.91738
(0.30648) (0.08930) (0.28174) (53.7494)
[ 0.21870] [ 11.4319] [ 0.25840] [ 1.11475]
D(LCONS(-2)) -0.418718 0.108631 0.142882 -89.93096
(0.41552) (0.12108) (0.38199) (72.8733)
[-1.00770] [ 0.89718] [ 0.37405] [-1.23407]
D(LCONS(-3)) 0.618763 -1.323643 0.708041 85.06196
(0.41794) (0.12179) (0.38422) (73.2982)
[ 1.48050] [-10.8686] [ 1.84282] [ 1.16049]
D(LCONS(-4)) 0.468110 1.274822 -0.169957 31.11972
(0.58492) (0.17044) (0.53772) (102.582)
[ 0.80030] [ 7.47954] [-0.31607] [ 0.30336]
D(LCONS(-5)) -0.362142 0.038358 0.024156 -197.9180
(0.63808) (0.18593) (0.58658) (111.905)
[-0.56755] [ 0.20631] [ 0.04118] [-1.76863]
D(LCONS(-6)) -0.434651 -1.098621 -0.049515 145.3241
(0.65075) (0.18962) (0.59823) (114.127)
[-0.66793] [-5.79371] [-0.08277] [ 1.27335]
D(LCONS(-7)) 1.161143 0.931183 0.227725 -24.06523
(0.69445) (0.20236) (0.63841) (121.791)
[ 1.67204] [ 4.60169] [ 0.35671] [-0.19759]
D(LCONS(-8)) -0.434348 0.040407 0.145478 -29.28513
(0.63059) (0.18375) (0.57970) (110.592)
[-0.68880] [ 0.21990] [ 0.25095] [-0.26480]
D(LCONS(-9)) -1.011054 -0.670000 -0.365513 144.1446
(0.64206) (0.18709) (0.59025) (112.604)
[-1.57469] [-3.58112] [-0.61925] [ 1.28010]
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D(LCONS(-10)) 1.380505 0.458871 0.159002 -66.71222
(0.59156) (0.17238) (0.54382) (103.747)
[ 2.33366] [ 2.66202] [ 0.29238] [-0.64303]
D(LCONS(-11)) -0.093852 0.051361 0.321357 -29.18175
(0.44455) (0.12954) (0.40868) (77.9647)
[-0.21112] [ 0.39649] [ 0.78634] [-0.37429]
D(LCONS(-12)) -1.824267 -0.252501 0.246501 18.41583
(0.43635) (0.12715) (0.40113) (76.5257)
[-4.18079] [-1.98589] [ 0.61451] [ 0.24065]
D(LCONS(-13)) 0.580327 0.090755 -0.468114 0.055822
(0.35093) (0.10226) (0.32261) (61.5449)
[ 1.65370] [ 0.88752] [-1.45104] [ 0.00091]
D(LINC(-1)) 0.106535 -0.032043 0.635824 13.72972
(0.09286) (0.02706) (0.08537) (16.2857)
[ 1.14727] [-1.18421] [ 7.44815] [ 0.84305]
D(LINC(-2)) 0.022065 0.025203 0.058743 16.26378
(0.09749) (0.02841) (0.08962) (17.0976)
[ 0.22633] [ 0.88717] [ 0.65545] [ 0.95123]
D(LINC(-3)) -0.307273 0.039867 -1.350253 -22.68559
(0.10092) (0.02941) (0.09278) (17.6994)
[-3.04469] [ 1.35566] [-14.5538] [-1.28172]
D(LINC(-4)) 0.179422 -0.095130 0.778692 40.38347
(0.16367) (0.04769) (0.15046) (28.7037)
[ 1.09626] [-1.99470] [ 5.17542] [ 1.40691]
D(LINC(-5)) -0.004309 0.021289 0.055250 5.016526
(0.15836) (0.04614) (0.14558) (27.7728)
[-0.02721] [ 0.46135] [ 0.37952] [ 0.18063]
D(LINC(-6)) -0.164357 0.050662 -1.298282 -20.09981
(0.16899) (0.04924) (0.15535) (29.6367)
[-0.97260] [ 1.02884] [-8.35713] [-0.67821]
160 | P a g e
D(LINC(-7)) 0.131908 -0.081807 0.734546 34.80764
(0.19770) (0.05761) (0.18175) (34.6724)
[ 0.66721] [-1.42005] [ 4.04160] [ 1.00390]
D(LINC(-8)) -0.029235 -0.005288 0.007376 -9.065397
(0.16088) (0.04688) (0.14790) (28.2154)
[-0.18172] [-0.11280] [ 0.04987] [-0.32129]
D(LINC(-9)) 0.069361 0.040281 -1.015423 -9.896416
(0.16798) (0.04895) (0.15442) (29.4594)
[ 0.41292] [ 0.82294] [-6.57568] [-0.33593]
D(LINC(-10)) 0.103439 -0.048927 0.567163 20.02034
(0.16974) (0.04946) (0.15604) (29.7685)
[ 0.60940] [-0.98921] [ 3.63471] [ 0.67254]
D(LINC(-11)) -0.060126 -0.005679 -0.021355 -9.347279
(0.09933) (0.02894) (0.09131) (17.4204)
[-0.60532] [-0.19620] [-0.23386] [-0.53657]
D(LINC(-12)) 0.136467 0.004815 -0.558042 0.789564
(0.10027) (0.02922) (0.09218) (17.5855)
[ 1.36097] [ 0.16481] [-6.05382] [ 0.04490]
D(LINC(-13)) 0.030115 -0.003321 0.306410 12.81590
(0.09322) (0.02716) (0.08570) (16.3490)
[ 0.32304] [-0.12227] [ 3.57544] [ 0.78389]
D(PR(-1)) 0.000564 0.000213 -6.00E-05 0.206661
(0.00051) (0.00015) (0.00047) (0.08944)
[ 1.10651] [ 1.43103] [-0.12800] [ 2.31048]
D(PR(-2)) -0.000275 -0.000191 -0.000305 0.337568
(0.00052) (0.00015) (0.00048) (0.09115)
[-0.52867] [-1.26071] [-0.63865] [ 3.70332]
D(PR(-3)) -0.000157 -0.000327 -4.46E-05 -0.006603
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09726)
161 | P a g e
[-0.28318] [-2.02587] [-0.08748] [-0.06789]
D(PR(-4)) 0.000402 0.000433 -3.02E-05 -0.202573
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09717)
[ 0.72577] [ 2.68515] [-0.05937] [-2.08483]
D(PR(-5)) 0.000130 -6.90E-05 -0.000249 -0.063583
(0.00058) (0.00017) (0.00054) (0.10215)
[ 0.22379] [-0.40654] [-0.46583] [-0.62245]
D(PR(-6)) -0.001128 -0.000220 0.000198 0.271700
(0.00056) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09757)
[-2.02667] [-1.35623] [ 0.38675] [ 2.78456]
D(PR(-7)) 8.96E-06 9.45E-07 -0.000315 -0.057461
(0.00058) (0.00017) (0.00053) (0.10128)
[ 0.01552] [ 0.00562] [-0.59369] [-0.56737]
D(PR(-8)) -8.90E-05 9.99E-05 -0.000250 -0.252573
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00050) (0.09601)
[-0.16262] [ 0.62610] [-0.49616] [-2.63060]
D(PR(-9)) 5.01E-05 0.000131 -0.000260 -0.038750
(0.00056) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09894)
[ 0.08873] [ 0.79897] [-0.50066] [-0.39164]
D(PR(-10)) 0.000460 -0.000258 -0.000305 0.152244
(0.00055) (0.00016) (0.00050) (0.09624)
[ 0.83832] [-1.61310] [-0.60477] [ 1.58185]
D(PR(-11)) -5.83E-05 -4.85E-05 0.000103 0.043781
(0.00054) (0.00016) (0.00050) (0.09472)
[-0.10793] [-0.30796] [ 0.20648] [ 0.46221]
D(PR(-12)) -9.21E-05 0.000217 0.000106 -0.174227
(0.00051) (0.00015) (0.00047) (0.09018)
[-0.17920] [ 1.44822] [ 0.22402] [-1.93192]
D(PR(-13)) 0.000380 -0.000262 -0.000532 -0.009865
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(0.00049) (0.00014) (0.00045) (0.08637)
[ 0.77075] [-1.82480] [-1.17515] [-0.11422]
C 0.001106 0.001325 0.003381 -0.568502
(0.00159) (0.00046) (0.00146) (0.27826)
[ 0.69717] [ 2.86591] [ 2.31820] [-2.04307]
DUM1 -0.000163 -0.000260 -0.001374 0.067467
(0.00059) (0.00017) (0.00054) (0.10369)
[-0.27640] [-1.51186] [-2.52825] [ 0.65067]
R-squared 0.566147 0.767720 0.850359 0.399062
Adj. R-squared 0.385090 0.670784 0.787910 0.148277
Sum sq. resids 0.001158 9.83E-05 0.000978 35.60639
S.E. equation 0.003019 0.000880 0.002776 0.529495
F-statistic 3.126906 7.919887 13.61690 1.591252
Log likelihood 825.5400 1048.728 840.7694 -109.6774
Akaike AIC -8.525304 -10.99147 -8.693584 1.808590
Schwarz SC -7.571056 -10.03722 -7.739337 2.762838
Mean dependent 0.004188 0.003742 0.003573 -0.052486
S.D. dependent 0.003850 0.001533 0.006027 0.573737
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.42E-17
Determinant resid covariance 3.44E-18
Log likelihood 2611.850
Akaike information criterion -26.47348
Schwarz criterion -22.65649
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APPENDIX 6
VAR ESTIMATES WHEN INCLUDING DUM2 AND LINC*DUM2
The second dummy variable (DUM2) is used to capture the period of the increasing rate of
credit demand between December 1999 and December 2007, where credit seems to increase
at an increasing rate. It is thought that expectations of future income may be formed at an
increasing rate during this period and that is one of the reasons behind the increasing rate of
credit demand over the period December 1999 and December 2007 and thus the use of a
slope and intercept dummy variable for income may increase the predictive power of future
income when modelling its relationship with credit. The results indicate that neither the
intercept dummy (DUM2) nor slope dummy (LINC*DUM2) coefficients are statistically
significant for any of the variables within the VAR.
When the LTL variable is taken as the dependent variable the R-squared and adjusted R-
squared statistics increase slightly (from about 0.566 to about 0.589 and about 0.39 to about
0.413 respectively). The F-statistic increases slightly from about 3.209 to about 3.346. The
number of statistically significant coefficients of the LINC variable is 1 (the same was also
seen in the basic VAR not including dummy variables), which indicates that the LINC
variable does not succeed in better explaining the relationship of expected future earnings and
credit demand when allowing for a change in the slope and intercept of the LINC variable.
The information criteria for the model as a whole showed the Schwarz criterion increased
from about -22.709 to around -22.564 and the Akaike criterion also increased from about
-26,455 to about -26,452.
It is concluded, mainly from the lack of the statistical significance of both the slope and
intercept dummy variables, and the increase in the Schwarz and Akaike information criterion
that DUM2 and LINC*DUM2 are excluded from the final VAR model.
Estimates
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 01/25/12   Time: 14:08
Sample (adjusted): 1996M03 2011M03
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Included observations: 181 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
D(LCREDIT) D(LCONS) D(LINC) D(PR)
D(LCREDIT(-1)) 0.084353 -0.014563 -0.089349 9.661240
(0.08648) (0.02610) (0.08285) (15.5490)
[ 0.97536] [-0.55801] [-1.07844] [ 0.62134]
D(LCREDIT(-2)) -0.050832 0.004299 0.001124 11.90863
(0.08164) (0.02464) (0.07821) (14.6780)
[-0.62265] [ 0.17451] [ 0.01437] [ 0.81132]
D(LCREDIT(-3)) 0.156722 0.014508 0.094977 16.80540
(0.08105) (0.02446) (0.07764) (14.5715)
[ 1.93374] [ 0.59321] [ 1.22327] [ 1.15331]
D(LCREDIT(-4)) -0.045440 0.023219 -0.009160 -10.06493
(0.08272) (0.02496) (0.07924) (14.8719)
[-0.54934] [ 0.93020] [-0.11560] [-0.67677]
D(LCREDIT(-5)) 0.140144 -0.026047 0.003426 -32.84197
(0.08106) (0.02446) (0.07766) (14.5743)
[ 1.72884] [-1.06482] [ 0.04412] [-2.25341]
D(LCREDIT(-6)) 0.085503 0.053289 -0.075530 4.345705
(0.08296) (0.02503) (0.07947) (14.9148)
[ 1.03071] [ 2.12874] [-0.95040] [ 0.29137]
D(LCREDIT(-7)) 0.060369 -0.038470 0.105940 -3.833094
(0.08539) (0.02577) (0.08181) (15.3533)
[ 0.70694] [-1.49286] [ 1.29499] [-0.24966]
D(LCREDIT(-8)) 0.130494 0.017672 -0.012191 10.63519
(0.08621) (0.02602) (0.08259) (15.5004)
[ 1.51363] [ 0.67929] [-0.14761] [ 0.68612]
D(LCREDIT(-9)) 0.240242 0.028525 0.191301 10.87661
(0.08621) (0.02602) (0.08259) (15.5007)
[ 2.78657] [ 1.09642] [ 2.31619] [ 0.70169]
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D(LCREDIT(-10)) -0.031028 0.006330 -0.038671 10.69865
(0.09033) (0.02726) (0.08653) (16.2400)
[-0.34351] [ 0.23222] [-0.44690] [ 0.65878]
D(LCREDIT(-11)) 0.038146 -0.019568 0.067550 1.096474
(0.08591) (0.02592) (0.08230) (15.4451)
[ 0.44405] [-0.75482] [ 0.82081] [ 0.07099]
D(LCREDIT(-12)) -0.079925 -0.027770 -0.087892 -2.150354
(0.08305) (0.02506) (0.07956) (14.9309)
[-0.96242] [-1.10814] [-1.10477] [-0.14402]
D(LCREDIT(-13)) -0.103239 0.030626 0.044457 -0.615926
(0.08104) (0.02445) (0.07763) (14.5696)
[-1.27399] [ 1.25241] [ 0.57266] [-0.04227]
D(LCONS(-1)) -0.003503 1.029735 0.117674 61.54070
(0.29937) (0.09034) (0.28680) (53.8250)
[-0.01170] [ 11.3983] [ 0.41030] [ 1.14335]
D(LCONS(-2)) -0.390087 0.109748 0.141539 -91.37698
(0.40617) (0.12257) (0.38911) (73.0266)
[-0.96040] [ 0.89540] [ 0.36375] [-1.25128]
D(LCONS(-3)) 0.626897 -1.328752 0.680854 85.81986
(0.40814) (0.12316) (0.39100) (73.3809)
[ 1.53597] [-10.7885] [ 1.74132] [ 1.16951]
D(LCONS(-4)) 0.436452 1.276200 -0.172679 32.76271
(0.57159) (0.17249) (0.54758) (102.767)
[ 0.76358] [ 7.39883] [-0.31535] [ 0.31880]
D(LCONS(-5)) -0.311936 0.040514 0.049880 -201.4573
(0.62377) (0.18823) (0.59757) (112.149)
[-0.50008] [ 0.21524] [ 0.08347] [-1.79634]
D(LCONS(-6)) -0.379202 -1.105610 -0.075713 143.7284
(0.63577) (0.19185) (0.60906) (114.306)
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[-0.59645] [-5.76277] [-0.12431] [ 1.25740]
D(LCONS(-7)) 1.144197 0.938865 0.213792 -23.02250
(0.67987) (0.20516) (0.65131) (122.235)
[ 1.68296] [ 4.57621] [ 0.32825] [-0.18835]
D(LCONS(-8)) -0.401934 0.039369 0.170134 -31.75783
(0.61670) (0.18610) (0.59080) (110.878)
[-0.65175] [ 0.21155] [ 0.28797] [-0.28642]
D(LCONS(-9)) -0.960674 -0.677079 -0.397481 143.0135
(0.62721) (0.18927) (0.60086) (112.767)
[-1.53166] [-3.57730] [-0.66152] [ 1.26822]
D(LCONS(-10)) 1.370631 0.470493 0.139198 -65.97752
(0.58168) (0.17553) (0.55725) (104.582)
[ 2.35632] [ 2.68038] [ 0.24980] [-0.63087]
D(LCONS(-11)) -0.079980 0.044659 0.324208 -29.71539
(0.43527) (0.13135) (0.41699) (78.2588)
[-0.18375] [ 0.34000] [ 0.77750] [-0.37971]
D(LCONS(-12)) -1.796085 -0.260613 0.195797 19.11391
(0.42601) (0.12855) (0.40811) (76.5926)
[-4.21610] [-2.02726] [ 0.47976] [ 0.24955]
D(LCONS(-13)) 0.543726 0.093337 -0.532724 4.095102
(0.34982) (0.10557) (0.33513) (62.8956)
[ 1.55429] [ 0.88416] [-1.58961] [ 0.06511]
D(LINC(-1)) 0.091689 -0.025074 0.663237 13.22872
(0.08945) (0.02699) (0.08569) (16.0817)
[ 1.02507] [-0.92894] [ 7.74003] [ 0.82259]
D(LINC(-2)) 0.009858 0.024527 0.058791 16.90693
(0.09543) (0.02880) (0.09142) (17.1576)
[ 0.10330] [ 0.85170] [ 0.64308] [ 0.98539]
D(LINC(-3)) -0.313719 0.040110 -1.348930 -22.41615
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(0.09862) (0.02976) (0.09448) (17.7313)
[-3.18105] [ 1.34777] [-14.2777] [-1.26422]
D(LINC(-4)) 0.135218 -0.085517 0.811565 41.06800
(0.15906) (0.04800) (0.15238) (28.5977)
[ 0.85011] [-1.78164] [ 5.32598] [ 1.43606]
D(LINC(-5)) -0.015217 0.020462 0.052658 5.693634
(0.15478) (0.04671) (0.14828) (27.8281)
[-0.09832] [ 0.43809] [ 0.35513] [ 0.20460]
D(LINC(-6)) -0.181357 0.051739 -1.293138 -19.46532
(0.16517) (0.04984) (0.15823) (29.6961)
[-1.09801] [ 1.03805] [-8.17247] [-0.65548]
D(LINC(-7)) 0.078328 -0.071527 0.774765 35.67927
(0.19222) (0.05800) (0.18414) (34.5588)
[ 0.40750] [-1.23313] [ 4.20744] [ 1.03242]
D(LINC(-8)) -0.033702 -0.004821 0.008148 -8.885551
(0.15719) (0.04743) (0.15058) (28.2608)
[-0.21441] [-0.10164] [ 0.05411] [-0.31441]
D(LINC(-9)) 0.050192 0.041686 -1.007794 -9.253517
(0.16419) (0.04955) (0.15730) (29.5206)
[ 0.30569] [ 0.84134] [-6.40699] [-0.31346]
D(LINC(-10)) 0.059852 -0.039627 0.608617 20.38196
(0.16468) (0.04969) (0.15776) (29.6079)
[ 0.36345] [-0.79742] [ 3.85784] [ 0.68840]
D(LINC(-11)) -0.058245 -0.004565 -0.017178 -9.635367
(0.09703) (0.02928) (0.09295) (17.4449)
[-0.60029] [-0.15591] [-0.18480] [-0.55233]
D(LINC(-12)) 0.127196 0.006023 -0.551266 0.969864
(0.09796) (0.02956) (0.09385) (17.6126)
[ 1.29844] [ 0.20374] [-5.87415] [ 0.05507]
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D(LINC(-13)) 0.008736 0.003180 0.334985 12.62305
(0.08988) (0.02712) (0.08610) (16.1594)
[ 0.09720] [ 0.11723] [ 3.89051] [ 0.78116]
D(PR(-1)) 0.000618 0.000207 -8.51E-05 0.205092
(0.00050) (0.00015) (0.00048) (0.08959)
[ 1.23968] [ 1.37405] [-0.17835] [ 2.28917]
D(PR(-2)) -0.000185 -0.000195 -0.000343 0.334574
(0.00051) (0.00015) (0.00049) (0.09149)
[-0.36446] [-1.27171] [-0.70402] [ 3.65678]
D(PR(-3)) -0.000138 -0.000321 -4.97E-06 -0.009224
(0.00054) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09740)
[-0.25467] [-1.96437] [-0.00958] [-0.09470]
D(PR(-4)) 0.000418 0.000441 3.26E-05 -0.205920
(0.00054) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09736)
[ 0.77239] [ 2.69859] [ 0.06285] [-2.11503]
D(PR(-5)) 0.000209 -7.17E-05 -0.000228 -0.068204
(0.00057) (0.00017) (0.00055) (0.10254)
[ 0.36601] [-0.41658] [-0.41718] [-0.66513]
D(PR(-6)) -0.001085 -0.000228 0.000164 0.271071
(0.00054) (0.00016) (0.00052) (0.09769)
[-1.99654] [-1.38949] [ 0.31419] [ 2.77488]
D(PR(-7)) -3.41E-05 1.68E-06 -0.000327 -0.054901
(0.00056) (0.00017) (0.00054) (0.10149)
[-0.06035] [ 0.00988] [-0.60432] [-0.54094]
D(PR(-8)) -9.29E-05 0.000107 -0.000203 -0.254323
(0.00053) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09613)
[-0.17377] [ 0.66364] [-0.39631] [-2.64559]
D(PR(-9)) 7.80E-05 0.000136 -0.000204 -0.042335
(0.00055) (0.00017) (0.00053) (0.09924)
[ 0.14134] [ 0.81555] [-0.38493] [-0.42660]
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D(PR(-10)) 0.000474 -0.000251 -0.000268 0.149947
(0.00054) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09637)
[ 0.88383] [-1.55230] [-0.52121] [ 1.55603]
D(PR(-11)) -9.57E-05 -4.32E-05 0.000173 0.042951
(0.00053) (0.00016) (0.00051) (0.09515)
[-0.18083] [-0.27022] [ 0.34179] [ 0.45139]
D(PR(-12)) -6.19E-05 0.000231 0.000234 -0.180848
(0.00050) (0.00015) (0.00048) (0.09064)
[-0.12278] [ 1.51811] [ 0.48376] [-1.99523]
D(PR(-13)) 0.000514 -0.000249 -0.000392 -0.022143
(0.00049) (0.00015) (0.00047) (0.08763)
[ 1.05401] [-1.69321] [-0.83892] [-0.25270]
C 0.001671 0.001105 0.002373 -0.552501
(0.00146) (0.00044) (0.00140) (0.26297)
[ 1.14252] [ 2.50466] [ 1.69343] [-2.10103]
DUM2 -0.021131 -0.000733 0.020363 0.376605
(0.02425) (0.00732) (0.02323) (4.35940)
[-0.87151] [-0.10017] [ 0.87664] [ 0.08639]
LINC*DUM2 0.004248 0.000155 -0.003704 -0.089851
(0.00458) (0.00138) (0.00438) (0.82264)
[ 0.92849] [ 0.11229] [-0.84500] [-0.10922]
R-squared 0.589153 0.764097 0.846114 0.401925
Adj. R-squared 0.413076 0.662995 0.780163 0.145607
Sum sq. resids 0.001096 9.98E-05 0.001006 35.43676
S.E. equation 0.002950 0.000890 0.002826 0.530325
F-statistic 3.345993 7.557721 12.82939 1.568073
Log likelihood 830.4708 1047.327 838.2380 -109.2453
Akaike AIC -8.568739 -10.96494 -8.654563 1.814865
Schwarz SC -7.596820 -9.993023 -7.682644 2.786784
Mean dependent 0.004188 0.003742 0.003573 -0.052486
S.D. dependent 0.003850 0.001533 0.006027 0.573737
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Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.43E-17
Determinant resid covariance 3.36E-18
Log likelihood 2613.921
Akaike information criterion -26.45216
Schwarz criterion -22.56449
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APPENDIX 7 – FIRM GRANGER-CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS
Firm block exogeneity Wald test and Granger causality tests
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Date: 01/19/12   Time: 13:56
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 186
Dependent variable: D(LTL)
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob.
D(LWB) 5.947960 8 0.6531
D(S) 4.512514 8 0.8082
D(PPI) 5.723173 8 0.6782
D(RT) 3.883333 8 0.8675
D(DR) 14.52011 8 0.0692
D(LMIX) 12.92518 8 0.1144
All 57.63259 48 0.1608
Dependent variable: D(LWB)
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob.
D(LTL) 9.159060 8 0.3291
D(S) 2.092768 8 0.9780
D(PPI) 2.345514 8 0.9685
D(RT) 17.83438 8 0.0225
D(DR) 16.62098 8 0.0343
D(LMIX) 9.406662 8 0.3092
All 52.46058 48 0.3052
Dependent variable: D(S)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LTL) 29.45825 8 0.0003
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D(LWB) 12.84131 8 0.1174
D(PPI) 13.42493 8 0.0980
D(RT) 5.331706 8 0.7216
D(DR) 5.870095 8 0.6618
D(LMIX) 29.48619 8 0.0003
All 84.34230 48 0.0009
Dependent variable: D(PPI)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LTL) 11.14187 8 0.1938
D(LWB) 7.462586 8 0.4876
D(S) 8.022726 8 0.4313
D(RT) 6.779875 8 0.5606
D(DR) 3.515937 8 0.8979
D(LMIX) 10.88817 8 0.2081
All 39.93346 48 0.7897
Dependent variable: D(RT)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LTL) 9.075099 8 0.3360
D(LWB) 7.639438 8 0.4695
D(S) 13.08530 8 0.1089
D(PPI) 9.012719 8 0.3412
D(DR) 39.12434 8 0.0000
D(LMIX) 9.704466 8 0.2864
All 96.11324 48 0.0000
Dependent variable: D(DR)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LTL) 7.539587 8 0.4797
D(LWB) 7.110714 8 0.5247
D(S) 3.369610 8 0.9091
D(PPI) 6.032580 8 0.6436
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D(RT) 18.58126 8 0.0173
D(LMIX) 7.197311 8 0.5155
All 53.37017 48 0.2755
Dependent variable: D(LMIX)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LTL) 12.49059 8 0.1306
D(LWB) 5.617179 8 0.6900
D(S) 4.730909 8 0.7859
D(PPI) 5.782416 8 0.6716
D(RT) 3.415110 8 0.9057
D(DR) 14.64514 8 0.0664
All 58.99442 48 0.1328
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APPENDIX 8
HOUSEHOLD GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS
Household block exogeneity Wald and Granger causality test results
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Date: 01/25/12   Time: 17:59
Sample: 1995M01 2011M03
Included observations: 181
Dependent variable: D(LCREDIT)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LCONS) 50.49846 13 0.0000
D(LINC) 28.69280 13 0.0072
D(PR) 8.784235 13 0.7890
All 77.26037 39 0.0003
Dependent variable: D(LCONS)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LCREDIT) 16.34071 13 0.2312
D(LINC) 7.966908 13 0.8457
D(PR) 18.02979 13 0.1564
All 44.03528 39 0.2669
Dependent variable: D(LINC)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LCREDIT) 10.00189 13 0.6938
D(LCONS) 32.05411 13 0.0024
D(PR) 4.815112 13 0.9790
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All 66.59451 39 0.0038
Dependent variable: D(PR)
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
D(LCREDIT) 11.49300 13 0.5696
D(LCONS) 15.01111 13 0.3067
D(LINC) 7.522106 13 0.8733
All 32.65931 39 0.7531
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APPENDIX 9
FIRM IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
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APPENDIX 10
HOUSEHOLD IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCREDIT) to D(LCREDIT)
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCREDIT) to D(LCONS)
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCREDIT) to D(LINC)
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCREDIT) to D(PR)
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCONS) to D(LCREDIT)
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCONS) to D(LCONS)
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCONS) to D(LINC)
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LCONS) to D(PR)
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LINC) to D(LCREDIT)
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LINC) to D(LCONS)
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LINC) to D(LINC)
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
5 10 15 20
Response of D(LINC) to D(PR)
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
5 10 15 20
Response of D(PR) to D(LCREDIT)
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
5 10 15 20
Response of D(PR) to D(LCONS)
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
5 10 15 20
Response of D(PR) to D(LINC)
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
5 10 15 20
Response of D(PR) to D(PR)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
178 | P a g e
APPENDIX 11
FIRM VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION RESULTS
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APPENDIX 12
HOUSEHOLD VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION RESULTS
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